State v. Naegle

• Decision Date: 28 October 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 34,451,34,451
• Citation: 388 P.3d 692
• Parties: State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Naegle a/k/a Michael Naegele, Defendant, and Mickey's Bail Bonds and Sherron Little, Sureties–Appellants, and Universal Fire and Casualty Company, Surety.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

388 P.3d 692

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v. Michael Naegle a/k/a Michael Naegele, Defendant,andMickey's Bail Bonds and Sherron Little, Sureties–Appellants,andUniversal Fire and Casualty Company, Surety.

NO. 34,451

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: October 28, 2016

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Templeman & Crutchfield, PC, C. Barry Crutchfield, Lovington, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge

{1} We write to clarify various issues regarding the remittitur of a bail bond that has been forfeited pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 31–3–2 (1993). When a bail bond has been filed in the magistrate court to secure the release of a defendant in a criminal case and the bond has not been transferred to the district court, all proceedings regarding the forfeiture of the bond must occur in the magistrate court. In addition, any subsequent proceedings to remit a previous forfeiture of the bond must be addressed in the same court where the forfeiture occurred—in this case, the magistrate court. Appeals to the district court regarding the bond forfeiture proceedings that occurred in the magistrate court are only addressed by the district court in its appellate capacity. Appellants' attempt to have this Court order a remittitur of the bail bond previously forfeited by the magistrate court was premature. The district court properly addressed the original bail bond forfeiture in an appellate capacity. We affirm the district court's determination that the bail bond forfeiture complied with Section 31–3–2 and further bond proceedings were properly remanded to the magistrate court.

I. Background and Procedural History

{2} This case arose from a default judgment on a bail bond entered by the magistrate court of Lea County on May 16, 2013, in case number M–26–IR–2012–00016. The bond was posted by Mickey's Bail Bonds through its agent, Sherron Little (Appellants), to secure the pretrial release of Michael Naegle, a/k/a Michael Naegele (Defendant). Defendant was charged with the felony offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66–8–102 (2010), and driving without a valid driver's license pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66–5–2 (2007). On September 19, 2012, the magistrate court entered an order admitting Defendant to bail in the amount of $ 5,000 subject to certain conditions, and Defendant was released on bail. Appellants, as surety, posted the $ 5,000 bail bond to obtain Defendant's release. Defendant failed to appear at a preliminary hearing on October 17, 2012, and the magistrate court issued a bench warrant for Defendant's arrest that included the language: "THIS WARRANT MAY BE EXECUTED ANYWHERE IN THIS STATE." The magistrate court further gave notice of a hearing on November 19, 2012, to forfeit the bail bond and enter judgment against Defendant and Appellants "unless they showed [good] cause why judgment should not be entered against them." The magistrate court later issued a continuance, signed by Appellant Little, and the hearing was rescheduled. On May 10, 2013, the magistrate court again rescheduled the hearing and issued a third notice of intent to hold a hearing to forfeit the bail bond unless Defendant and Appellants "showed [good] cause why judgment should not be entered against them." At the forfeiture hearing on May 16, 2013, neither Defendant nor Appellants appeared and the magistrate court entered an order forfeiting the bond and granting judgment against Appellants for the full amount of the bail bond. Appellants appealed this order to the district court.

{3} No activity occurred for over a year. On October 8, 2014, after a dismissal without prejudice for lack of prosecution, the district court ordered the reinstatement of the appeal and issued a new bench warrant for Defendant's arrest. Appellants then secured Defendant from Arkansas and returned him to New Mexico where he was taken into custody on December 3, 2014.

{4} At the district court hearing held on January 16, 2015, Appellant Little testified that Defendant fled to Arkansas after his initial bond hearing but Appellants had been unable to extradite him because the bench warrant issued by the magistrate court was not executable beyond the territorial limits of New Mexico. Appellant Little further stated that she believed the bench warrant issued by the magistrate court was only for "in state" but because it was for a felony, she had requested and received a "good" bench warrant from the district court. Appellant Little recounted that after receiving the bench warrant from the district court, she drove to Arkansas, and notified the local authorities of her intention to extradite Defendant and they said, "call if you have any problems." Appellant Little took Defendant into her custody and brought him back to New Mexico. Appellants then argued to the district court that the bond was not subject to forfeiture under New Mexico law.

{5} After undertaking a review of the relevant Arkansas law, the district court found that it was unnecessary for Appellants to have secured a new district court bench warrant in order to lawfully apprehend Defendant in Arkansas. As such, the district court determined that the state of Arkansas did not thwart the efforts of Appellant Little to apprehend Defendant. See State v. Amador , 1982–NMSC–083, ¶ 14, 98 N.M. 270, 648 P.2d 309. Additionally, although the district court found that Appellant Little was instrumental in securing Defendant's return to New Mexico, the district court concluded that Appellants had failed, under Rule 8–406(D) NMRA, to show an impediment to Defendant's appearance or that Defendant was taken into custody prior to the entry of the magistrate court judgment. See id . ("The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside ... upon a showing of good cause why the defendant did not appear as required by the bond or if the defendant is surrendered by the surety into custody prior to the entry of a judgment of default on the bond.") Therefore, the district court determined that Appellants "failed to sustain their burden on appeal." The district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate court and remanded the case for enforcement of the magistrate's previous orders and judgments. It is from this ruling that Appellants filed a timely appeal to this Court.

II. DISCUSSION

{6} Appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion in affirming the bond forfeiture entered by the magistrate court. Appellants raise two issues on appeal challenging the district court's ruling, arguing that: (1) the forfeiture was unreasonable as it was in direct conflict with the logic and effects of the facts, and as such, was contrary to reason and common sense; and (2) the forfeiture was contrary to provisions of Section 31–3–2(F) that governs the remittitur of a forfeited bond. The State argues that Appellants failed to preserve any issue regarding Section 31–3–2(F) in the district court and notwithstanding such a failure of preservation, that Section 31–3–2(F) is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers because it is an unreasonable infringement on the judiciary. We hold that the district court did not err in affirming the forfeiture of the bond by the magistrate court under Section 31–3–2. We further conclude that the question of Appellants' entitlement to remittitur under Section 31–3–2(F) was not ripe for determination in the district court. As a result, we decline to address the State's additional constitutional argument.

Standard of Review

{7} Section 31–3–2 controls the substantive rights and procedural process for the forfeiture and remittitur of bail bonds. Section 31–3–2(B)(2), states that "[w]henever a person fails to appear at the time and place fixed by the terms of his bail bond, the court ... may declare a forfeiture of the bail." Furthermore, the court "may direct that a forfeiture be set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture." Section 31–3–2 (C). On appeal, the district court will review any pretrial or preliminary rulings previously made by lower courts on a de novo basis. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 27 ; City of Farmington v. Pinon–Garcia , 2012–NMCA–079, ¶ 13, 284 P.3d 1086. To the extent that the issue before the district court called for an interpretation of statutory law, we review the issue de novo. State v. Pacheco, 2008–NMCA–055, ¶ 15, 143 N.M. 851, 182 P.3d 834. Insofar as the statutory provisions themselves required the magistrate court to exercise discretion in determining whether to order the forfeiture of a bond we review the ruling for an abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 25. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by its ruling unless we can characterize [the ruling] as clearly untenable or not justified by reason." State v. Rojo , 1999–NMSC–001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

No Error by the Magistrate Court

{8} As noted above, forfeiture and remittance of bail bonds is governed by Section 31–3–2. When a defendant fails to appear, the court may declare a forfeiture of the bail bond. See § 31–3–2(B)(2). "If the court declares a forfeiture, it shall ... declare such forfeiture at the time of nonappearance [,] give written notice thereof to the surety within four working days of declaration[,] and issue a bench warrant for the person's arrest."Id. A court has discretion to set aside the forfeiture if justice so requires, but if the forfeiture is declared, the court may enter a default judgment against the surety. Section 31–3–2 (C), (D). The procedure to enter a default judgment under the statute reads:

Notice of the motion to enter a judgment

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