State v. Namyst
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | A20-0482 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Emily Maye Namyst, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Adrian S. Lafavor-Montez, Colich & Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Conor E. Tobin, Grannis & Hauge, P.A. Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
Appellant challenges her conviction for failing to yield to a pedestrian, arguing that the district court erred in instructing the jury, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction.We affirm.
On February 1, 2019, around 7:00 p.m., A.P. was driving her husband (J.P.) and their children home.A.P. was driving in St. Louis Park, heading east on Excelsior Boulevard to turn onto Yosemite Avenue.The Excelsior-Yosemite intersection has two eastbound lanes and one turn lane onto Yosemite.A.P. was in the right-hand lane.When A.P. was roughly 300 feet from the turn, she saw a pedestrian, K.C., in the crosswalk on or by a median separating east and westbound traffic on Excelsior.K.C. was facing south to cross eastbound traffic.A.P. slowed and came to a complete stop within two to three seconds.A semi-truck similarly stopped behind A.P.'s vehicle.
K.C. was wearing dark-colored clothing and she had her hood up.K.C. did not move until A.P.'s vehicle stopped.She then looked to her right before crossing Excelsior in the crosswalk.K.C. walked at a slow-to-normal pace.As K.C. crossed, she was hit by the vehicle in the lane next to A.P.'s vehicle.K.C. "fl[ew]" approximately six feet into the air over the driver's side of the vehicle and landed in the middle of the intersection several feet from the crosswalk.J.P. ran to K.C.'s assistance and called 911.
The state charged Namyst with careless driving and failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk or at an intersection in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 169.13, subd. 2, .21, subd. 2(a)(2018).
At Namyst's jury trial, A.P. and J.P. testified and recounted the accident similarly.K.C. testified that she had been on a bus going home from work and pulled the string for the bus to stop.Her next memory is being in the hospital and hearing that she had been unconscious for ten days because she was injured as a result of a collision with a vehicle.K.C. suffered extensive injuries, including, Officers testified regarding the "significant damage" to the front driver's side of Namyst's vehicle.
Namyst testified that she lived near the intersection and was aware of the crosswalk and how it is marked with a sign and white paint on the roadway.Namyst testified that she noticed the vehicles to her right slowing down.Namyst took her foot off of the accelerator and scanned the area for something that caused the vehicles to stop, but she did not brake.She admitted that the vehicles could have stopped for a pedestrian.Namyst testified that she did not see K.C., but was aware something happened when "[she] made an impact."
During deliberations, the jury submitted questions, including: (1)"Can the time a pedestrian is walking in front of a stopped car in the left turn lane be interpreted as a place of safety?" and (2)"Can a single location be defined simultaneously as both a crosswalk and a place?"The district court provided the jury with the definition of a "place of safety" as stated in Brazington v. Plankerton, 82 N.W.2d 620(Minn.1957).Over Namyst's objection, the district court instructed the jury that "other place of safety" means "safety zones or safety islands when they have been provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways in the interests of safety."
The jury found Namyst not guilty of careless driving, but guilty of failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk.The district court sentenced Namyst to 90 days in the workhouse, with 85 days stayed for one year and five days of sentence to service, and imposed a fine.This appeal followed.
Jury instruction
Namyst first argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of "other place of safety."The district court's jury instructions are reviewed as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law, without misstating the law.State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 522(Minn.2016).District courts are afforded "broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the language of jury instructions."State v. Smith, 674 N.W.2d 398, 400(Minn.2004).Absent an abuse of that discretion, this court will not reverse a district court's decision on jury instructions.State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682(Minn.2007).
"The extent to which a district court must explain the law of the case, define the crime charged, and explain the elements of the offense" depends on the facts and law of each particular case.State v. Moore, 863 N.W.2d 111, 120(Minn. App.2015), review denied(Minn. July 21, 2015)."[D]etailed definitions of an element of an offense may be necessary if, without the additional detail, the instructions could mislead the jury or cause the jury to speculate about what the state must prove to obtain a guilty verdict."Id.
Namyst was charged with failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.21, subd. 2(a).Under the statute:
Where traffic-control signals are not in place or in operation, the driver of a vehicle shall stop to yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a marked crosswalk or at an intersection with no marked crosswalk.The driver must remain stopped until the pedestrian has passed the lane in which the vehicle is stopped.No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield.
Minn. Stat. § 169.21, subd. 2(a)(emphasis added).
After the jury returned with questions, the district court instructed that "other place of safety" means "safety zones or safety islands when they have been provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways in the interests of safety."SeeBrazington, 82 N.W.2d at 623.Namyst claims that the definition of "other place of safety" from Brazington misled the jury.
In Brazington, a pedestrian saw the defendant's car approaching from one block away, stepped off the curb, and started crossing a street.Id. at 621.While crossing, the pedestrian saw the defendant's car getting closer but was unable to estimate its distancefrom her; she hesitated slightly, took more steps, and then was struck by the defendant's car.Id. at 621-22.The defendant argued that he should have been granted a directed verdict because the pedestrian was negligent for continuing after she hesitated and saw him approaching, and her negligence proximately caused the accident.Id. at 622.
The supreme court determined that the pedestrian was not negligent as a matter of law because she was struck after she had taken several steps from the center of the intersection, indicating that, had the defendant complied with Minn. Stat. § 169.21, subd. 2,1 and yielded the right-of-way, there would have been no accident.Id.The supreme court also stated that the district court was not required to instruct the jury that the pedestrian was guilty of "suddenly leaving a 'curb or other place of safety' into the path of a closely approaching vehicle," in part, because the reference "to 'other place of safety' obviously was intended to relate to [s]afety zones or [s]afety islands when they have been provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways in the interests of safety."Id. at 623.The supreme court concluded that any other construction of the term "would in effect nullify totally statutes relating to pedestrian right-of-way at such intersections and crosswalks."Id.
Here, the jury asked, "Can the time a pedestrian is walking in front of a stopped car in the left turn lane be interpreted as a place of safety?" and "Can a single location be defined simultaneously as both a crosswalk and a place?"The district court instructed the jury that an "other place of safety" means "safety zones or safety islands when they havebeen provided for pedestrians on heavily traveled streets or highways."By explaining that a "place of safety" includes "safety zones," the jury had to determine whether K.C. suddenly left a safety zone—the portion of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial