State v. Nagle

• Decision Date: 17 January 1884
• Citation: 14 R.I. 331
• Parties: STATE v. PATRICK NAGLE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

14 R.I. 331

STATE v. PATRICK NAGLE.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 17, 1884

When an indictment charges an offence with a continuando, evidence is admissible to prove the commission of the offence at any time within the period alleged.

When an indictment charges an offence as committed on a given day evidence is admissible to prove the commission of the offence either on the given day or on any other day before the finding of the indictment and within the period of limitation, but only on one day.

When an Indictment charges an offence as committed on a given day and the prosecutor wishes to introduce evidence of its commission on another day, he should specify before hand the day to which his proof will apply, otherwise he will by introducing evidence referring the offence to one day be confined to that day.

When an indictment charged an offence as committed on a given day and evidence at the trial was admitted tending to prove the commission of the offence on other days also:

Held, that the prosecutor should have been required to specify the day on which he would go to the jury.

A motion for a bill of particulars is addressed to the discretion of the court.

A motion to continue a case on account of surprise is addressed to the discretion of the court.

Such motions are not revisable on a bill of exceptions.

Pub Stat. R.I. cap. 204, § 34, providing that " in any case the court may, and upon the request of either party it shall, direct the jury to return a special verdict upon an issue submitted to the jury," does not apply to criminal prosecutions.

EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas.

This case was a complaint against the defendant brought in the Justice Court of the town of Pawtucket, for illegally keeping for sale intoxicating liquors in said town, October 13, 1883. The defendant, after conviction in the Justice Court, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. In the latter court the defendant asked for a bill of particulars, stating specifically the time and place of the alleged illegal acts, which the State intended to prove. The State specified the place but refused to specify the time, claiming the right to offer evidence as to any day or any number of days within two years prior to the date of the complaint. The presiding justice refused to order a specification of the time and the defendant excepted.

In the Court of Common Pleas the State offered evidence to the jury of the defendant's guilt on October 13, and then put in evidence tending to show his guilt on August 11, 1883, September 30, 1883, and October 7, 1883, whereupon the defendant asked for a continuance of the case, alleging surprise. The presiding justice refused the continuance and the defendant excepted. The defendant then asked the court for an order directing the State to elect upon which day it would claim that the defendant committed the offence. The presiding justice refused this request and the defendant excepted. The evidence as to days other than October 13 was admitted against the defendant's objection and the defendant excepted.

After the evidence had been closed the defendant asked the court for an order directing the jury to bring in a special verdict as to the day on which the offence was committed. The presiding justice refused the request and the defendant excepted.

Pub. Stat. R.I. cap. 204, § 34, provide:

" No action shall be defeated by the misjoinder of parties, if the matter in controversy can be properly dealt with and settled between the parties before the court; and the court may order any party improperly joined in any action to be stricken out, or may, upon such terms as may be proper, order any other person to be made a party to such action, and to be summoned in to answer thereto; and in any case the court may, and upon the request of either party it shall, direct the jury to return a special verdict upon an issue submitted to the jury."

Samuel P. Colt, Attorney General, for plaintiff.

Charles E. Gorman & Hugh J. Carroll, for defendant.

DURFEE C. J.

A motion for a bill of particulars is a motion addressed to the discretion of the court, and as such is not revisable for error on a bill of exceptions. Commonwealth v. Giles, 1 Gray, 466; Commonwealth v. Wood, 4 Gray, 11; Chaffee v. Soldan, 5 Mich. 242; State v. Hood, 51 Me. 363. The first exception is, therefore, overruled. For the same reason the exception for the refusal of the court below to grant a continuance asked for by the defendant on the ground of surprise must be overruled.

The complaint, dated October 19, 1883, charges the defendant with illegally keeping intoxicating liquors for sale on October 13, 1883. On the trial the State first introduced certain testimony tending to prove the commission of the offence October 13. The witness was then asked by the prosecution if he had been near or at the defendant's premises before October 13. The record shows that the question was objected to, allowed, and exception reserved. Testimony was then introduced tending to show the commission of the offence on divers days before October 13, to wit: on October 7 September 30, and August 11. Thereupon the...