State v. Nadeau
| Decision Date | 21 May 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 9408,9408 |
| Citation | 105 A.2d 194,81 R.I. 505 |
| Parties | STATE v. NADEAU. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
William E. Powers, Atty. Gen., Alfred E. Motta, Sp. Counsel, Providence, for State.
Joseph Mainelli, Providence, for defendant.
This indictment in substance charged the defendant with unlawfully and corruptly attempting to obtain from another person a gift as an inducement to secure for the latter an appointment to the police force of the city of Woonsocket in this state in violation of general laws 1938, chapter 612, § 21. In the superior court, after the defendant's plea in abatement and his motion to dismiss were overruled, the case was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged. Thereafter the trial justice denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and the case is here on his bill of exceptions to that decision and to certain other rulings made before and during the trial.
The following among other facts appear in the undisputed evidence. At all times referred to in the indictment the defendant Leo A. Nadeau was a duly elected councilman from the fifth ward in the city of Woonsocket. Robert A. Gallant, the complaining witness, was a candidate for appointment to the police force of said city. All such appointments were entirely within the power and control of the board of police commissioners, hereinafter called the board, which comprised the mayor and two other elected members.
On January 20, 1951 twenty-one candidates, including the complaining witness, took the written examination and on January 27 Gallant was examined physically by the police surgeon. The reports of both examinations were then evaluated by the chief of police, who reported his recommendations to the board as to all the applicants who took the examinations. Gallant received a rating of 59, was twentieth on the list, was not recommended by the chief of police, and was not appointed.
On the vital question of defendant's attempt to obtain money from the complaining witness as charged in the indictment, the evidence is conflicting. The state relied solely on the complaining witness who testified to the effect that on February 10, 1951 he received a telephone message initiated by defendant to meet the latter at the pumping station where he worked; that neither had known the other personally; and that after mutual identifications they went from the boiler room to a small office. The defendant, according to Gallant's testimony, closed the door and asked if he were still interested in getting a job on the police force. When Gallant answered affirmatively defendant said: 'I will put your name in for the next meeting,' and then stated: 'There's reasons--there's reasons * * * if you want to get on.' When asked what the reasons were defendand said 'Twelve hundred dollars * * * if you want to get on.'
Gallant further testified that he was told to bring the $1,200 to defendant at the pumping station as soon as he decided. After returning home to talk it over with his wife, Gallant telephoned defendant about 12:30 p. m. at the pumping station as follows: 'I told him to forget about it; that I couldn't afford to pay for the job.' At that time defendant told Gallant in effect to forget the matter and leave it where it was.
The defendant on the other hand categorically denied that he had asked for or talked about 'reasons' or money, or delivery thereof, as testified by Gallant. He admitted the latter's visit and telephone calls, but explained that the incident was initiated by another councilman, admittedly a friend of Gallant, who had previously spoken to defendant about helping to get a police appointment for Gallant. According to defendant the visit and telephone calls were not made on February 10, because he was sick for the first two weeks in February, and that it probably was earlier, that is, during the time he, defendant, was being briefed about the job he was to begin the first Monday of February.
The defendant further explained that they went to a small office, away from the noise of the boiler room, so they could hear each other and that he had promised he would do what he could to help Gallant and would talk to some of the members of the board after he finished work at three o'clock. However, Gallant telephoned back about 12:30 p. m. to the effect that he was no longer interested in getting on the police force. Consequently defendant never spoke to any person about it, nor did he attempt to do anything to further or to reject the application of Gallant. Apparently at that time neither defendant nor Gallant knew whether the chief of police had recommended or rejected the latter's application.
Under his motion for a directed verdict, defendant argues in substance that the evidence showed at best a mere solicitation; that neither 'solicitation' nor an 'attempt to receive' a bribe was mentioned in the statute and therefore was intentionally omitted; that in any event solicitation at common law was related to a felony whereas violation of the statute here is only a misdemeanor; and that if the act is considered as an attempt to commit a crime, there was no proof of a bribe or willingness on the part of the complaining witness to pay a bribe and no overt act pursuant to such a willingness or agreement. In support of these contentions defendant strongly relies on State v. Bowles, 70 Kan. 821, 79 P. 726, 69 L.R.A. 176, State v. Campbell, 70 Kan. 900, 79 P. 1133, and People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 255 P. 792, 52 A.L.R. 811, as holding that the mere offer or solicitation of a bribe would not be sufficient to prove an offense under an alleged similar statute.
We do not agree with these contentions. The pertinent part of the indictment charged that defendant Whatever the case may be at common law or elsewhere, the crime here charged was an alleged violation of G.L. 1938, chapter 612, § 21. That section, entitled 'Offenses Against Public Policy' was first enacted as public laws 1905, chapter 1219, and reads in part as follows: 'No * * * public official shall corruptly accept, or obtain or agree to accept, or attempt to obtain * * * any gift or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do * * * any act in relation to the business of his principal, master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he is an official, or for showing or forbearing to show favor or disfavor to any person in relation to the business of his principal, master, employer, or state, city or town of which he is an official.'
Prior to 1905, provisions of this kind were apparently directed to offenses against public justice which involved only official acts of the judicial department. See G.L. 1896, chapter 276, §§ 4 and 5. The addition of the pertinent sections, now G.L. 1938, chapter 612, §§ 21 and 22, show a clear intent to extend such crimes to include violations involving acts in the executive and legislative departments. Moreover it specifically makes it a crime to 'attempt to obtain * * * any gift or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do * * * any act * * * or for showing or forbearing to show favor or disfavor to any person in relation to the business of his principal, master, employer, or state, city or town of which he is an official.'
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