State v. Mylod
| Decision Date | 18 July 1898 |
| Parties | STATE v. MYLOD. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Walter E. Mylod was adjudged probably guilty of practicing medicine without authority, and he raised the question of the constitutionality of Gen. Laws, c. 165, and the question was certified, and transmitted to the appellate division of the supreme court for determination.
Charles F. Stearns, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State. George H. Littlefield, for defendant.
The defendant was adjudged probably guilty in the district court of the Sixth judicial district upon complaint of Gardner T. Swarts, secretary of the state board of health. Said complaint, which was made under chapter 105, Gen. Laws R. I., alleges that the defendant, at Providence, on the 26th day of November, 1897, "did then and there practice medicine and surgery for reward and compensation, without lawful license, certificate, and authority, and not being then and there duly registered according to law." The defendant, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty, and subsequently, and before judgment, raised a question of the constitutionality of said chapter 165, which question, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 250, Gen. Laws R. I., was certified and transmitted to the appellate division of the supreme court for decision.
Gen. Laws R. I. c. 165, provides for the registration of physicians, and its object is to regulate the practice of medicine and surgery. Under this chapter, authority to practice medicine and surgery is through a certificate issued by the state board of health, and said board, upon application, and without discrimination against any particular school or system of medicine, is required to issue such certificate to any reputable physician practicing, or desiring to begin the practice of, medicine or surgery in this state, who possesses certain specified qualifications. Section 2 of said chapter, in part, is as follows: Section 8 of said chapter is as follows: For the state, Everett Hall testified, substantially, that he called upon the defendant at his residence, and asked to be cured of malaria; that the defendant said he was Dr. Mylod; that the defendant sat looking at the floor, with his eyes shaded, as if engaged in silent prayer, for about 10 minutes, and then, looking up, said, "I guess you'll feel better;" that defendant gave him a book entitled "A Defense of Christian Science"; that he gave defendant one dollar; that defendant did not recommend nor administer any drug or medicine, nor take his pulse or temperature, nor do any of the things usually done by physicians. Clarence Vaughn, in behalf of the state, testified that he called upon the defendant at his residence on two occasions, and requested to be cured of the grippe; that he gave defendant one dollar each visit; that defendant said he was Dr. Mylod; that defendant gave him a card, stating the defendant's office hours, and describing defendant as a Christain Scientist, but not in any way referring to defendant as a physician; that defendant did not take his pulse or temperature, nor do any of the other things that physicians do in treating disease, but seemed to be sitting in silent prayer; that defendant gave him a book entitled "An Historical Sketch of Metaphysical Healing"; that defendant told him to look, not on the dark side of things, but on the bright side, and to think of God, and it would do him good, since thought governs all things. Dr. Gardner T. Swarts, secretary of the state board of health, testified that the defendant is not a registered physician, that said defendant does not have authority to practice medicine in Rhode Island, and that physicians often cure disease without the use of drugs or medicine. For the defense, the charter of the Providence Church of Christ, Scientist, was introduced in evidence, and the defendant testified, substantially, that he is the president and first reader or pastor of said church; that said church has been organized and has held regular religious services for seven years; that said church belongs to the sect known as Christian Scientists, in whose belief God and Jesus Christ and the Bible hold a supreme place; that the principal distinguishing difference between Christian Scientists and other sects consists in the belief of the former regarding disease, which they believe can be reduced to a minimum through the power of prayer; that the public religious services of said church consist of silent prayer, music, reading of the Scriptures and of extracts from "Science and Health," by Mary G. Baker Eddy; that he, beyond a greater realization of truth which his longer study of Christian Science may have given him, professed to have no greater power over illness than that possessed by any member of his church; that he did not tell the witnesses Hall and Vaughn that he could cure them, nor did he call himself a doctor; that he did not attempt to cure them by means of any power of his own; that he assured them that it is God alone who heals, acting through the human mind; that all he did was to engage in silent prayer for them, and to endeavor to turn their thoughts to God and towards the attainment of physical perfection; that the efforts made for them were precisely the same in character as those which he makes for his congregation at public services of his church; that he does not practice medicine, nor attempt to cure disease; that he has no knowledge of medicine or surgery; that, as a Christian Scientist, he never recommended to any one a course of physical treatment; that he has only the method of prayer and effort to encourage hopefulness, for all who come to him in public or private, and whatever disease they imagine they have; and that his ministrations often can be and are rendered as effectively in the absence as in the presence of the beneficiary. Other witnesses were called, but there was no material variance in the testimony except that the witnesses Hall and Vaughn testified that the defendant said he was Dr. Mylod, which testimony was contradicted by the defendant.
The constitutional question raised by the defendant is that under section 3, art. 1, Const. R. I., which secures to him religious freedom, he had a right to perform the acts shown by the testimony to have been performed, and that, therefore, said chapter 165, Gen. Laws R. I., under which said complaint was made, is unconstitutional if, and in so far as, it provides a penalty for the performance of said acts. This question, properly, cannot be considered by the court unless said chapter 165 is sufficiently broad to include within its prohibitive provisions the acts of the defendant, for the defendant cannot question the constitutionality of said chapter unless his rights would be affected by its enforcement. State v. Snow 3 R. I. 61. There is no testimony tending to show that the defendant practiced or attempted to practice surgery, or that he made any diagnosis or examination to ascertain whether the witnesses Hall and Vaughn were suffering from disease, or that he administered or prescribed any drug, medicine, or remedy, or that he claimed any knowledge of disease, or the proper remedies therefor. Upon the testimony, the only claim that can be made by the state is that upon a card handed to one of the witnesses appeared the name and office hours of the defendant; that the defendant said he was Dr. Mylod; that he offered silent prayer for the witnesses Hall and Vaughn, who claimed to be suffering from disease; that he gave said witnesses each a book in which, presumably, the principles of Christian Science were taught, explained, and defended; that he told the witness Vaughn, substantially, to look on the bright side of things, and think of God, and it would do him good; and that he accepted compensation for his services. Did these acts of the defendant constitute the practice of medicine, in violation of chapter 165, Gen. Laws R. I.? It is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the lawmaking power as embodied in the statutes. The legislature is presumed to mean what it has plainly expressed, and, when it has so expressed its meaning, construction is excluded. It is only when the meaning of a statute is obscure, or the words employed are of doubtful meaning, that, in order to give effect to the legislative intention, the duty of construction arises. In the construction of penal statutes a well-established rule is that words...
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