State v. Munoz, 006598

• Citation: 991 S.W.2d 818
• Decision Date: 17 February 1999
• Docket Number: 006598
• Parties: IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. 0065-98 THE STATE OF TEXAS v. ALFRED DeLEON MUNOZ, Appellee ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HIDALGO COUNTY McCORMICK, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Mansfield, Keller, Holland, Womack and Keasler, JJ., joined. Meyers, Price and Johnson, JJ., concur in the result. O P I N I O N This case requires the Court to decide issues of federal constitutional law. Therefore, we are obligated to follow controlling United States Supreme Court federal constitutional precedents. Appellee was indicted on one count of deadly conduct and three counts of attempted murder. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment based on federal constitutional speedy trial grounds and the State appealed. Relying on its prior decision in Melendez v. State, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. State v. Munoz, 960 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1997); Melendez v. State, 929 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.). We granted discretionary review petitions filed by the Hidalgo County District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW The essential ingredient of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee is "orderly expedition and not mere speed." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459-60, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee "would appear to guarantee a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposition of the charges against him"). Since 1972 United States Supreme Court precedent has required courts to analyze federal constitutional speedy trial claims "on an ad hoc basis" by weighing and then balancing four factors: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. 0065-98

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

ALFRED DeLEON MUNOZ, Appellee

ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

HIDALGO COUNTY

McCORMICK, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Mansfield, Keller, Holland, Womack and Keasler, JJ., joined. Meyers, Price and Johnson, JJ., concur in the result.

O P I N I O N

This case requires the Court to decide issues of federal constitutional law. Therefore, we are obligated to follow controlling United States Supreme Court federal constitutional precedents.

Appellee was indicted on one count of deadly conduct and three counts of attempted murder. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment based on federal constitutional speedy trial grounds and the State appealed. Relying on its prior decision in Melendez v. State, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. State v. Munoz, 960 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1997); Melendez v. State, 929 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.). We granted discretionary review petitions filed by the Hidalgo County District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The essential ingredient of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee is "orderly expedition and not mere speed." United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459-60, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee "would appear to guarantee a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposition of the charges against him"). Since 1972 United States Supreme Court precedent has required courts to analyze federal constitutional speedy trial claims "on an ad hoc basis" by weighing and then balancing four factors: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the accused. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-17 (1972). This balancing test requires weighing case-by-case "the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant." Barker, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116. No single Barker factor is a "necessary or sufficient condition to the finding" of a speedy trial violation. Barker, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. The "related" Barker factors "must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id.

In reviewing the trial court's decision on appellee's federal constitutional speedy trial claim, the Court of Appeals applied a "bifurcated standard of review" meaning "an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components" and a "de novo" standard for the legal components of the trial court's decision. Munoz, 960 S.W.2d at 196. Based on this Court's recent decisions in Guzman v. State and Johnson v. State, we agree this is the appropriate standard of review. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) (reviewing courts should "afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record supports"); Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) (in reviewing trial courts' decisions on federal constitutional speedy trial claims, appellate courts may conduct de novo review by independently weighing and balancing the four Barker factors). This disposes of the District Attorney's first ground for review which requests this Court to clarify the standard of review in cases like this.

Most of the facts relevant to appellee's speedy trial claim are undisputed. The issue here mostly involves the legal significance of these facts to this claim. Because appellee won in the trial court on his speedy trial claim, we must presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact issues in appellee's favor, and we are required to defer to these implied findings of fact that the record supports. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.

LENGTH OF DELAY

The length of delay is a "triggering mechanism" for analysis of the other Barker factors. Barker, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. "Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other [Barker] factors that go into the balance." Id. "Presumptive prejudice" does not "necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 528 fn 1 (1992). This Barker factor "is actually a double enquiry." Doggett, 120 L.Ed.2d at 528.

"Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay, (citation omitted), since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a `speedy' trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Id.

In this case, the State concedes and the Court of Appeals decided "a seventeen-month delay between the date of [appellee's] arrest, February 11, 1995, and the date of his speedy trial hearing, July 25, 1996, is sufficient to trigger review of the remaining [Barker] factors." Munoz, 960 S.W.2d at 197. We also will consider this delay sufficient to trigger consideration of the other Barker factors.

REASON FOR THE DELAY

Under Barker "different weights should be assigned to different reasons" for the delay. Barker, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. A "deliberate attempt to delay the trial" should be weighed heavily against the government. Id.1 A "more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighed [against the government] less heavily." Id. A valid reason for the delay should not be weighed against the government at all. Id. (valid reason for the delay "should serve to justify appropriate delay"). And delay which is attributable in whole or in part to the defendant may even constitute a waiver of a speedy trial claim. Barker, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116 (delay attributable to defendant constitutes waiver of speedy trial); see also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26, 38 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (defendant may be "disentitled to the speedy-trial safeguard in the case of a delay for which he has, or shares, responsibility").

During the hearing on appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment based on speedy trial grounds, the prosecution attributed the entire seventeen-month delay to an overcrowded court docket and ongoing plea negotiations. The record reflects the prosecution made four plea offers to appellee during this period of time. Each succeeding plea offer was more beneficial to appellee than the previous plea offer.

"Q. Okay. And then would you agree that if that was in November, then in January, or at a later time, the negotiations came to the point where it was eight years in prison with no affirmative finding. Do you recall that made to you?

"A. [APPELLEE'S LAWYER] I recall the longer my client was in jail the lower and lower the recommendations were being made, to the final point of after he had been in jail to 17, almost 18 months now, that the recommendation was three years TDC with an affirmative finding, half time, which--which--although--although--which is often considered by many people time served.2"

The parties agreed on a plea after the prosecution's fourth plea offer. The case was set for a hearing on appellee's plea for June 18, 1996. However, at the June 18th hearing appellee reneged on the deal and asked the prosecution for a more beneficial plea. The prosecution refused and informed the trial court there would be no guilty plea. The trial court set a trial date for August 19, 1996.

"Q. Okay. And what was your--what was your offer in June of this year?

"A. In June of this year, that was the three years with the lesser offense on the affirmative finding and things of that nature.

"Q. Is it true, Mr. Thompson, in June of this year this case was set for a plea of guilty?

"A. That's true. This case, I believe, was set twice in the month of June. I show that it was set June 18th for a plea of guilty. And I believe there was one prior setting--or earlier setting in June of this year where the case--where the case was set.

"Q. Okay. What is your understanding of why the case was set for a plea of guilty?

"A. My understanding was that the defendant was going to plea (sic) guilty at that time.

"Q. Who did you get that understanding from?

"A. From the defendant's attorney.

"Q. Is that Mr. Guerra?

"A. That is Mr. Guerra.

"Q. Can you tell the Court, Mr. Thompson, what happened when it was set for a plea of guilty in June of this year?

"A. My recollection is when it was set for a plea of guilty on June 18th of this year, that we went in to court. I had put together the evidence package, State's Exhibit No. 2, tendered--given the defense counsel the stipulation and the waivers and all those things, and then--then while we were there in court, the defendant decided to reject--that he didn't want three years, and Mr. Guerra came back to me and said, Give him two years. At that particular time, the judge then came out on the bench. It was announced that there wasn't going to be a plea of guilty, that the defendant wanted a trial. And this case was then set for trial on the 19th of August."

The prosecution, appellee and appellee's attorney all testified the entire seventeen-month delay was attributable to ongoing good faith plea negotiations.3

The prosecution testified:

"Q. At this time could you expand on what the State's excuse or reason for this defendant not being brought to...