State v. Naranjo
| Decision Date | 21 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 36473.,36473. |
| Citation | 152 Idaho 134,267 P.3d 721 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Eloy NARANJO, Jr., Defendant–Appellant. |
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Eloy Naranjo, Jr. appeals his judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine of twenty-eight (28) grams or more, but less than two hundred (200) grams, Idaho Code § 37–2732B(a)(4),1 and failure to obtain a tax stamp, I.C. § 63–4205. We vacate the conviction and remand.
Officer Martinez with the Jerome County Sheriff's Office was contacted by an individual who volunteered to act as a confidential informant (the CI) in return for accommodations from the sheriff's office regarding his sister's (the CI's sister) arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The CI notified the sheriff's office that he believed he could purchase methamphetamine from Naranjo because he had purchased from Naranjo in the past. The sheriff's office agreed to set up a controlled buy from Naranjo using the CI to make the purchase. Naranjo agreed to meet the CI in a grocery store parking lot to sell him and his supposed friend (an undercover Drug Enforcement Administration officer) four ounces of methamphetamine. The officer searched the CI before the controlled buy to ensure he did not have any drugs, weapons, or a significant amount of money. After the CI and the undercover officer arrived at the parking lot as agreed, Naranjo called the CI and told him to meet at Naranjo's house. At that time, the CI was aware that his sister was at Naranjo's house.
The undercover officer parked his vehicle in Naranjo's driveway and the CI entered the house to conduct the purchase. For safety concerns, the undercover officer was unwilling to enter the house, and he was unwilling to send the CI in with the money until he saw the methamphetamine. The CI's sister exited the house to show the officer approximately one gram of methamphetamine. The officer remained in his vehicle, but gave the CI the money to make the purchase. The CI returned to the house and negotiated a sale in which Naranjo allegedly gave the CI a baggie containing one ounce (28.35 grams) of methamphetamine, and the CI gave Naranjo the $900 he received from the officer. After the transaction, Naranjo stood in front of his house and the officer was able to visually identify him.
At trial, the State's witnesses included: the CI, the undercover officer, Officer Martinez, and Scott Hoopes, a forensic chemist. Agent Lehnhoff, to whom the substance was given for processing and testing, did not testify and Naranjo did not call any witnesses or testify. Naranjo argued that the CI and his sister set him up by fabricating the sale at his house and that the State could not tie him to the methamphetamine because it did not test the baggie for his fingerprints. The jury convicted Naranjo of failing to obtain a tax stamp and trafficking in methamphetamine of at least twenty-eight grams. Naranjo was sentenced to a unified term of ten years with five years determinate for trafficking in methamphetamine, to run concurrent with a unified term of three years with one year determinate for failing to obtain a tax stamp. Naranjo filed a motion for a new trial arguing he had newly-discovered evidence, which was denied. Naranjo appeals.
Naranjo claims that: (1) the district court erroneously admitted prior bad act evidence, the CI's statement that he had previously purchased methamphetamine from Naranjo; (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that the substance Naranjo sold was methamphetamine because Agent Lehnhoff did not testify; (3) the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of the offense; and (4) if these three errors were harmless standing alone, together they constituted cumulative error.
Naranjo claims that insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction because "there was no evidence that established that the substance that tested positive for being methamphetamine was the same substance that Mr. Naranjo was alleged to have delivered to [the CI]...." The sole basis for this contention is that Agent Lehnhoff, the DEA agent to whom the undercover officer delivered the substance, did not testify regarding his handling and transfer of the substance for testing.2
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998) ; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001 ; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App.1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101 ; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.
The CI testified that Naranjo weighed out an ounce of a crystal substance, placed it in a clear baggie and sold it to the CI. He further testified that he gave the baggie to the undercover officer. The undercover officer explained that he obtained the baggie from the CI and delivered it to Special Agent Lehnhoff, who did not testify because he was in Afghanistan. The undercover officer testified at length regarding the procedures used to handle and transport substances. These procedures included placing the substance in a heat-sealed envelope, identifying the envelope by case number, date, when and where the substance was obtained, and other identifying information. Compliance with the procedures is evidenced by the handling officer's signature and a witness signature. Procedures for shipping the substance to the DEA laboratory in San Diego for testing were also explained. The undercover officer examined the heat-sealed envelope placed into evidence and testified that the markings on it demonstrated that all of the procedures had been followed. He testified that he recognized Special Agent Lehnhoff's handwriting and his signature, together with the witnessing officer's signature. He further testified that the envelope contained all of the information required by the standard procedures. Finally, the undercover officer testified that the envelope contained the information to be included by the testing laboratory and that it appeared that the DEA's process was also followed.
Scott Hoopes, the forensic chemist with the DEA, testified that he performed the chemical analysis on the package received from Special Agent Lehnhoff using the proper procedures. He testified that the substance offered at trial was the same substance he had received, which was evidenced by the seal and his initials on the package. He further testified that the substance tested positive for methamphetamine.
We have reviewed the trial evidence and conclude that there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact, considering the evidence and reasonable inferences, could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance offered into evidence at trial, which tested positive for methamphetamine, was the same substance obtained by the CI from Naranjo.
Naranjo claims that the district court erred when it allowed the CI to testify that he had previously purchased methamphetamine from Naranjo because the testimony was inadmissible prior bad act evidence and the State's Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) notice was untimely. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's criminal propensity. I.R.E. 404(b) ; State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010) ; State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct.App.2009). However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b). Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the Idaho Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis. The first tier involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). Such evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude the act occurred and the defendant was the actor. Id. We will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been established by sufficient evidence as we do all factual findings by a trial court. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. We defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Id. Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667, 227 P.3d at 921 ; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. Therefore, when considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, we exercise free review of the trial court's relevancy determination. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190.
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. When reviewing this tier ...
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