State v. Myers
Decision Date | 11 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-K-1803.,99-K-1803. |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Coby MYERS. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Katherine M. Franks, Abita Springs, Counsel for Applicant.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Paul D. Connick, Jr., Dist. Atty., Richard C. Bates, Baton Rouge, Terry Michael Boudreaux, Gretna, Michael Scott Futrell, Pollock, Ellen Steman Fantaci, Metairie, Counsel for Respondent.
On July 16, 1997, a jury convicted defendant, Coby Myers, of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2. The trial judge subsequently sentenced defendant, as a second felony offender, to twelve (12) years at hard labor. Defendant raises only the issue of whether the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans2 from the jury solely on the basis of their race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). After a review of the record and the applicable law, we hold the trial judge erred in not addressing defense counsel's Batson objections and this error raises serious federal constitutional equal protection issues affecting the rights of both the defendant and the excused venirepersons. Thus, defendant's conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
On June 28, 1996, Sergeant Wayne Kron of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office was dispatched to 2504 Arizona Street, Marrero, Louisiana, in response to a silent burglar alarm. When he arrived at the residence, he heard a disturbance at the front of the house and saw two black males running across the lawn. At trial, Sergeant Kron testified he ordered the two males to stop and, in response, the two stopped briefly, smiled directly at him, and continued to run. Sergeant Kron was unable to apprehend them. Approximately ten days later, Sergeant Kron identified Coby Myers from a photographic lineup as one of the two men he had seen running away from 2504 Arizona Street. Based on this identification, defendant was arrested and charged with the crime of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2.
On July 15, 1997, a twelve-person jury was empaneled. One day later, after deliberating on the evidence presented, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged and the trial judge sentenced defendant to ten (10) years at hard labor. The State then filed a multiple offender bill of information alleging defendant was a second felony offender. On November 12, 1997, the trial court vacated defendant's prior sentence and sentenced him to twelve (12) years at hard labor as a habitual offender.
Defendant appealed alleging, among other assignments of error, that the trial judge erred in not sustaining the defense objection to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude six black jurors on the basis of race and in not requesting race-neutral reasons for excluding these jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, relying on State v. Green, 94-0887 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, affirmed the conviction holding defendant failed to make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination because "[t]here is no proof in the record that the rejection of [the] six potential jurors was in any way predicated upon race." State v. Myers, 98-899, p. 6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/19/99), 737 So.2d 255, 259. Thus, defendant's Batson challenge automatically failed and the State was not required to give race-neutral reasons for excluding the six black jurors during voir dire. Id.
We granted certiorari to determine the sole issue of whether the court of appeal erred in determining the State was not required to give race-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenges against six of seven African-American jurors because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the State as required by Batson. State v. Myers, 99-1803 (La.11/24/99), 749 So.2d 685.
In his only assignment of error, defendant argues that the State used peremptory strikes to exclude six black potential jurors from the venire in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The record shows that the first panel of jurors called for voir dire contained three black venire members. One black juror was selected and the State used two peremptory challenges to exclude the other two. At the end of the first panel selection, defense counsel and the prosecutor entered into the following exchange:
The second panel of jurors called for voir dire contained two black venire members both of whom were excused by the prosecution with peremptory challenges. At this point, defense counsel stated "For the record ... we are really getting very close to having [a prima facie case] ... I think we are beyond that point." The court continued with the jury selection without responding to defense counsel's objection. Finally, after the third panel of prospective jurors was examined, the State again excluded two black venire-persons, bringing its total to six African-Americans excused peremptorily, and defense counsel made the following objection:
Thus, again, in response to defense counsel's objection, the court simply continued with jury selection. The court neither ruled on defendant's establishment of a prima facie case, nor did it require the prosecutor to provide race-neutral reasons for its strikes. Only one black juror was on the jury ultimately empaneled.
Both in this state and throughout the nation, the law is firmly settled that peremptory strikes may not be based on race in either criminal or civil cases. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719 ( ); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ( ); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) ( ); State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 817 (La.1989) ( ). If it appears that one party is using its peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner, the other party may raise the issue by making what has come to be known as a Batson objection.
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a three-part framework to be employed in evaluating an equal protection challenge to a prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination in the prosecutor's use of the strike. If he fulfills this requirement, then the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. This is a burden of production, not one of persuasion. Then, the trial court must decide whether the defendant has carried the ultimate burden of proving that the strike constituted purposeful discrimination on the basis of race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89,
106 S.Ct. at 1719; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991).
The combination of factors needed to establish a prima facie case are: (1) the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor's challenge was directed at a member of a cognizable group; (2) the defendant must then show the challenge was peremptory rather than for cause (i.e., "peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate' "); and (3) finally, the defendant must show circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor struck the venireperson on account of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
In Green, 655 So.2d at 287-88, this court held that the sole focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the prosecutor at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes and outlined several factors that could lead to a finding that a prima facie case has been made pursuant to Batson:
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988), re'hg denied, 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 517, 102 L.Ed.2d 551 (1988).
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