State v. Nagle

• Decision Date: 15 April 1903
• Parties: STATE v. NAGLE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

54 A. 1063

25 R.I. 105

STATE

v. NAGLE.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 15, 1903.

Rose Nagle was convicted of murder, and she petitions for a new trial. Petition granted.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and DOUGLAS, JJ.

Charles P. Stearns, Atty. Gen., for the State.

George R. Macleod, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. The defendant, who has been convicted of the crime of murder, now petitions for a new trial on various grounds, amongst which are certain alleged erroneous rulings of the trial court in the admission of testimony.

The defendant's husband, James Nagle, came to his death on the 14th day of November, 1901, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, from the effect of a pistol shot which was fired into his head while he was in bed, or on the bed, in his own house in East Providence. Shortly after the fatal shot was fired, the defendant called in some of her neighbors, and told them that her husband had shot himself, which statement was then accepted by them, as it also was by the medical examiner, who appeared a few moments later, as being true. The day following, however, in view of certain circumstantial evidence which had been discovered in relation to the taking off of the deceased, and particularly in relation to the alleged purchase by the defendant, a short time before, of a pistol at the store of Halliday Bros, in East Providence, she was arrested upon a criminal complaint charging her with the murder of her husband. Upon being arraigned in the district court of the Seventh Judicial District she pleaded not guilty to said charge, and was ordered committed to jail to await a preliminary examination in said court. She was committed to jail by Samuel S. Barney, town sergeant and mittimus officer of the town of East Providence, and while on the way to jail in his custody certain statements or admissions were made by her, according to his testimony, to which he was allowed to testify against the defendant's objection in the trial of the indictment now before us. Before testifying to such statements or admissions, the witness was inquired of by the attorney general as to whether any inducement was offered to defendant to talk about the affair; also whether the witness tried to get her to talk with him about it, or whether he made any threat to her in the premises. His answer was that he had no inducement to hold out to her, and actually held out none; whereupon he was permitted, against the defendant's objection, to testify to the conversation which took place between them. He testified as follows: "She insisted on her innocence. She said: 'They have found me guilty, and bound me over to the grand jury—guilty of killing Jimmy. I am innocent. I did not kill him.' I said to her: 'You have an undoubted right to plead guilty or not guilty. That is your privilege. There is no reason why you should plead guilty. You have that privilege. The court allows you that either way.' There was nothing further said about the matter of killing directly. She said something about the pistol. She says: 'I didn't buy a pistol. In fact,' she says, 'I was never in Halliday's store in my life.' I reminded her that nothing had been said about Halliday's store; that I hadn't mentioned it. She talked rather incoherently about some other matters, and I asked her a question. I said, 'What did you pay for the pistol?' She said '$2.' She didn't say where she bought it directly. 'Well,' I said, 'did you pay for the cartridges?' She said, 'They gave me the cartridges in the store.' Q. Was there anything said in that conversation about insurance on James Nagle's life? A. There was. She said that she had two insurance policies, if I remember correctly, $200 each, or something to that effect. 'if I am proven and found guilty I shall lose that; I would not get a cent of it.'" in cross-examination the court said to defendant's counsel, "You can ascertain now about those threats and the in ducements held out." The witness then stated that he told defendant that the truth, whatever that might be, ought to be told, but that she had an undoubted right to plead guilty or not guilty in regard to any part of the case which was coming before the court; that he also told her: "The truth is always the best, except where it would be a means of conviction; and even then I should prefer, if it was my case, to tell the truth. Q. And you told her that before she said these things? A. Yes, sir; I told her so always."

In view of these admissions on the part of the witness Barney, the defendant's counsel then requested that the jury be instructed not to consider said testimony, on the ground that witness had no right to give her advice at all, or hold out any inducements. This request was denied, and the defendant duly excepted thereto. In further cross-examination witness testified that he said to defendant: "'it is thought that you bought this revolver,' but she said, 'No, sir; I did not buy it' I said to her, 'There is no question but what you bought the revolver, and if you did you will gain nothing by denying it' Also: 'it would be better for you to tell the truth. We have ample proof that you purchased this revolver.' That she said: T did not, and I never was in Halliday's store in my life.' I remarked that I did not mention Halliday's store in the matter at all. 'Now.' I said, 'having mentioned the place where you bought it, you might just as well say whether or not you bought it. What did you pay them for that revolver?' She said 'I paid them $2.00 for it, and they gave me the cartridges.'" Defendant then told witness where she had put the revolver, but she persistently denied ever having used it upon her husband.

The question raised by the defendant's exception, broadly considered, is whether the court erred in not granting defendant's request to instruct the jury not to consider any part of said Barney's testimony which related to statements or admissions made by defendant concerning the purchase of the pistol and the procuring of the cartridges therefor. Although the statements or admissions in question did not amount to a confession within the strict legal import of that term—a confession being a voluntary acknowledgment of guilt, or, as well and concisely defined in Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence, p. 52, "A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime" —yet, as said admissions had a vital bearing upon a highly important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence relied on by the prosecution, we must regard them as in the nature of a confession. Indeed, we think it is manifest from the record that the sole ground upon which the proof of the conversation above set out was tendered by the prosecution was that it was in the nature of a confession. And, this being so, it follows that in determining whether the proper foundation for its admission was laid, or, rather, whether the trial court erred in not ruling it out, as requested by defendant, it is immaterial how far the confession tended to prove guilt. "Having been offered as a confession," as said by the court in the recent and noted case of Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. p. 541, 18 Sup. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568, "and being admissible only because of that fact, a consideration of the measure of proof which resulted from it does not arise in determining its admissibility. If found to have been illegally admitted, reversible error will result, since the prosecution cannot, on the one hand, offer evidence to prove guilt, and which, by the very offer, is vouched for as tending to that end, and, on the other hand, for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of the error caused by its wrongful admission, be heard to assert that the matter offered as a confession was not prejudicial, because it did not tend to prove guilt." This quotation is pertinent to the case at bar. The admissions made by the defendant were offered by the prosecution as tending to prove guilt. If they did not have that tendency, then they were inadmissible in evidence. But that they clearly did tend to prove guilt, and that they were only admissible as being in the nature of a confession, or as amounting to a partial confession, is evident.

Treating the statements of the defendant in question, then, as in the nature of a confession, we are next to inquire whether, in view of the manner in which they were obtained by the committing officer, they were obnoxious to the rule which obtains in such cases. This rule is well stated in 3 Russell on Crimes (6th Ed.) 478, as follows: "But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence; not obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. * * * A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise, for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted." See, also, 1 Greenl. Ev. (16th Ed.) §§ 219, 220; Taylor on Ev. (9th Ed.) § 872 et seq.; 1 Bishop, Crim. Pro. (3d Ed.) § 1217 et seq.; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262; Reg. v. Baldy, 2 Den. & P. Crown Cases, 428.

We have come to the conclusion, after much consideration, that the statements or admissions made by the defendant were not freely and voluntarily made within the rule as thus stated, and hence were improperly allowed to go to the jury. It appears, from the cross-examination of the committing officer, Barney, that, previous to the making of most of said statements by the defendant, he bad told her that the truth, whatever that might be, ought to be told; that it was always the best, except where it would be the means of conviction;...