State v. Muller, No. 88221
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
| Writing for the Court | GRIMES; KOGAN |
| Citation | 693 So.2d 976 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly S264 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Raymond G. MULLER, Appellee. |
| Docket Number | No. 88221 |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1997 |
Page 976
v.
Raymond G. MULLER, Appellee.
Page 977
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Patricia E. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, and Bernie McCabe, State Attorney and C. Marie King, Assistant State Attorney, Clearwater, for Appellant.
Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender and Anne M. Sylvester, Sixth Judicial Circuit, New Port Richey, for Appellee.
GRIMES, Justice.
The State appeals the decision in State v. Muller, 681 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), declaring section 316.193(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), to be unconstitutionally vague. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
Section 316.193(6)(d), which is a subdivision of the driving under the influence (DUI) statute, reads in pertinent part:
(d) In addition to the penalty imposed under paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c), the court shall also order the impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle that was driven by, or in the actual physical control of, the person who is convicted, unless the court finds that the family of the owner of the vehicle has no other public or private means of transportation.
The length of the impoundment or immobilization depends upon the extent of previous DUI convictions.
Raymond Muller was arrested for DUI. Muller pled no contest and was placed on probation after being adjudicated guilty. The trial court declined to impose the additional penalty of vehicle impoundment, finding that the impoundment provision was unconstitutional.
The State appealed the trial court's determination of the statute's unconstitutionality. The district court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that section 316.193(6)(d) was unconstitutionally vague because it provides no mechanism for enforcement and fails to define "immobilization."
A statute is generally considered vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. Warren v. State, 572 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1991). In analyzing section 316.193(6)(d), the district court of appeal attempted to fit its holding into the traditional vagueness analysis by citing to Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235 (Fla.1995). However, the issue in Bouters was whether the statutory definition of "harasses" in the stalking statute provided defendants with adequate notice of what conduct was proscribed. In contrast to the statute challenged in...
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Sieniarecki v. State, No. SC94800.
...that "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness"); see also State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976 (Fla.1997) (holding that section 316.193(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), which requires impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle driven by a pe......
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L.B. v. State, No. 89424
...vague if it "does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct." See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976, 977 (Fla.1997). While we agree that section 790.001(13) is not "a paradigm of legislative drafting," State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388, 1390 ......
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State v. Darynani, No. 4D99-4172.
...vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976 (Fla.1997). Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, a dictionary may be consulted to ascertain the plain and ordinary m......
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Epstein v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, No. 4D13–4066.
...U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). This also holds true specifically for due process challenges. See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla.1997) (holding that a defendant lacked standing to challenge a violation of the due process rights of the non-defendant owners of a......
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Sieniarecki v. State, No. SC94800.
...that "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness"); see also State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976 (Fla.1997) (holding that section 316.193(6)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), which requires impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle driven by a pe......
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L.B. v. State, No. 89424
...vague if it "does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct." See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976, 977 (Fla.1997). While we agree that section 790.001(13) is not "a paradigm of legislative drafting," State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388, 1390 ......
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State v. Darynani, No. 4D99-4172.
...vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976 (Fla.1997). Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, a dictionary may be consulted to ascertain the plain and ordinary m......
-
Epstein v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, No. 4D13–4066.
...U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). This also holds true specifically for due process challenges. See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla.1997) (holding that a defendant lacked standing to challenge a violation of the due process rights of the non-defendant owners of a......