State v. Myers

• Decision Date: 29 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15208,15208
• Citation: State v. Myers, 242 Conn. 125, 698 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1997)
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Ryan MYERS.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 823

698 A.2d 823

242 Conn. 125

STATE of Connecticut v. Ryan MYERS.

No. 15208.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 18, 1997.

Decided July 29, 1997.

Susan M. Hankins, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Carolyn K. Longstreth, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom were Elpedio Vitale, Assistant State's Attorney, and, on the brief, Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Ryan Myers, was convicted of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, ¹ robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 ² and 53a-134 (a)(4), ³ conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a)(4) and 53a-48 (a), ⁴ and attempted assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 53a-59 ⁵ and General Statutes §§ 53a-49 ⁶ and 53a- . Although the defendant raises several issues in this appeal, at this time we reach only the procedural aspects of his claim for a new trial predicated on juror bias and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. ⁷

On June 8, 1994, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty on all counts. On June 27, 1994, prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion captioned "motion for a new trial" (motion) on the basis of juror bias. In the motion, the defendant sought a new trial and the motion set forth its basis, together with an appendix containing photocopies of certain relevant newspaper articles. ⁸ In the last paragraph of his motion, the defendant requested that the trial court also consider it as a "petition for a new trial," in accordance with General Statutes § 52-270. ⁹ On September 19, 1994, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's claims of juror bias, and concluded the hearing on January 9, 1995. At no time prior to the trial court's decision on the motion did the state object to the procedural posture of the motion.

On October 24, 1994, before the completion of the hearing and the subsequent ruling on the defendant's motion, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total term of 100 years imprisonment. The trial court stated that it sentenced the defendant before deciding his motion in order to ensure that there would be appellate review of the court's decision on the motion. ¹⁰ On March 17, 1995, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. On March 27, 1995, the state moved for reconsideration of that decision, arguing for the first time that the defendant's claim of juror bias was raised in a procedurally defective manner. Because the defendant had failed to institute a separate proceeding by way of a petition for new trial, pursuant to § 52-270, by serving a writ and complaint on the state; see State v. Asherman, 180 Conn. 141, 144, 429 A.2d 810 (1980); State v. Servello, 14 Conn.App. 88, 101, 540 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 811, 545 A.2d 1107 (1988); the state argued that the defendant's petition was improperly brought and, consequently, that the state was deprived of its right to appeal from the trial court's order granting a new trial. The trial court agreed with the state and vacated its order granting a new trial.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly vacated its order granting the defendant a new trial on the ground, inter alia, that the defendant should have raised the issue of juror impartiality by way of a properly instituted proceeding on a petition for a new trial pursuant to § 52-270. The state argues that the trial court acted properly and, also, as an alternative ground on which to affirm the judgment of the trial court, that the defendant failed to establish that he was actually prejudiced by the juror's failure to disclose pertinent information. We agree with the defendant that the trial court improperly concluded that the issue of juror bias in this instance must have been raised by a petition for a new trial brought pursuant to § 52-270. We must, however, remand the case to the trial court for an articulation as to whether the trial court found actual bias.

The following undisputed facts recited by the trial court are relevant to the resolution of the issue raised by the defendant's motion. "The issue raised by the defendant in his motion for a new trial, which was filed prior to the sentencing of the defendant, is that the juror Richard Gay, who turned out to be the foreperson, had been involved in an incident about thirteen months prior to his selection as a juror and made no mention of it at any time during the process of jury selection or at any time thereafter. According to the testimony of [Gay] given in the course of the evidentia[ry] hearing held by the court on September 19, 1994, he made no mention of this occurrence because he did not think it was relevant. [He testified that] '[i]t had no bearing on anything.' ... And when asked if anybody he knew, [or a] family member, had ever been the victim of a crime, his response had been 'No' because 'a family member' 'didn't mean me.' ... Had he been asked the specific question as to himself and any experience with being a victim of a crime, he would have answered differently....

"Evidence was offered by way of newspaper articles in the New Haven Register of May 1, 1993 ... [to which Gay testified] of an occurrence in which he was assaulted by a number of youths following an automobile accident in downtown New Haven in which he either was pulled out of his car or got out and was thereafter subjected to an assault which required overnight hospitalization. In a subsequent interview by a Register reporter he was quoted as saying that the law was easing up too much on these kids, they're not good for anything and the law should kick their.... ¹¹ The defendant in this case is a young black male residing in New Haven and in the opinion of the court would fit generally within the class of the individuals allegedly referred to by [Gay]. These statements were denied by [Gay] in that he claimed not to recall specifically what he told the reporter but that he did recall wanting the police to investigate the incident. [Gay] also indicated ... that he wanted the police to investigate because he had been 'beat up,' although he claimed not to remember the assault at the time of the hearing on this motion.

"The question raised by the defendant in the face of this information is whether [Gay] should have disclosed this information as bearing upon his ability to be fair and impartial in sitting as a juror on this case. The state claims that no actual bias has been shown and that when asked the question whether any family member had been the victim of a crime, he truthfully answered as to others of the family, but because he was not specifically asked whether he had been a victim of a crime he had no duty to volunteer the incident of April 29, 1993...." (Emphasis in original.)

I

We first address whether the trial court properly vacated its decision granting the defendant's motion for a new trial based upon its conclusion, inter alia, that the defendant's claim was required to have been brought by way of a properly instituted proceeding on a petition for a new trial pursuant to § 52-270. The state argues that the defendant's claim of juror bias was initiated through a procedurally defective petition for a new trial. The defendant counters that his motion for a new trial, brought pursuant to Practice Book § 902, ¹² properly raised his claim of juror bias. We agree with the state that the defendant's motion was not a properly brought petition for a new trial, but we also agree with the defendant that a claim of juror bias may be brought either by way of a motion for a new trial pursuant to § 902 of the Practice Book or a petition for a new trial pursuant to § 52-270.

The state relied on State v. Servello, supra, 14 Conn.App. at 100-102, 540 A.2d 378, for its argument before the trial court that the defendant's petition for a new trial was procedurally defective. The state renews this argument on appeal. A petition for a new trial is properly "instituted by a writ and complaint served on the adverse party; although such an action is collateral to the action in which a new trial is sought, it is by its nature a distinct proceeding." State v. Asherman, supra, 180 Conn. at 144, 429 A.2d 810. In State v. Servello, supra at 101, 540 A.2d 378, the Appellate Court noted that the defendant did not follow that procedure and that "[t]he defendant filed his 'petition for new trial' within the technical confines of the docketed criminal case. No separate civil action was brought." The court in Servello indicated that "[w]e are presented, then, with the question of whether the defendant's failure to bring a petition for a new trial in a separate action deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the petition.... [T]he trial court should have dismissed the defendant's petition for a new trial because it was improperly brought, and we do not review the trial court's denial of that petition." Id. at 101-102, 540 A.2d 378; see also State v. Saraceno, 15 Conn.App. 222, 250-51, 545 A.2d 1116, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 823, 824, 552 A.2d 431, 432 (1988); State v. Smith, 15 Conn.App. 502, 503, 545 A.2d 1150 (1988). The motion in the present case clearly does not meet the requirements of a petition for a new trial because it too was filed within the confines of the criminal case.

Nonetheless, we construe the defendant's motion as a motion for a new trial, pursuant to Practice Book § 902, even though he alternatively sought a new trial pursuant to § 52-270. Although not dispositive, the motion was clearly captioned "motion for a new trial" and the defendant filed his motion prior to final judgment. ¹³ Further, the trial court captioned its written...