State v. Muller, 23360.

• Decision Date: 01 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 23360.,23360.
• Citation: 2005 SD 66,698 N.W.2d 285
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Marty MULLER, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

698 N.W.2d 285

2005 SD 66

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Marty MULLER, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 23360.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued April 27, 2005.

Decided June 1, 2005.

Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Sherri Sundem Wald, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, SD, for plaintiff and appellant.

Scott R. Bratland of Austin, Hinderaker, Hopper, Strait & Bratland, Watertown, SD, for defendant and appellee.

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained during a traffic stop in Watertown, South Dakota. Defendant alleged the traffic stop was in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, as the officer's stop was based on erroneous information relayed by the Watertown police dispatch alleging Defendant's license plates were expired. As a consequence of the traffic stop, Defendant was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence and driving under revocation. During the traffic stop, Defendant alleged he had renewed his license plates in Milbank, South Dakota. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court held that a traffic stop and subsequent arrest are invalid when an arresting officer acts upon information in records, which, though correct when put into records, has been erroneously retained in records through the fault of the State record keeping agency.

[¶ 2.] We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 3.] On November 22, 2003, at approximately 1:42 a.m., Marty Muller (Defendant) was observed driving a yellow Firebird in Watertown, South Dakota, by city police officer Tim Toomey. Officer Toomey's attention was drawn to Defendant's vehicle because of a loud exhaust system and because it was traveling ten miles per hour on snow packed roads. Officer Toomey followed Defendant's vehicle and observed it make several turns, traveling northbound, then westbound, turning southbound and westbound again. The license plate on Defendant's vehicle was covered with snow that obscured the lower half of the plate where current registration stickers are normally located. However, Officer Toomey was able to see the numbers on the plate and initiated a license plate check. Officer Toomey was informed by the Watertown police dispatch that the license plate had expired in March 2003.

[¶ 4.] Based on this information, Officer Toomey initiated a traffic stop by engaging the vehicle stop lights on his patrol car. Defendant's vehicle traveled one block to Third Street, turned northbound and turned into a parking lot before stopping. Once the vehicle stopped, Officer Toomey approached Defendant's vehicle and wiped the snow off of the license plate and found a registration sticker that appeared to be current and valid.

[¶ 5.] Officer Toomey then approached Defendant's driver side window in order to explain why he had initiated the traffic stop. When Officer Toomey made eye contact with Defendant, he immediately noticed Defendant's eyes were blood shot. As Officer Toomey leaned down to speak with Defendant in his vehicle, he noted an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Defendant's vehicle.

[¶ 6.] Defendant was asked for his driver's license, but was able to produce only a South Dakota identification card. Defendant stated he had no other identification with him. Defendant was also unable to produce proof of registration, but was able to produce an expired insurance card. During the conversation, Officer Toomey observed Defendant's actions were slow, and his speech was slurred.

[¶ 7.] Officer Toomey then asked Defendant to come back to the patrol car in order to determine why Defendant's plates were coming back as expired. As Defendant walked toward the patrol car, he was staggering. Once in the patrol car, Officer Toomey noted an odor of alcoholic beverage on Defendant's breath as he spoke. Officer Toomey requested a driver's license check on Defendant, and was told by dispatch that Defendant's license was revoked. Defendant alleged he had renewed his plates in Milbank, South Dakota, but was unable to produce a current registration.

[¶ 8.] Based on Officer Toomey's observations of Defendant's slurred speech, staggering, and the odor of alcohol on Defendant's breath, additional officers were called to the scene to assist with field sobriety tests. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence under SDCL 32-23-1, and driving under revocation under SDCL 32-12-65(1). The State gave Defendant notice via a Part II Information that it intended to seek revocation of driving privileges under SDCL 32-23-4 for a third DUI offense.

[¶ 9.] At a motion to suppress hearing, Officer Toomey testified he pulled Defendant over based on the expired plate check, and not because the license plate was partially obscured by snow or because of the loud exhaust. Officer Toomey testified he was still uncertain why Defendant's license plates had come back as expired when Defendant had what appeared to be a current registration sticker displayed on the plates. Officer Toomey testified that he had never encountered a situation where a license plate check came back as expired and the vehicle had what appeared to be a valid sticker displayed on the license plate. Officer Toomey also testified he had dispatch run the registration in addition to the plate, and the registration still came back expired. Finally, Officer Toomey testified he did not know whether or not the registration sticker was valid, only that it appeared valid to him and that the dispatch report he obtained after the arrest still indicated expired plates.

[¶ 10.] The trial court found that Officer Toomey's traffic stop was based on the information provided by police dispatch. In its conclusions of law, the trial court held the Watertown police dispatch office is an agency of the State of South Dakota. The trial court also held the computer inaccuracy, even if unintended, amounted to a capricious disregard for the rights of Defendant. The trial court held a stop and subsequent arrest are invalid when an officer acts upon information in records, which though correct when put into records, no longer applies and which through the fault of the system, has been retained in the records. Finally, the trial court held the stop of Defendant's vehicle was a violation of Defendant's constitutional and statutory rights and entered an order suppressing all evidence obtained during the traffic stop.

[¶ 11.] The State's motion to reconsider was denied by the trial court. The State raises one issue on appeal:

The trial court erred by granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 12.] We traditionally review a trial court's decision to suppress evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Wilson, 2000 SD 133, ¶ 7, 618 N.W.2d 513, 516 (citing State v. Durke, 1999 SD 39, ¶ 11, 593 N.W.2d 407, 409). However, a trial court's decision based on an error of law can be by definition an abuse of discretion. State v. Vento, 1999 SD 158, ¶ 5, 604 N.W.2d 468, 469. "Our review of a motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right is a question of law examined de novo." State v. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d 486, 488 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996) (proper standard of review of Fourth Amendment challenges is de novo); United States v. Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1375 (9th Cir.1993); State v. Hirning, 1999 SD 53, ¶ 9, 592 N.W.2d 600, 603.) "The existence of reasonable suspicion is a question of law which is fully reviewable by this Court" under the de novo standard of review. State v. Herrboldt, 1999 SD 55, ¶ 7, 593 N.W.2d 805, 807 (quoting State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 898 (S.D.1993)).

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

[¶ 13.] The trial court erred by granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

[¶ 14.] The text of the Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

US Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies when a vehicle is stopped by law enforcement. Vento, 1999 SD 158, ¶ 8,604 N.W.2d at 470 (citing State v. Richards, 1998 SD 128, ¶ 11, 588 N.W.2d 594, 596 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979))). An officer is required to have a "specific and articulate suspicion of a violation before an automobile stop will be justified" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (quoting State v. Cuny, 534 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1995)). The standard for determining whether a factual basis existed for the traffic stop is as follows:

While the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon "specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." State v. Herrboldt, 1999 SD 55, ¶ 7, 593 N.W.2d 805, 808 (quoting Spenner v. City of Sioux Falls, 1998 SD 56, ¶ 14, 580 N.W.2d 606, 611). Under these standards, it is well established that a traffic violation, however minor, creates sufficient cause to stop the driver of a vehicle." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95-[96] (1996); State v. Kenyon, 2002 SD 111, ¶ 16, 651 N.W.2d 269, 274.

State v. Akuba, 2004 SD 94, ¶ 15, 686 N.W.2d 406, 413 (quoting State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, ¶ 16, 668 N.W.2d 89, 95).

[¶ 15.] We have previously held that an officer's subjective beliefs about a mistake of law, or his intentions, cannot invalidate a stop, as long as the circumstances of the stop, when viewed objectively, justified the action. Vento, 1999 SD 158, ¶ 11,...