State v. Neal

• Decision Date: 02 May 2017
• Docket Number: No. 51,274–KA,51,274–KA
• Citation: 219 So.3d 482
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Rashard NEAL, Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

219 So.3d 482

STATE of Louisiana, Appellee

v.Rashard NEAL, Appellant

No. 51,274–KA

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

May 2, 2017

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT, By: Carey J. Ellis, III, ANGELA L. CLAXTON, Counsel for Appellant

RASHARD NEAL, Pro Se

JAMES EDWARD PAXTON, District Attorney, ANITA TENNANT MACK, EDWIN MOBERLEY, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellee

Before Brown, Garrett, and Cox, JJ.

COX, J.

Following a trial by jury, Rashard Neal was unanimously convicted as charged of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Neal was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension. Neal appeals only his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

At 8:32 p.m. on the evening of September 4, 2014, the Madison Parish Sheriff's Office in Tallulah, Louisiana, received a report of a shooting at a local carwash. When deputies arrived at the scene, they discovered that Lapatrick Mitchell¹ had been shot and killed. Shortly before the shooting, several witnesses saw Mitchell and Neal engaged in a heated argument at the carwash over money. Neal conceded that the argument had occurred, but denied killing Mitchell. At trial, two eyewitnesses claimed that they saw Neal return to the carwash and shoot Mitchell.

A 9mm handgun was found on the rear passenger floorboard of Mitchell's vehicle, but it had not been fired. Three spent .40 caliber shell casings were also found at the scene. No physical evidence connected Neal to the crime, and no weapon was recovered. Neal's cellphone had little text message activity from 6:53 p.m. until 8:28 p.m. No witness could pinpoint the timing of the events. Based upon the eyewitness accounts, however, Neal was arrested the day after the shooting.

On December 8, 2014, Neal was charged by a grand jury indictment with the second degree murder of Mitchell. Neal's five-day trial ended on June 11, 2016, when a unanimous jury found him guilty as charged of second degree murder.

On June 16, 2016, Neal was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Neal argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who shot Mitchell. Although he admits that he had an argument with Mitchell, Neal contends that the two eyewitnesses who claimed they saw him shoot Mitchell gave inconsistent versions of the event to police and were not credible witnesses. Additionally, Neal argues that no evidence linked him to the crime. Specifically, no murder weapon was ever found and no gun recovered matched the spent casings found at the crime scene. Finally, Neal argues that detectives failed to investigate another possible suspect.

The state argues that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses identifying Neal as the shooter was sufficient to prove the elements of second degree murder. The state contends that investigations conducted by law enforcement corroborated the testimony of the two eyewitnesses and also provided a supporting timeline of the events. Ultimately, the state argues that witness credibility issues are reserved for the trier of fact. The state submits that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence would lead any rational factfinder to find that the elements of second degree murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Law

Under Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), appellate courts review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to convince any rational trier of fact that all the essential elements of a crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tate , 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied , 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder. State v. Pigford , 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517 ; State v. Dotie , 43,819 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So.3d 833, writ denied , 09-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.3d 297.

It is the function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicting testimony. State v. Washington , 50,424 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/16/16), 188 So.3d 350. The trier of fact hears the testimony firsthand and, unless the factfinder's assessment of believability is without any rational basis, it should not be disturbed by a reviewing court. State v. Mussall , 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988) ; State v. Price , 48,986 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/15/14), 140 So.3d 1212, writ denied , 14-1274 (La. 2/6/15), 158 So.3d 814. A factual determination concerning conflicting testimony will not be disturbed on review unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence. Mussall, supra ; State v. Williams , 32,631 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99), 747 So.2d 1256, writ denied , 00- 0734 (La. 11/27/00), 775 So.2d 441, and writs denied , 00-0358, 00-0360 (La. 1/5/01), 778 So.2d 588.

A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Hill , 42,025 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So.2d 758, writ denied , 07-1209 (La. 12/14/07), 970 So.2d 529 ; State v. Gilliam , 36,118 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So.2d 508, writ denied , 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So.2d 422. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith , 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442 ; State v. Eason , 43,788 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied , 09-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913, cert. denied , 561 U.S. 1013, 130 S.Ct. 3472, 177 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2010).

In cases involving a defendant's claim that he was not the person who committed the crime, the Jackson rationale requires the state to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof. State v. Brady , 414 So.2d 364 (La. 1982) ; State v. Brock , 37,487 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/03), 855 So.2d 939, writ denied , 04-1036 (La. 4/1/05), 897 So.2d 590 ; Williams, supra . Face-to-face transactions taking place during daylight hours and the length of time that transpires during the altercation are facts that reduce the likelihood of misidentification.

State v. Ruano , 12-1517 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/31/13), 120 So.3d 908, writ denied , 13-2068 (La. 3/14/14), 134 So.3d 1193 ; State v. Payne , 04-828 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/14/04), 892 So.2d 51.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. La. R.S. 14:10(1) ; State v. Lindsey , 543 So.2d 886 (La. 1989), cert. denied , 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990) ; State v. Wilhite , 40,539 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/30/05), 917 So.2d 1252, writ denied , 06-1078 (La. 11/9/06), 941 So.2d 35. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Huizar , 414 So.2d 741 (La. 1982) ; Wilhite, supra . The discharge of a firearm at close range and aimed at a person is indicative of a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon that person. State v. Seals , 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, cert. denied , 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1558, 137 L.Ed.2d 705 (1997).

Positive identification by only one witness may be sufficient to support a defendant's conviction. State v. Davis , 27,961 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/8/96), 672 So.2d 428, writ denied , 97-0383 (La. 10/31/97), 703 So.2d 12 ; State v. Miller , 561 So.2d 892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990), writ denied , 566 So.2d 983 (La. 1990). Additionally, a jury may consider flight and attempts to avoid apprehension as evidence of a guilty conscience. State v. Fuller , 418 So.2d 591 (La. 1982) ; State v. Wiggins , 44,616 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So.3d 1039, writ denied , 09-2329 (La. 4/23/10), 34 So.3d 271.

Trial Testimony and Evidence

Officer Ezell of the Madison Parish Sheriff's Office was the first to testify at trial. Officer Ezell testified that he assisted in the investigation on September 4, 2014, and was one of the first responders to the crime scene. He stated that he took two statements from Neal, who turned himself in one hour after the shooting. In Neal's first statement to Officer Ezell, Neal denied killing Mitchell, but admitted to having a heated argument with him. In a second statement, made on September 5, 2014, Neal again denied shooting Mitchell. Officer Ezell testified that Neal was arrested after giving the second statement because the investigation had disclosed two eyewitnesses who claimed they saw Neal shoot Mitchell. The two eyewitnesses were Lester Solomon and Mose Rone.

Officer Ezell interviewed Lester Solomon and took his statement. According to Officer Ezell, Solomon stated that at the time of the shooting, he was seated on the driver's side of the vehicle, and Mitchell was standing on the passenger side at the rear door. Solomon stated that both the front and back passenger doors of the vehicle were open, as well as the back hatch. In his statement, Solomon stated that Mitchell was washing his vehicle when Solomon "heard a pop, like a gunshot." Solomon stated that he looked up and "saw Rashard Neal shoot Lapatrick Mitchell." On September 5, 2014, Solomon took Officer Ezell to the carwash and showed him how the crime took place. The vehicle was placed exactly where it had been at the time of the shooting. Officer Ezell testified that he stood where Solomon had been standing and looked through the window. Officer Ezell stated that he could...