State v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 10 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. SD31067,SD31067 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES SCOTT MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES SCOTT MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. SD31067
Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District Division One
Filed: November 10, 2011
AFFIRMED
James Scott Murphy ("Defendant") appeals the trial court's judgment convicting him of speeding, in violation of section 304.010, and sentencing him to pay a fine of $150.00.1 Defendant claims that the conviction cannot stand because the park ranger who issued the ticket acted outside his authority in issuing the ticket, the State failed to prove the offense because there was no evidence that the 35-miles-per-hour ["mph"] speed zone extended up to the sign for the 55-mph speed zone, and the uniform citation
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issued to him and filed in the trial court was an insufficient charging document.2 We find these arguments to be without merit and affirm.
We summarize the facts adduced at the bench trial in this case in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. banc 2005). On the evening of the events in question, Eric Shearrer, a ranger of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("Ranger"), was working a radar unit in Sam A. Baker State Park ("the park"). Ranger testified that he was stationed about one-quarter mile within the park.3 At that location, Highway 143 runs through the park for approximately three miles, and Ranger parked his car toward the north end of that stretch. The land on the west side of the highway is private property, but the land on the east side of the highway is inside the park. The highway itself is inside the park.4 Ranger situated his vehicle
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parallel to Highway 143 facing south just beyond a bridge. The speed limit at that location was 35 mph. About 700 feet farther north on the highway is a sign marking the beginning of an area where the speed limit is 55 mph.
Ranger first observed Defendant's vehicle traveling north within the park on Highway 143 as the vehicle approached a bridge. Ranger gained a radar lock on the vehicle as it began to cross the bridge, and the radar unit emitted a high audio tone, indicating increasing speed. As the tone started to drop, indicating decreasing speed, Ranger obtained a reading of 57 mph as Defendant's vehicle left the bridge. Because of the deceleration, the vehicle's speed was a bit over 57 mph as it crossed the bridge. Ranger activated his lights and pulled the vehicle over.
Ranger asked Defendant if he knew what the speed limit was, and Defendant replied, "It's 55." Ranger said, "Well, sir, where you were at[,] it was actually 35." Defendant "indicated that he could see the 55 [mph] speed limit, so he felt that it was 55 [mph]." Ranger replied "that the speed limit doesn't actually change until you get to the speed limit sign." Ranger issued a uniform citation to Defendant for speeding.
The citation identified the court, identified the location of the offense as "143 HWY SABSP[,]" and included Defendant's name and address. In the section provided for "facts supporting [the officer's] belief[,]" Ranger wrote "SPEEDING 57/35[.]"
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Below, in a box labeled "Driving" in the upper left corner and containing "MPH" in the lower right corner, Ranger had written "57" and a box labeled "Posted Speed Limit" in the upper left corner and containing "MPH" in the lower right corner, in which Ranger had written "35." Below both of those boxes was another box labeled "In violation of:" in the upper left corner and a checkbox followed by "RSMo" in the upper right corner and a checkbox followed by "ORD." immediately under that in the lower right corner. Ranger completed this box by writing "304.010" and putting an "X" in the checkbox next to "RSMo." Toward the bottom of the citation is printed, "On information, undersigned prosecutor charges the defendant and informs the court that above facts are true and punishable by:" followed by a blank line and on the far right a checkbox followed by "RSMo" in the upper right corner and a checkbox followed by "ORD." immediately under that in the lower right corner. Immediately below the box with this language appears the signature of the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney. The prosecutor filed the citation in the circuit court.
A trial was held at which Ranger testified to the facts recited above, and Defendant presented several photographs and maps of the area as exhibits. Defendant did not testify, but he argued to the trial court that the maps showed he was outside the park at the point where Ranger locked in the 57-mph radar reading, because "the maps show that the boundary line at the bridge stops at the water line" and that Ranger was not in the park when he took that radar reading and when he stopped Defendant and issued the uniform citation. The trial court found Defendant guilty of speeding and sentenced him to pay a fine of $150.00.
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In his first point, Defendant claims that it was error for the trial court to find that he was within the park when he was on the bridge. He claims that section 253.065.1 only gives Ranger jurisdiction over state highways located within the boundary of a state park and that "[t]here was no evidence submitted that supported the Big Creek Bridge as being within the boundaries of Sam A. Baker State Park." We disagree.
To determine whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, this Court examines the record for substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder might have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kimes, 234 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Mo.App. 2007). "We accept as true all evidence and reasonable inferences tending to prove guilt and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences." State v. Moore, 194 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Mo.App. 2006). "Conflicts in the evidence, determination of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are within the peculiar province of the [fact-finder]." State v. Zimmerman, 886 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Mo.App. 1994).
Ranger testified that the highway at all points relevant to this case was within the park. Defendant discredits this testimony because the maps he introduced at trial raise a question as to the park's boundary line at that location.5 "However, in a court-tried criminal case, 'determination of credibility of witnesses is a matter for the trial court and is not within the province of an appellate court to pass on their credibility.'" State v. Patton, 157 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Mo.App. 2005) (quoting State v. Wilson, 846 S.W.2d 796,
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798 (Mo.App. 1993)). "'It is the duty of the trial court to determine which evidence is more credible and persuasive.'" Patton, 157 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting State v. Baumruk, 85 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Mo. banc 2002)). "'As the trier of fact, the trial judge can believe all or part of a witness' testimony and reject the rest and can disbelieve testimony even if uncontradicted.'" Patton, 157 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting State v. Martin, 850 S.W.2d 421, 422 (Mo.App. 1993)). "Usually the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish any fact." State v. Geary, 884 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Mo.App. 1994). See also Moore, 194 S.W.3d at 390; Zimmerman, 886 S.W.2d at 692. Defendant's first point is denied.
In his second point, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not finding that Ranger was outside of the park boundaries "and could not lawfully pursue the defendant." Defendant claims that Ranger was outside the park at the time he observed the alleged offense and when he stopped Defendant to issue him the citation. Therefore, because Ranger had authority under section 544.157.1 to initiate a stop outside his jurisdiction only if he was in "fresh pursuit" and that such "fresh pursuit" must originate from within Ranger's jurisdiction, see City of Ash Grove v. Christian, 949 S.W.2d 259, 264 (Mo.App. 1997), Defendant argues that Ranger had no legal authority to stop him and issue the citation. The problem with Defendant's argument is, even assuming Ranger lacked authority to stop Defendant, an issue we do not reach, that does not relieve Defendant of his criminal culpability.
Generally, claims regarding the authority of an officer to make an arrest or stop are brought in the context of a motion to suppress evidence or in the context of a claim for damages against the arresting officer. See section 542.296; see also Payton v. New
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York, 445 U.S. 573, 591-92, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Appellate courts have uniformly rejected arguments that because an arrest or detention was in some manner allegedly illegal, the convicting court either (1) lacked jurisdiction to try and convict the defendant, or (2) should have dismissed the charging document altogether. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980); State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. banc 1980); State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Mo. banc 1979); State...
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