State v. National Credit Co.
| Citation | 181 So. 769,236 Ala. 224 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | 6 Div. 335. |
| Parties | STATE v. NATIONAL CREDIT CO. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Tuscaloosa County; Tom B. Ward, Special Judge.
Appeal to the Circuit Court by the National Credit Company from an assessment made by the State Tax Commission for excise tax. From a judgment setting aside the assessment, the State appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
A. A Carmichael, Atty. Gen., and Matt H. Murphy, Sp. Atty. Gen and Wm. H. Ellis and Frontis H. Moore, both of Birmingham for the State.
Foster, Rice & Foster, of Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the State of Alabama from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, in Equity, setting aside an assessment made by the State Tax Commission for excise tax, levied against appellee under the provisions of An Act of the Legislature of Alabama, approved April 4th, 1933. General Acts, 1933, Extra Session, pages 104-110.
The major purpose of a similar Act of 1932, Gen. Acts 1932, Ex Sess., p. 107, was declared, in Union Bank & Trust Co. v. S. H. Blan, Individually, etc., 229 Ala. 180, 155 So. 612, 614, to be "to levy an excise tax for the privilege of engaging in the business of banking in the state of Alabama, and of conducting a financial business employing moneyed capital coming into competition with the business of national banks, so that national banks as well as state banks would be amenable to the law."
The assessment made against the appellee, National Credit Company, was for the tax year 1935, and was based upon, or measured by the net income of appellee for the year 1934.
In the record we find the following stipulation of counsel:
"It is agreed by and between the State of Alabama and National Credit Company, a partnership composed of V. Hugo Friedman, Sam Friedman, and Edwin Rosenfeld, that an assessment was duly and regularly made by the State Tax Commission of the State of Alabama for excise tax allegedly due by the said National Credit Company for the year 1935, based upon net income for the calendar year 1934, under the authority of Act No. 111, House Bill 413, approved April 4, 1933, General and Local Acts of 1933, page 104, and that a protest to said assessment was duly and regularly filed by said National Credit Company and duly and regularly heard by the said Commission, and that after such hearing, said assessment was made final in the amount of $79.90, and that if the said National Credit Company is liable for said tax, it is liable in said amount of $79.90, with interest thereon; that the said National Credit Company duly and properly appealed from said assessment, within the time allowed by law, to the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, in Equity, the county in which the members constituting the partnership firm of said National Credit Company reside and where said National Credit Company did business, and that after said appeal to said Circuit Court, a certified copy of the transcript of record of said Commission was duly filed in said Court and on the trial of this cause, said transcript was introduced in evidence by the State of Alabama, and a prima facie case thereby made out against the said National Credit Company."
The evidence offered on the trial of the cause conclusively establishes the following facts: That the appellee is a partnership, with its place of business in the City of Tuscaloosa; that for a number of years it has been engaged in the business of buying and discounting purchase money notes and conditional sales contracts, given for automobiles bought on time payment. This business has been carried on by appellee for a number of years, including the years of 1933 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937, in the Counties of Tuscaloosa and Pickens, and to some limited extent in Hale County. The notes and conditional sales contracts were given to the several automobile dealers, and by them sold or discounted, and transferred to the appellee. A part, about twenty per cent, of the paper is transferred to the National Credit Company without recourse, and the remaining eighty per cent is transferred upon endorsement by, and with recourse on, the automobile dealer. It also appears from the evidence that when an automobile is purchased on credit, or partly on credit, the purchaser gives the dealer a retention of title contract covering the balance due, of the sale price, together with insurance and other carrying charges; that the dealer then discounts, endorses and transfers the paper to...
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