State v. Munchrath

Citation78 Iowa 268,43 N.W. 211
PartiesSTATE v. MUNCHRATH.
Decision Date03 October 1889
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Woodbury county; G. W. WAKEFIELD, Judge.

Fred Munchrath, Jr., John Arensdorf, and others, were jointly indicted for the murder of George C. Haddock, committed in Sioux City on the 3d day of August, 1886. Separate trials were demanded. The first trial of Arensdorf was had at the March term, 1887, of the Woodbury district court, and resulted in a disagreement of the jury. The trial of Munchrath was commenced on the 7th day of the next September, and resulted in his conviction of the crime of manslaughter. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and he was adjudged to be imprisoned in the penitentiary at Fort Madison for the term of four years, and to pay the costs of the trial, taxed at $896.65. From that judgment Munchrath appeals.Argo & McDuffie and C. C. Treadway, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

ROBINSON, J.

1. Appellant complains of the action of the district court in overruling each of 14 challenges of jurors for cause. During the impaneling of the jury he exhausted his 20 peremptory challenges, but the jury, as finally constituted, contained three of the jurors he had challenged for cause. The statute requires that a challenge for cause “must distinctly specify the facts constituting the causes of challenge.” Code, § 4405. Among the causes for challenging a juror, specified in the section named, is the following: (11) Having formed or expressed such an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner as would prevent him from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the trial.” The corresponding cause for challenge contained in the Revision was as follows: (8) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief that the prisoner is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged.” Revision, § 4771. It will be noticed that under the existing statute no opinion which a juror entertains disqualifies him unless it “would prevent him from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the trial.” Of the challenges for cause several are insufficient, for the reason that the necessary facts are not stated. The challenge of William Gordon was in the following language: “The defendant challenges the juror on his answers for cause.” The juror testified that he had no knowledge of the facts in the case excepting what he had read and heard; that he read all the testimony during the trial of Arensdorf; that he had been acquainted with Haddock, and attended his church; that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of defendant which he then retained, and that he would go into the jury-room with that opinion in his mind. His examination covers nearly a page and a half of the printed abstract, and contains numerous questions and answers. Some of his answers certainly show no cause for challenge. It was the duty of defendant to “distinctly specify” which of the several facts disclosed by the answers he relied upon as a cause of challenge. The challenges of Luse, Barr, Goodrich, and Allen were in substance and effect the same as the challenge of Gordon, and insufficient to require further consideration. We do not hold that the facts constituting a cause of challenge should be stated in the language of the statute, but we do hold that the challenge should show with reasonable certainty the ground upon which it is based. That, at least, is due to the court and the adverse party, and is necessary for the proper administration of justice.

2. The challenges for cause not already considered will be treated as sufficient in form, although it is doubtful whether some of them meet the statutory requirement. All seem to be founded upon subdivision 11 of section 4405 of the Code. Several of the jurors to whom they were directed stated in substance that they had read what was claimed to be all the evidence given on the trial of Arensdorf, as it was published in one or more of the Sioux City papers; that they had talked about the case, and had formed an opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case. Several stated that it would require evidence to remove that opinion. One stated that his opinion was unqualified and unconditional, and that it would occupy his mind more or less during the trial; but he also stated that before he changed his opinion he “would want to hear some testimony.” Most of the jurors stated that they thought they could try the case and render a verdict according to the evidence submitted on the trial. None showed any ill feeling towards defendant; none manifested any other desire than that justice should be done; and none had any personal knowledge of the facts in the case. As we view the record in this case, we are required to determine whether a person otherwise unobjectionable is disqualified from acting as a juror on the trial of one defendant if he has formed an opinion as to his guilt or innocence from having read what is claimed to be a full report of the evidence given on the trial of another defendant for the same offense. If he had served as a juror in the last-named case he would be disqualified by the statute. Code, § 4405, subd. 8. The same would have been true had he served on the grand jury which found the indictment, or on the coroner's jury which inquired into the death of the person whose death is the subject of the indictment, or if he had been on a jury formerly sworn to try the same indictment and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict, after the cause was submitted to it, or if he had served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an offense. Code, § 4405, subds. 7, 9, 10. In all these cases the juror is conclusively presumed, on proper objection, to be disqualified from acting as a juror by reason of his knowledge of the facts in the case. But the statute does not in terms disqualify one who has read or heard a report of one trial from acting as juror on another for the same offense. A person may form an opinion from reading newspaper accounts of an alleged crime, or from hearing others speak of it, and not be disqualified thereby from acting as a juror, provided the opinion so formed is not of such a character as to interfere with the rendering of a true verdict on the evidence submitted on the trial. State v. Vatter, 71 Iowa, 558, 32 N. W. Rep. 506;State v. Sopher, 70 Iowa, 496, 30 N. W. Rep. 917;State v. Bruce, 48 Iowa, 534. It is the duty of the court, and not of the juror, to determine whether or not his opinion disqualifies him to act as a juror. “In all challenges the court shall determine the law and the fact.” Code, § 4409. Other witnesses than the juror may be examined as to his qualification. Id. § 4408. It is the duty of the trial court to decide as to the fact of qualification of the juror from a consideration of his examination as a whole, and from the consideration of such other evidence and circumstances as may be relevant and tend to aid it in reaching a just conclusion. A conscientious juror may be in doubt as to whether the opinion he has formed will affect his verdict, while the court may be entirely satisfied that he would discharge the duties of a juror impartially, and in all respects as required by law. Another juror might believe and state that he could listen to the evidence and render a verdict without regard to his previously formed opinion, while the court might be entirely satisfied from the examination as a whole that his opinion could not be readily overcome, and that he could not discharge the duties of a juror properly. The court might be greatly aided in its determination of the fact by the appearance of the juror, his manner while undergoing examination, and circumstances surrounding the trial; and in cases of doubt this court will not interfere with the decision of the court below.

In this case much of the evidence given on the trial of Arensdorf must have been given on the trial of appellant, but it was not claimed on either trial that appellant fired...

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3 cases
  • State v. Wheelock, No. 41521.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 3, 1934
    ...opinion, has been held to be no insuperable objection to serving on a jury. State v. Smith, 73 Iowa, 32, 34 N. W. 597;State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 43 N. W. 211;State v. Lindsay, 161 Iowa, 39, 140 N. W. 903;State v. Ralston, 139 Iowa, 44, 116 N. W. 1058;State v. Brady, 100 Iowa, 191, 69......
  • State v. Bittner
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 21, 1929
    ...or the crime of conspiracy itself (citing cases).” The instant indictment says nothing about a conspiracy. See State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 43 N. W. 211. It was not necessary so to do to make evidence of a conspiracy competent. The indictment does not name any other person except the d......
  • State v. Munchrath
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • October 3, 1889

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