State v. Murray
| Decision Date | 29 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 09–0195.,09–0195. |
| Citation | 796 N.W.2d 907 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee,v.Ronald Ray MURRAY, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender and Dennis D. Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin R. Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Thompson, County Attorney, and Anthony H. Janney, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree robbery and second-degree theft. He appeals, contending the district court erred by instructing the jury on both specific and general intent when he was charged only with crimes requiring proof of specific intent. The court of appeals affirmed, and on further review we also affirm.
A jury could have found the following facts from the evidence presented at trial. At about noon on November 19, 2007, Ronald Murray, Jr., walked into a bank in Keystone, Iowa, with a gun. He wore a blue jacket with a white hood tied down tight around his face. He waved the gun and told the teller to give him all the money in the drawer or a bomb would go off in the restaurant nearby. The teller gave him the money, and Murray left. Several people who knew Murray saw him in the vicinity of the bank near the time of the robbery wearing a blue jacket with a white hood. Upon learning of the robbery, one of them reported Murray's address to the police, who located Murray early that afternoon. A white hooded sweatshirt, a blue jacket, a soft-air pistol, two bank money bands, and cash were found in his car.
Murray was ultimately charged with robbery in the second degree, theft in the second degree, and threats. After a jury trial, Murray was acquitted of the threats charge, but was convicted of both second-degree robbery and second-degree theft.
Murray appealed his conviction, arguing the district court erroneously instructed the jury on both general and specific intent, though he was charged with only specific intent crimes. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which concluded Murray was not prejudiced by the jury instructions and affirmed his conviction. We granted Murray's application for further review.
We review alleged errors in jury instructions for correction of errors at law. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996). Errors in jury instructions are presumed prejudicial unless “the record affirmatively establishes there was no prejudice.” State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa 2010). We do not consider an erroneous jury instruction in isolation, but look at the jury instructions as a whole. State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 104 (Iowa 2004).
The jury received the following relevant instructions.
To commit a crime a person must intend to do an act which is against the law. While it is not necessary that a person knows the act is against the law, it is necessary that the person was aware he was doing the act and he did it voluntarily, not by mistake or accident. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of his acts.
“Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind.
Because determining the defendant's specific intent requires you to decide what he was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant's specific intent. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of his acts.
The State must prove all of the following elements of Robbery In The Second Degree:
1. On or about the 19th day of November, 2007, the defendant had the specific intent to commit a theft.
2. In carrying out his intention or to assist him in escaping from the scene, with or without the stolen property, the defendant:
a. Committed an assault on [the bank tellers].
b. Threatened [the bank tellers] with or purposely put [the bank tellers] in fear of immediate serious injury.
If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is guilty of Robbery In The Second Degree. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the defendant is not guilty of Robbery In The Second Degree.
With regard to Instruction No. 18 an assault occurred if a person committed an act which was intended to cause pain or injury and/or resulted in physical contact which was insulting or offensive and/or placed another in fear of an immediate physical contact which would have been painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to the other.
Murray objected to the use of instruction 16 defining general criminal intent, arguing that all of the charged crimes, as well as all lesser-included crimes, required proof of specific intent. The district court overruled the objection and gave the instruction to the jury. On appeal, Murray argues the inclusion of instruction 16 rendered the jury instructions confusing and permitted the jury to find him guilty of the charged crimes based upon a finding that he possessed only general intent rather than specific intent. Because we cannot tell which type of intent the jury relied upon, he argues, we must presume the instruction was prejudicial and reverse his conviction.
The State does not dispute that robbery, theft, and threats are crimes requiring proof of specific intent. However, the State contends that because assault, an element of robbery, is a general intent crime, it was appropriate to include the general intent instruction.
The type of intent required to sustain an assault conviction has been the subject of much debate recently. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 744 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2008); State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 533–34 (Iowa 2006). We find it unnecessary to revisit the issue in this case. As the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Robinson
...on remand, we examine the jury instructions as law of the case in light of our holding on the kidnapping charge. See State v. Murray, 796 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 2011) (noting lesser included offense instruction became law of the case when defendant failed to preserve error by objecting to in......
-
State v. Harrison
...2016). "We do not consider an erroneous jury instruction in isolation, but look at the jury instructions as a whole." State v. Murray , 796 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 2011). Our standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Schlitter , 881 N.W.2d 380, 38......
-
State v. Ambrose, 13–0450.
...establishes there was no prejudice.’ ” Asher v. Ob–Gyn Specialists, P.C., 846 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Murray, 796 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 2011) ). To the extent error is not preserved on an issue, any objections must be raised within an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel ......
-
State v. Coleman
...2010). "We do not consider an erroneous jury instruction in isolation, but look at the jury instructions as a whole." State v. Murray , 796 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 2011). We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Schlitter , 881 N.W.2d at 388. Our standard of review for c......