State v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 15 July 1938
• Citation: 124 Conn. 554,1 A.2d 274
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. MURPHY et al.

1 A.2d 274

124 Conn. 554

STATE v. MURPHY et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 15, 1938

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Arthur F. Ells, Judge.

John J Murphy and others were convicted of conspiracy and other crimes, after various motions and demurrers attacking the amended information were denied and overruled and the issues were tried to the jury, and the named defendant appeals.

No error.

The Supreme Court of Errors did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial because of remarks by state's attorney that state's witness whose credibility had been attacked, had never been known by state's attorney to tell jury an untruth, where court cautioned jury to disregard the remarks.

John A. Danaher, of Hartford, for appellant Murphy.

Hugh M. Alcorn, Hugh Meade Alcorn, Jr., and Harold E. Mitchell all of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

BROWN Judge.

The information in the first court, upon which the defendant Murphy was convicted, charges that he and the fifteen other defendants, all members of a truck drivers' labor union of which he was the treasurer-secretary and business agent, conspired together to violate § 6194 of the General Statutes against breach of the peace and § 6208 against intimidation, and for the purpose of preventing by threats and intimidation the use of the highways by trucks operated by others than those belonging to the union, feloniously conspired to compel truck owners against their will to employ only union drivers and nonunion drivers against their will to join the union, or abstain from driving trucks upon the highways; and to accomplish this purpose persistently followed numerous motor trucks in a disorderly manner in motor vehicles, with intent to intimidate and injure the owners and operators and their property. The information goes on to enumerate in detail twelve different incidents involving trucks, their drivers and owners, upon highways in Hartford and vicinity during the period from September 11th to 27th, 1937, alleged to have transpired in pursuance of the conspiracy. Typical of the conduct of the defendants described therein are such acts as: forcibly stopping and diverting trucks miles from their course; detaining them for hours or even days; then compelling drivers and owners to accede to unionization demands as the condition of their trucks' release; damaging truck mechanisms; detaining drivers against their will; making threats and using intimidation to compel owners to employ only union labor, and drivers to join the union; carrying drivers away from and forcing them to abandon their trucks; following trucks persistently in a disorderly manner in motor vehicles fueled at the expense of the union; threatening injury to the trucks to intimidate the owners and drivers and make them abstain from operating; stoning and damaging delivery trucks and threatening and intimidating their drivers to compel them and the owners to abstain from operating; and beating and injuring and threatening and intimidating a delivery truck driver with similar purpose.

The trial court has found that the State offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that all of the defendants were members of the union, that all were on strike and actively interested in making it fully effective, that those of them other than the defendant Murphy to whose conduct in this regard we refer below, were actively engaged in picket duty, that in the course thereof these defendants actually participated in one or more of the twelve incidents alleged in the information, each of which in itself constituted unlawful conduct on the part of the participants, and that they had with criminal intent agreed together to perpetrate these unlawful acts to accomplish their purpose.

The claim of the defendant Murphy, hereinafter referred to as the accused, however, is that even though all this be true as to the other defendants, there was no sufficient evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have found that he actually participated in any of these twelve picketing occurrences or engaged in active picketing at any time, and that there being no direct evidence of his agreeing to such conduct, the case against him is one of ‘ inference upon inference, without basis in fact either as to guilty knowledge or criminal participation,’ and that by reason of this the evidence cannot support the verdict of guilty against him. His contention upon appeal, as it was at the trial, is that by virtue of his position as an officer of the union properly discharging his official duty to it, he was a party to no illegal activity, but stands rather as an innocent victim of circumstances because of unlawful acts by others for which he is in no way responsible. Among other facts which the trial court has found that the State offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved are these: that as treasurer he had complete control of the union's funds and could have refused to make disbursements to the pickets for gas and oil, but in fact continued such payments throughout the period of the strike in the total amount of $1454.76; that shortly after the arrest of two of the other defendants for beating a nonunion driver during one of the twelve episodes alleged, he provided cash bail for them from money he had previously drawn from the union's account at the bank in anticipation of the arrest of union men, and later fearing further arrests drew $500 more for the same purpose which was on his person when he himself was apprehended; that he told Detective Hickey that he knew two of the trucks diverted by the union pickets and detained at the union headquarters for seven days were being held; that one of the other defendants told Hickey that on September 25th, 1937, the defendant said to him, ‘ What the hell's the matter with you, why aren't you chasing those Fox trucks?’ ; and that the defendant also told Hickey when arrested that he could ‘ settle the strike in ten minutes' if released.

Whether this was sufficient to afford a basis as to his guilty knowledge and participation, we need not inquire, for it was supplemented by the following among other facts which the State offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved of his actual participation; that he was actually present during the picketing near Fox's warehouse twice during the forenoon and again talking to one of the other defendants in the afternoon of September 25th, 1937, on the morning of which day one of the twelve episodes occurred; that he was also present on Maple Avenue in Hartford for some fifteen minutes shortly after midnight on one of the earlier days of the strike where he conferred with groups from a large crowd of pickets who were engaged in stopping trucks, and that when later questioned as to the lawfulness of his activities on that occasion, he replied: ‘ Well, you have got me there’ ; and that on the night of September 14th, 1937, when two trucks stopped by the pickets had been diverted to union headquarters and the drivers brought there and forced to join the union, its secretary asked the accused whether the trucks might proceed, who, upon learning that they belonged to Greer Brothers, exclaimed, ‘ we have been laying for Greer for a long time’ and the trucks ‘ won't move out of here tonight unless Greer signs up,’ which Greer subsequently did against his will after being told this by the accused over the telephone, this being another of the twelve episodes. Furthermore he alone of all the defendants failed to take the witness stand.

We have not before us a printed transcript of the evidence. Section 5692 of the General Statutes requires that upon an appeal from the denial of a motion to set a verdict aside the evidence shall be printed at the expense of the appellant. An examination of the claims of proof of the parties, the charge of the trial court and the briefs of counsel, satisfy us that this is not a case in which we should, if we ever ought to, waive compliance with the requirement that the evidence be printed to present such a ruling for review. The denial of the motion to set the verdict aside is not before us for consideration.

The accused in his brief claims three particulars in which he was entitled to have the information made more specific under his motions for a bill of particulars, the denial of which is the first error assigned on his appeal from the judgment. The first, relating to the names of trucking concerns alleged to have been conspired against, falls strictly within our ruling in State v. Pallotti, 119 Conn. 70 73, 174 A. 74, where the defendant's motion for a specific allegation of the names of officials and voters conspired against was held properly denied. Supreme Court Record and Briefs, Vol. A-60, page 6. The second, as to what defendants were the participants in the overt acts alleged, and the third as to whether defendants were those who did them, were also properly denied. What we said in the Pallotti Case is equally true here, the information ‘ stated the circumstances of the offense with considerable particularity; nor does it at all appear that it failed to inform the accused of the ‘ nature and cause of the accusation,’ Constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 9, or give him sufficient information to enable him to prepare his defense. The accused was not entitled to the bill of particulars requested as a matter of right. * * * The record fails wholly to disclose that any harm could have come to the accused from that denial.' (page 75.) The court did not err in denying the motion in the exercise of its discretion. Dombroski v. Abrams, 116 Conn. 454, 455, 165 A. 457; Prince v. Takash, 75 Conn....