State v. Murphy

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: HALL
• Citation: State v. Murphy, 463 So.2d 812 (La. App. 1985)
• Decision Date: 23 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 16616-KA,16616-KA
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Donald Ray MURPHY, Appellant.

Page 812

463 So.2d 812

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Donald Ray MURPHY, Appellant.

No. 16616-KA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Second Circuit.

Jan. 23, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1985.

Kidd & Kidd by Paul Henry Kidd, Monroe, for appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, James Norris, Dist. Atty., Earl Cox, Asst. Dist. Atty., Monroe, for appellee.

Before HALL, MARVIN and NORRIS, JJ.

HALL, Judge.

The defendant, Donald Ray Murphy, appeals his conviction of armed robbery, LSA-R.S. 14:64. The defendant was sentenced to serve 20 years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we affirm.

Facts

On the morning of October 28, 1980, two black males entered the Stop N Go convenience store on Coleman Avenue in West Monroe, Louisiana. One of the men pointed a Marlin 22 caliber rifle at the store clerk and told everyone in the store to lie down on the floor. At that point, the men removed approximately $100 in cash from the cash register and fled the store in a silver 1976 Chevrolet Malibu Classic.

The defendant and Kenneth Ray McCarter were arrested the next day in Rankin County, Mississippi. Three police officers from West Monroe, Louisiana interviewed the defendant and McCarter in the Rankin County, Mississippi jail. McCarter confessed to participating with the defendant in the armed robbery of the Stop N Go convenience store in West Monroe. According to McCarter, it was defendant Murphy who produced the gun at the robbery.

Defendant Murphy also gave a statement to the West Monroe police officers confessing his participation with McCarter in the armed robbery of the convenience store. However, the defendant claimed that McCarter was the man who pulled the rifle out.

After a jury trial, the defendant and McCarter were found guilty of armed robbery by a vote of 10 to 2. The defendant entered a motion for a new trial which was subsequently denied by the trial court. On appeal, the defendant filed the following assignments of error:

"(1) The trial court erred in compelling defendant to stand trial wearing jail clothing and restrained by shackles.;

"(2) The trial court erred in finding that defendant was stopped, searched, and arrested with probable cause.;

"(3) The trial court erred in admitting evidence consisting of defendant's confession, a blue coat, and a weapon, and in finding said evidence to have been obtained pursuant to a lawful search and arrest.;

"(4) The trial court erred in finding defendant's custodial statement to have been freely and voluntarily given with full awareness of the nature of the charge under investigation.;

"(5) The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to recuse the trial judge.;

"(6) The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to quash based upon the denial of speedy trial and the violation of statutory guidelines governing the limitation of prosecution in felony cases.;

"(7) The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to quash based upon the prejudicial misjoinder of defendant.

"(8) The trial court erred in allowing the admission of an inculpatory statement made by defendant's co-defendant.;

"(9) Defendant was denied the right to counsel free of conflicting of interest due to the earlier appointment of counsel to represent co-defendants with conflicting interest.;

"(10) Defendant was denied basic due process as the result of the prosecutorial nondisclosure of evidence seriously undermining the testimony of a key witness and bearing upon the suppression of items of evidence.; and

"(11) The trial court sentenced defendant to an excessive and disproportionate sentence and further violated defendant's right to minimum due process at the sentencing stage of his criminal trial."

Assignment of Error No. 1

By this assignment, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to stand trial wearing clothing issued by the Ouachita Parish Jail and shackles on the defendant's legs. The defendant contends that the clothing and the shackles destroyed his presumption of innocence before the jury.

The Ouachita Parish Jail provided the defendant clothing for the trial. The clothing consisted of a plain blue shirt, blue jeans, and boots. The trial court noted that it could not see anything on the clothing which indicated that it belonged to the Ouachita Parish Jail.

The record also reflects that the defendant was required to wear shackles on his legs during the course of the trial. During voir dire examination, defendant's counsel questioned several jurors concerning the shackles. The attorney asked the prospective jurors if they had noticed the restraints placed on the defendant. Each of the prospective jurors questioned testified that they had not noticed the restraints. Additionally, each prospective juror stated that it did not indicate to them a presumption of the defendant's guilt. After two jurors were questioned concerning the restraints, the trial court asked counsel to approach the bench for a conference. After the conference the court stated to the jurors that it has come to his attention, through the questioning of defense counsel, that one or both of the defendants were in some sort of restraints. The court informed the jurors that this was simply a procedure used by law enforcement officers who are instructed to do this when anyone is taken into custody and that it was not to be considered by the jurors as evidence or that the defendant has a propensity to do anything or that he is guilty of anything by the simple fact that restraints were being used.

The defendant subsequently filed a motion for mistrial based upon the use of restraints on the defendant. The trial court removed the jury and conducted a hearing on the issue.

Defense counsel contended at the hearing that he raised his objection during voir dire when he noticed jurors looking at the restraints. However, the court stated that it did not notice jurors looking at the restraints and did not notice the restraints until defense counsel questioned several jurors concerning the restraints.

Captain Tilman Brown of the Ouachita Parish Sheriff's Office testified that it was now the procedure of the sheriff's office to require defendants to be placed in leg irons at all times. The captain testified that this procedure was necessitated by a number of previous escapes by other defendants. Captain Brown also indicated that he had no specific knowledge that defendant Murphy might try to escape. The trial court denied defendant's motion for mistrial on the basis that any prejudice that may have occurred was eliminated by the trial court's admonition to the jury. Additionally, the court refused to order the removal of the leg restraints because it was the usual procedure of the court, mindful of the fact that there have been previous escapes, to require defendants to wear leg restraints.

An accused may insist that he be brought into the court with the appearance, dignity, and self respect of a free and innocent man. State v. Kinchen, 290 So.2d 860 (La.1974); State v. Broadway, 440 So.2d 828 (La.App.2d Cir.1983). The defendant should not be brought before the court in any manner destructive of the presumption of innocence and of the dignity and impartiality of the judicial proceedings. State v. Wilkerson, 403 So.2d 652 (La.1981); State v. Broadway, supra.

The United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), held that the state cannot, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothing. When examining this issue on appellate review, the court must focus on whether the defendant has demonstrated that his clothing at trial was readily identifiable as prison attire. State v. Leggett, 363 So.2d 434 (La.1978).

In the present case, the court indicated that the defendant was wearing a plain blue shirt, blue jeans, and boots. The court indicated that there were no markings on the clothing which would indicate to the jury that the clothes were owned by the Ouachita Parish Jail. The defendant made no showing that the clothing could be identified as prison attire. Therefore, the defendant's contention that his clothing denied him his presumption of innocence before the jury is without merit.

In State v. Colvin, 452 So.2d 1214 (La.App.2d Cir.1984), this court found that the standards for judging the propriety of the use of restraints in the courtroom was explained in State v. Wilkerson, supra. The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Wilkerson, supra, stated as follows:

"Ordinarily, a defendant before the court should not be shackled or handcuffed or garbed in any manner destructive of the presumption of his innocence and of the dignity and impartiality of the judicial proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208 (La.1976); State ex rel. Miller v. Henderson, 329 So.2d 707 (La.1976). However, exceptional circumstances may require, within the discretion of the trial court, the restraint of the prisoner for reasons of courtroom security or order or where the prisoner's past conduct reasonably justifies apprehension that he may attempt to escape. State ex rel. Miller v. Henderson, supra; State v. Daniel, 297 So.2d 417 (La.1974).

"If the handcuffing is objected to at the time of the trial, for a finding of reversible error the record must show an abuse of the trial court's reasonable discretion resulting in clear prejudice to the accused. State ex rel. Miller v. Henderson, supra."

The trial court did not err in refusing to grant the mistrial. Mistrial is a drastic remedy and should only be granted on a showing of substantial prejudice. The motion was made during the second day of voir dire. Counsel for defendant had made no...