State v. Myers
| Decision Date | 24 February 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 13601,13601 |
| Citation | 159 W.Va. 353,222 S.E.2d 300 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia v. Warren Gayle MYERS. |
Syllabus by the Court
1.In a criminal trial, a psychiatrist testifying on the issue of insanity should be permitted to make unrestricted use of the information elicited by him during his interview with the defendant and should further be permitted to make reference to information available to him in the form of records or documents whose reliability has been reasonably established and which have been kept in the regular course of professional care or treatment of the defendant, provided that such information either from the interview or the records is information taken into consideration by the psychiatrist in arriving at his diagnosis.
2.When a defendant in a criminal case raises the issue of insanity, the test of his responsibility for his act is whether, at the time of the commission of the act, it was the result of a mental disease or defect causing the accused to lack the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his act to the requirements of the law, and it is error for the trial court to give an instruction on the issue of insanity which imposes a different test or which is not governed by the evidence presented in the case.
3.The defendant who raises the issue of his insanity at the time of the commission of the act carries the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is error for the court to give an instruction which suggests or imposes some different burden of proof.
4.In a criminal case, it is improper for the prosecuting attorney, in final argument to comment on the manner in which another arm of the government may handle matters of parole, probation or confinement, and the failure of the trial court either to declare a mistrial or to instruct the jury as to the impropriety of such remarks in such a manner as to eliminate any prejudicial influence in the minds of the jury is error.
Jones, Williams, West & Jones, Jerald E. Jones, Clarksburg, for plaintiff in error.
Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., David P. Cleek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for defendant in error.
On June 19, 1973, a jury found the defendant below guilty of murder in the first degree and recommended mercy.On appeal, the defendant contends that he was prejudiced: (1) by the court's refusal to permit defendant's psychiatrists to make full and adequate disclosure of the history given to them by the defendant as well as the history contained in various medical and military records; (2) by the court's failure properly to instruct the jury on the issue of insanity; and (3) by the court's failure either to declare a mistrial or to caution the jury properly in connection with certain remarks regarding punishment which were made by the Prosecuting Attorney in his closing argument.
The defendant was indicted by a grand jury of the then Intermediate Court of Harrison County, West Virginia, at the March 1973 term thereof, charging him as follows:
'. . . that Warren Gayle Myers, on the _ _ day of January, 1973, in the said County of Harrison, feloniously, wilfully, maliciously, deliberately and unlawfully did slay, kill and murder one David Sam Haddix; . . .'
The defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
At the trial below, the State introduced evidence disclosing that on January 20, 1973, following a fight between the defendant and the decedent at the Twin Pines Tavern in Harrison County, West Virginia, the defendant left the tavern and approximately thirty minutes later returned with a rifle and shot and killed David Sam Haddix.
The defendant offered no evidence to rebut the account of the State's witnesses as to what had occurred at the Twin Pines Tavern.
Instead, the defense confined itself to an effort to establish that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.
In this connection, the defense offered the testimony of Dr. Arthur Mardones and Dr. A. V. Vallarin, both of whom were licensed to practice medicine in the State of West Virginia and were accepted by the court as expert witnesses competent to testify in the field of psychiatry.Both doctors testified that, at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or illness which they characterized as paranoid schizophrenia.
The State did not present any expert testimony in its behalf to rebut that offered by the defendant.
During the testimony of Dr. Mardones, it appeared that the defendant had been examined and treated by Dr. Mardones at a Veterans' Administration Hospital on several occasions both on an inpatient and outpatient basis prior to the alleged offense.The court refused to permit the doctor to testify as to information regarding the defendant which had come to him through various medical records regarding the defendant's military service and resulting psychiatric difficulties.
The court also refused to permit either Dr. Mardones or Dr. Vallarin to state in full detail the history which was given to them by the defendant as a part of their examination of the defendant subsequent to the commission of the alleged offense, including an account of the circumstances of the fight and the shooting.
The defendant by counsel contends that such restrictions placed upon the development of psychiatric testimony prevented him from making a full presentation of his psychiatric defense and further prejudiced that defense by making it impossible for him to establish fully and completely the basis of the diagnosis which the doctors made.
The defendant's contention in this respect is well taken, and this Court finds that the trial court unduly restricted the presentation of psychiatric testimony on behalf of the defendant.
One of the diagnostic tools at the command of the psychiatrist is the information which he can obtain from the defendant in the form of an interview.The interview is as essential as a diagnostic tool for the psychiatrist as is the x-ray examination for the orthopedist or the laboratory work for the diagnostician.The information elicited during the interview should, if the defendant so elects, be fully disclosed to the jury.A limitation on such disclosure prevents the psychiatrist from stating to the jury one of the important and indeed indispensable elements of his diagnosis and to that extent prevents him from fully advising the jury as to the basis of his opinion.It has long been recognized in this State that statements made to a doctor by one whom he is examining are admissible as a ground and reason for an opinion to be given in evidence by such witness.Curfman v. West Penn, 113 W.Va. 85, 166 S.E. 848(1932).To hold otherwise would seriously restrict the doctor in any legitimate explanation which he might offer as to his diagnosis.
Likewise, it is prejudicial to preclude a doctor from making reference to information which comes to him in the form of records or documents prepared in the normal course of either his examination or treatment of the patient.Of course, it should be established that such records have been kept in the regular course of professional care or treatment.If they come to the physician with their source and reliability so established and if they are documents and records on which he relies for the purpose of making his diagnosis, there is no sound reason why he should not be permitted to refer to them and to disclose to the jury that they were taken into consideration by him in arriving at his diagnosis.
The psychiatric testimony in this case suggests that the defendant had a long history of mental illness possibly originating out of some of his experiences in World War II.It appears that the witness Mardones as a Veterans' Administration physician had acquired records relating to the defendant's background and showing diagnoses and treatment of defendant's mental disorders prior to the offense with which the defendant was charged.To prevent the doctor from utilizing such records and from disclosing to the jury his utilization of them in arriving at his diagnosis places an unreal stricture on him and compels him to be not only less than frank with the jury but also compels him to appear to base his diagnosis upon reasons which are flimsy and inconclusive when in fact they may not be.
In a murder case, the law recognizes that one of the defenses...
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