State v. Na'Im B., No. 17923.

• Decision Date: 12 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17923.
• Citation: 952 A.2d 755,288 Conn. 290
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. NA'IM B.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL&gt

952 A.2d 755

288 Conn. 290

STATE of Connecticut v. NA'IM B.¹

No. 17923.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 17, 2008.

Decided August 12, 2008.

Timothy F. Costello, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Anne Mahoney, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Paul W. Summers, assistant public defender, with whom was James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

NORCOTT, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

NORCOTT, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of the defendant, Na'im B., of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1).² The state appeals, following our grant of certification,³ from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of risk of injury to a child arising from the defendant's delay in seeking medical attention for burns suffered by the victim, his four month old son. State v. Na'im B., 101 Conn.App. 373, 921 A.2d 679 (2007). On appeal, the state claims that it introduced sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction and that the Appellate Court's conclusion to the contrary was improper. Specifically, the state contends that the Appellate Court misapplied the appropriate standard of review and did not adequately consider relevant circumstantial evidence in its analysis. We agree with the state, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following facts that the jury reasonably could have found, and the relevant procedural history. On the night of January 12, 2003, the victim suffered third degree burns on both the palm and back of his left hand, which were caused by an electric hair straightener. Earlier that same evening, U, the victim's mother, had used that straightener while preparing to attend a birthday party, but had forgotten to turn it off when she was finished. U left the apartment for the party at 11:30 p.m., leaving the defendant at home with the victim and U's two other sons, ages six and three. The victim was not injured when U left the apartment.

U returned home from the party at approximately 1:15 a.m., and was greeted in the hallway by her three year old son. The victim was not crying when U entered the apartment. U sat with her three year old son in the living room until 3 or 3:30 a.m., at which point she went to the master bedroom and found the defendant and the victim asleep on the bed. U did not hear the victim cry at all during the time she was in the living room. U laid down in the bed with the defendant and the victim, but, before she could fall asleep, the three year old entered the room and climbed into bed with them, waking up the victim and causing him to whine and fuss. U started to play with the victim, at which point she noticed that his left hand did not feel normal and would not respond to her touch. U took the victim to the bathroom, where there was more lighting, and saw that his hand was extremely swollen and had formed a large blister. U began yelling at the sight of the victim's hand, at which point he started to cry. U called 911 shortly before 4 a.m.

The police arrived at the apartment at approximately 4 a.m. Both the defendant and U informed the police that the victim had not been injured before U had left for the birthday party at 11:30 p.m., and the defendant further stated that he had been with the victim all night long. The defendant was taken to the police station, where he subsequently gave the following four explanations about how the injury had occurred: (1) he accidentally had burned the victim while preparing a bottle; (2) he had burned the victim either with his lighter or a cigarette; (3) the three year old may have burned the victim with the lighter; and (4) the victim may have crawled over the bed and burned himself on the baseboard heater beside the bed. After further questioning the defendant finally claimed that he did not know how the burn had occurred.

The state charged the defendant with two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21(a)(1),⁴ and one count of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1).⁵ Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of one count of risk of injury to a child for his wilful delay in seeking medical attention for the victim, but he was acquitted of the other two charges. The trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment, execution suspended after thirty-five months, followed by five years of probation.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia,⁶ that the state produced insufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 374, 921 A.2d 679. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant, and concluded that there was no direct evidence indicating how old the injury was when U called 911, and, therefore, no evidence indicating that there was a delay in seeking medical attention at all. Id., at 378, 921 A.2d 679. The Appellate Court further concluded that the state had presented insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was aware of the victim's injury before U called 911, and that the jury's inference regarding such awareness was too speculative to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 379, 921 A.2d 679. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case with direction to render judgment of acquittal. Id. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

On appeal, the state claims that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the state claims that the Appellate Court improperly failed to: (1) consider the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the state to support its theory of when the injury occurred; and (2) view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict when it determined that there was insufficient evidence to show a delay in seeking medical attention or that the defendant was aware of the injury before U called 911. In response, the defendant adopts the reasoning of the Appellate Court in claiming that there was no evidence indicating when the injury occurred from which the jury could conclude that there was a delay in seeking medical attention, and that the state's theory as to the defendant's awareness of the injury was too speculative based on the evidence adduced at trial. We agree with the state and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction.

"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....

"We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt....

"Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. ... It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.... In evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The [finder of fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 542-43, 881 A.2d 290 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082, 126 S.Ct. 1798, 164 L.Ed.2d 537 (2006). Nevertheless, "[b]ecause [t]he only kind of an inference recognized by the law is a reasonable one ... any such inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture.... It is axiomatic therefore, that [a]ny [inference] drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Niemeyer, 258 Conn. 510, 518, 782 A.2d 658 (2001).

"Finally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt ... nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal.... On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact's] verdict of guilty." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, supra, 275 Conn. at 543, 881 A.2d 290.

In order to establish the crime of risk of injury to a child under the "situation" prong of § 53-21(a)(1), the state must prove that the defendant wilfully or unlawfully caused or permitted a child under the age...