State v. Myers

• Decision Date: 16 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 31610.,31610.
• Citation: State v. Myers, 216 W. Va. 120, 602 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 2004)
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Stanley M. MYERS, Defendant Below, Appellant.

602 S.E.2d 796

216 W.Va. 120

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v.Stanley M. MYERS, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 31610.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 27, 2004.

Decided: June 16, 2004.

Dissenting Opinions of Justices Starcher and Albright June 25, 2004.

Stanley M. Myers, Pro Se, Saint Marys, for the Appellant.

Pamela Jean Games-Neely, Prosecuting Attorney, Christopher C. Quasebarth, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Martinsburg, for the Appellee.

DAVIS, Justice:

This case involves an order directing a criminal defendant to pay jury costs incurred in connection with a conviction that was subsequently reversed by this Court, when, on remand, the criminal defendant pled guilty to lesser offences involving the same criminal conduct.After a careful review of the record presented, the parties' briefs, and the relevant law, we find that the circuit court did not err in assessing the jury costs pursuant to W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c)(1)(2001)(Supp.2003).In addition, we find that the circuit court's order assessing "costs" was sufficiently specific under the requirements of § 52-1-17(c).

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1996, Mr. Stanley Myers, defendant below and appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Myers"), was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault.These crimes were perpetrated against four minor male victims.Mr. Myers received three sentences of fifteen to thirty-five years for the first degree offenses, and one sentence of one to five years on the third degree offense.All of these sentences were to run consecutively.

Mr. Myers petitioned this Court for an appeal of his conviction, but his petition was denied.Thereafter, he instituted a civil habeas corpus action.¹The circuit court ultimately denied habeas relief and Mr. Myers appealed.This Court accepted the appeal.After finding, inter alia, that Mr. Myers received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial, we reversed his conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.²After remand, Mr. Myers pled guilty to three counts of first degree sexual abuse, and one count of third degree sexual assault.He was sentenced to four consecutive one to five year terms.In addition, Mr. Myers was fined $8,000 and assessed costs.Mr. Myers requested a statement of his costs from the circuit clerk and learned that an amount of $10,125.54 was included for the jury that had participated in his initial trial; that is, the trial that had resulted in the conviction that was later reversed by this Court.Mr. Myers then filed in the circuit court a motion to correct judgment of costs.He also petitioned this Court for an appeal of the judgment of costs.By order entered September 17, 2003, the circuit court granted Mr. Myers' motion to correct judgment of costs.A typographical error was identified and the jury costs were reduced to $1,012.54.Subsequently, we granted Mr. Myers petition for appeal on October 30, 2003, and we now affirm the circuit court's assessment of costs.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The order from which Mr. Myers appeals is his sentencing order.We have held that "[t]he Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders ... under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands."Syl. pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas,201 W.Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221(1997).However, the particular issues raised by Mr. Myers require us to interpret W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c) to ascertain whether the statute may be applied to impose jury costs for a conviction that has been reversed, but where the defendant has subsequently been reconvicted.This poses a legal question of which our consideration is de novo."Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review."Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415(1995).With due regard for these standards, we consider the issues raised by Mr. Myers.

III.DISCUSSION

Mr. Myers presents two issues for our review.The first issue is whether a trial court may, pursuant to W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c), assess jury costs that arose from a criminal proceeding resulting in a conviction that was later reversed on appeal, when the defendant has pled guilty after remand by this Court.³If this question is answered affirmatively, then we must consider whether the circuit court's order in this instance complied with the express provisions of W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c).We will address each of these issues in turn.⁴

A.Assessing Jury Fees after Conviction Reversed on Appeal

The question of whether W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c)(1) should be interpreted to allow jury costs for an earlier proceeding to be assessed where the earlier proceeding was reversed on appeal, but where the defendant was ultimately convicted on the same set of factual circumstances, is one of first impression for this Court.

W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c)(1) states:

(c) Anytime a panel of prospective jurors has been required to report to court for the selection of a petit jury in any scheduled matter, the court shall, by specific provision in a court order, assess a jury cost.In circuit courtcases the jury cost shall be the actual cost of the jurors' service, and in magistrate courtcases, the jury cost assessed shall be two hundred dollars.Such costs shall be assessed against the parties as follows:

(1) In every criminal case, against the defendant upon conviction, whether by plea, by bench trial or by jury verdict;

Mr. Myers submits that, because W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c)(1) directs assessment of jury costs against a criminal defendant"upon conviction,"he may not be assessed jury costs for a proceeding that was later reversed on appeal as it did not result in a conviction.Because W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c)(1) does not expressly answer the question with which we are presented in this case, we must endeavor to interpret this statute.In so doing, we must strive to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intended purpose for its enactment, as "'[t]he primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.'Syllabus Point 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361(1975)."Syl. pt. 2, Taylor v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,214 W.Va. 324, 589 S.E.2d 55(2003).

We have heretofore established that the assessment of costs is not for punitive purposes."[C]osts are not punishment or part of the penalty for committing a crime."State ex rel. Canterbury v. Paul,205 W.Va. 665, 670, 520 S.E.2d 662, 667(1999).See generally24 C.J.S.Criminal Law § 1738(1989)("Court costs are not fines, and therefore, the costs of prosecution are purely compensatory, and not punitive."(footnotes omitted)).Consequently, we deduce that the clear legislative intent of this statute is simply to require one who is convicted of a crime to reimburse the State for the costs associated with a jury's participation in the proceedings leading to his or her conviction.It is from this perspective that we must interpret this statute to determine the extent to which the State should be reimbursed for jury costs.At this stage of our analysis, we must be mindful that W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c)(1) is a statute in derogation of the common law.⁵See, e.g., State v. St. Clair,177 W.Va. 629, 631, 355 S.E.2d 418, 420(1987)("Allowance and recovery of costs was unknown at common law, and therefore only costs specifically allowed by statute may be recovered.").For this reason, it must be strictly construed.

"`Statutes in derogation of the common law are allowed effect only to the extent clearly indicated by the terms used.Nothing can be added otherwise than by necessary implication arising from such terms.'Syllabus Point 3, Bank of Weston v. Thomas, 75 W.Va. 321, 83 S.E. 985(1914)."Syllabus Point 6, City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, 166 W.Va. 1, 283 S.E.2d 589(1980).

Syl. pt. 7, Teter v. Old Colony Co.,190 W.Va. 711, 441 S.E.2d 728(1994).See alsoBice v. Boothsville Tel. Co.,62 W.Va. 521, 524, 59 S.E. 501, 502(1907)("All costs are of statutory authorization, for the common law gave none in any case....Statutes relating to costs must be strictly construed.").

Admittedly, few cases address the specific issue presented in this case.The theory advocated by Mr. Myers, though, does have some support.These cases reason that when a conviction is reversed, the conviction is nullified and the slate is wiped clean so no jury costs may be assessed,⁶ or that where the reversal is the result of misconduct on the part of the state, the defendant cannot be assessed costs.⁷However, we do not find that the reasoning in these cases fulfills the legislative goal of requiring a convicted criminal to reimburse the State for the costs it has expended to provide him or her a jury.Moreover, to adopt such a view would require us to ignore portions of the language contained in § 52-2-17(c), and this we cannot do.

"Each word of a statute should be given some effect and a statute must be construed in accordance with the import of its language.Undefined words and terms used in a legislative enactment will be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning."Syllabus point 6, in part, State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin,175 W.Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171(1984).

Syl. pt. 2, State v. Snodgrass,207 W.Va. 631, 535 S.E.2d 475(2000).W. Va.Code § 52-1-17(c) states that "[a]nytime a panel of prospective jurors has been required to report to court for the selection of a petit jury in any scheduled matter, the courtshall, by specific provision in a court order, assess a jury cost."(Emphasis added).The common meaning of the term "anytime" is understood to be "invariably; without...