State v. Myers
| Citation | 94 S.W. 242,197 Mo. 225 |
| Parties | STATE v. MYERS. |
| Decision Date | 22 May 1906 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
must be indorsed thereon, but other witnesses may be sworn by the state. On a trial for homicide, the prosecuting attorney, after the impaneling of the jury, indorsed on the information names of new witnesses. Accused had not been notified that the witnesses would be used against her until after the jury was sworn. There was nothing to show that the prosecuting attorney purposely refrained from indorsing the names of the new witnesses in order to obtain an undue advantage over accused. Held, that the court properly permitted the state to examine the new witnesses without granting a continuance to accused, on the ground that the names of such new witnesses were not indorsed on the information.
2. JURY — CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE — SPECIFICATION OF GROUNDS — NECESSITY.
A challenge of a juror for cause must specifically point out the cause.
3. SAME — SUFFICIENCY.
Where a juror on his voir dire testified that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of accused on trial for crime, from having read a copy in a newspaper of the confession of an accomplice, and from reading in the newspaper a report of the trial of the accomplice, a challenge of the juror, without specifying the ground of the challenge, was insufficient for failing to point out the ground of challenge.
4. SAME.
Rev. St. 1899, § 2616, provides that it shall be a good cause of challenge to the juror that he has formed an opinion, but if it appear that such an opinion is founded only on newspaper reports, and not such as to prejudice his mind, he may be sworn. A juror on his voir dire testified that he had formed an opinion of the guilt or innocence of accused on a trial for crime, from having read a copy in a newspaper of the confession of an accomplice and from the reading of a newspaper report of the trial of the accomplice. There was nothing to show that the newspaper reports of the trial of the accomplice were correct reports. Held, that the juror was not disqualified where he testified that, notwithstanding his opinion, he could try the case on the evidence.
5. WITNESSES — COMPETENCY — DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS — SEPARATE INDICTMENTS FOR SAME OFFENSE.
Rev. St. 1899, § 4680, provides that any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is, notwithstanding, a competent witness. On a trial for homicide, the prosecution called as a witness an accomplice who had been convicted of the crime, and his cause was pending on motion for a new trial. No promise was made by the prosecution to induce him to testify. He was charged separately from accused in the case. Held, that he was a competent witness.
6. CRIMINAL LAW — EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRATORS — ADMISSIBILITY.
The declaration of a conspirator, made after the accomplishment of the conspiracy, is incompetent as against a co-conspirator.
7. SAME — OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE — NECESSITY.
The court, on appeal in a criminal case, will not pass on the admissibility of evidence, where the record shows that it was received without objection.
8. SAME — EVIDENCE — COMPETENCY.
Where, on a trial for homicide, the counsel of defendant cross-examined an accomplice, who had been previously convicted, with respect to his confession, and read to the accomplice portions of the alleged confession and cross-examined him thereon, the court did not err in allowing the state to read the whole confession.
9. SAME.
Where it was shown that a statement was in the handwriting of accused on trial for crime, and the statement contained matters material to the case, the statement was properly admitted in evidence, though it was not signed by accused.
10. SAME — GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL — DISQUALIFICATION OF JUROR.
Rev. St. 1899, § 3763, provides that no exception to a juror on account of his citizenship or other legal disability shall be allowed after the jury is sworn. Section 4679 provides that comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writing and the evidence of witnesses may be submitted to the jury as evidence of the genuineness of the writing in dispute. On a trial for homicide, it became a question as to whether or not certain letters were in the handwriting of accused. A juror on his voir dire testified that he could only write his own name, but he was not challenged by accused. Held, that the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial, on the ground of the inability of the juror to read and write.
11. HOMICIDE — INFORMATION — DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON — NECESSITY.
It is not necessary to allege, in an information for murder, that the weapon with which the assault was made was a deadly weapon.
12. SAME.
An information for murder, which alleges that the murder was committed by the use of several designated weapons, is not erroneous, for an assault may be charged to have been made with different kinds of weapons.
13. CRIMINAL LAW — HARMLESS ERROR — ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.
On a trial of a wife charged with the murder of her husband, the state claimed that she and her paramour conspired to kill decedent. A witness for the state testified without objection to having seen the wife get off a train shortly after the killing, and there meet her paramour. The court overruled an objection to the question as to when the witness next saw the paramour. The witness answered that he did not see him anymore. Held, that the ruling of the court was not prejudicial to accused.
14. SAME — EVIDENCE — CONCLUSION OF WITNESS.
A statement by a witness in a criminal case, in answer to a question as to how often accused wrote to a person named, that she wrote to him a good deal, is not objectionable as a mere conclusion of the witness, but is a statement of fact.
15. SAME — ADMISSIBILITY.
Where, in a criminal case, the prosecuting attorney was endeavoring to show that a witness was familiar with the handwriting of accused and had corresponded with her herself, and that a bundle of letters written to her sister was at her home after the commission of the offense, and the prosecuting attorney had inquired of the witness where those letters were, and she answered that they were burned up, it was not error to overrule an objection to the question as to how long after the commission of the offense the letters of accused were destroyed; it being competent to prove what had become of the letters in accounting for their absence.
16. HOMICIDE — CONDUCT OF ACCUSED — EVIDENCE — ADMISSIBILITY.
On a trial of a wife for the murder of her husband, proof that she did not attend his funeral was competent as a circumstance for the consideration of the jury.
17. CRIMINAL LAW — APPEAL — HARMLESS ERROR — EVIDENCE.
On a trial of a wife for the murder of her husband, the admission of proof that she did not attend his funeral, if error, was not ground for reversal.
18. HOMICIDE — EVIDENCE — ADMISSIBILITY.
Where, on a trial of a wife charged with the murder of her husband, the state claimed that the wife had entered into a conspiracy with a third person to murder decedent, and that in pursuance of the conspiracy the accused had furnished the third person with money and had written to him to go to the city where accused and her husband resided, objections to question put to the third person, testifying as a witness for the state, why he came to the city where accused and her husband resided, and whether accused wrote to him to come, were properly overruled.
19. COURTS — TERMS — SPECIAL TERMS — AUTHORITY TO ORDER — PRELIMINARY FACTS.
Rev. St. 1899, § 1606, provides that, when a person charged with crime shall be confined in jail two months before the regular term of court, the jailer shall inform the judge, who may call a special term of court for the trial of such person. Accused, charged with crime, obtained a change of venue from J. county to C. county. The judge of the circuit court of C. county entered an order for a special term for the trial of accused, which recited that he had been notified in April by the sheriff of C. county that accused was in jail awaiting trial. It appeared that accused was in the county jail of J. county in May. Held, in view of section 8125, authorizing the sheriff of a county to commit a person in his custody to the jail of some other county, etc., there was nothing to contradict the notice given by the sheriff to the judge prior to the entry of the order for the special term.
20. CRIMINAL LAW — INSTRUCTIONS — ASSUMPTION AS TO FACTS.
Where, on a trial for homicide, the court required the jury, in order to find accused guilty, to find that he willfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly, etc., killed decedent with designated weapons, which were deadly weapons, and defined the words "willful, deliberate, premeditated," etc., an instruction that he who uses upon another, at a vital part, a deadly weapon, must be presumed to know that the effect is likely to be death, and must be presumed to intend the death, and if accused took the life of decedent by wounding him in a vital part with a club, razor, or scissors, and such weapons were deadly weapons, etc., was not open to the objection that it assumed that the weapons were deadly.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; J. W. Alexander, Judge.
Maggie Myers, alias Aggie Myers, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and she appeals. Affirmed.
Frank Gordon, R. B. Ruff, W. E. Fowler, and Jos. S. Brooks, for appellant. The Attorney General and John Kennish, for the State.
At the April term, 1904, of the criminal court of Jackson county, Mo., at Kansas City, Mo., the prosecuting attorney of said county filed the following information:
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