State v. O'Neill, Cr. N

Decision Date26 October 1962
Docket NumberCr. N
Citation117 N.W.2d 857
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, Respondent, v. Vernon O'NEILL, Appellant. o. 303.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution, defining rights of the accused in a criminal prosecution, provides that the party accused shall have the right 'to appear and defend in person and with counsel.'

2. If a defendant in a criminal prosecution appears for arraignment without counsel, he must be informed by the court of his right to counsel before being arraigned and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. 'If he desires, and is unable to employ, counsel, the court must assign counsel to defend him.' Section 29-13-03, NDCC.

3. Where the court before arraignment advises the accused that it is his right to have a lawyer during all of the proceedings and the accused repeatedly tells the court that he does not want a lawyer, the court has fulfilled his duty with respect to advising the accused of his right to counsel under the provisions of Section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution and Section 29-13-03, NDCC, formerly Section 29-1303, NDRC 1943.

4. For reasons stated in the opinion, it is held that the petitioner waived his constitutional right to counsel, that the waiver was freely and understandingly made, and that he was not deprived of his right to counsel in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Vernon O'Neill, pro se, Austin & Christensen, Bismarck, on brief, for appellant.

Leslie R. Burgum, Atty. Gen., of North Dakota, and E. T. Christianson, State's Atty. of Pembina County, for respondent.

MORRIS, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Pembina County dated February 28, 1962, denying a petition of Vernon O'Neill for a writ of error coram nobis. The petitioner alleges that he pleaded guilty, on September 25, 1944, to the crimes of grand larceny and robbery in the first degree, that he was on that day sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary to a term of from one to five years for each crime, that he was not represented by counsel at any stage of the proceedings, nor did he intelligently, knowingly and understandingly waive the services of counsel. He further states that he did not fully realize the seriousness and possible consequences of the charges against him and that he had been advised by the sheriff that an attorney was not necessary, and:

'That by virtue of this advice, by the fright of antagonizing the prosecutor or the Court, the assistance of counsel was not had and was not waived with a complete and intelligent understanding of the services that competent counsel could provide and that one would be provided free by the county. If the petitioner had been fully advised as to the services counsel could provide, free from the possibility of antagonizing the prosecutor or the Court and would be provided free of charge, he would have gladly accepted the services of counsel.'

He also alleges that the failure of the court to properly advise him with respect to his right to counsel constitutes a violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the State of North Dakota which resulted in a negation of due process of law, with the result that his plea of guilty and sentence are a mullity. The petition also states that the petitioner has completed the sentences imposed in North Dakota but is presently imprisoned as a result thereof. An explanation of this statement appears from the transcript attached to the petition and from the petitioner's brief.

On September 17, 1944, the petitioner and Merle Robinson were apprehended, and their questioning implicated Ed Thoreson and Tim Miller. The four were brought before a justice of the peace upon complaints charging them with grand larceny and robbery in the first degree. They were bound over to the district court on both complaints. The justice's certification in the grand larceny case states:

'September 19, Defts appeared for hearing, complaint was read and Defts advised of their rights, whereon they each pleaded guilty, and waiving bond, were placed in Sheriff's care until their case is disposed of by Dist Judge.'

A similar certification was made in the robbery case. The grand larceny case involved the theft of $387.80 worth of wheat from a farmer's granary. The robbery case involved the forcible robbery of an aged man, who lived alone, of $25 and a check.

On September 25, 1944, the four defendants were arraigned in the District Court of Pembina County on informations charging the two crimes. The first arraignment was for robbery. The defendants were asked their names and after response the state's attorney asked for slight changes in the first names of two of the defendants. The transcript shows that the following then took place:

'THE COURT: It may be so changed, Mr. State's Attorney. You boys are entitled to a lawyer if you want one. Do you want a lawyer? You are charged, each one of you, with a serious crime, do you wish to engage counsel? (Each one of defendants answers 'No.')

'THE COURT: Have you thought this over and are you sure you do not want any lawyer at all? (Defendants, and each of them, state they do not want counsel.)

'THE COURT: It is your right to have a lawyer during all the proceedings if you want one. (Each defendant again states he does not want a lawyer.)

'THE COURT: You don't want one then? (All state 'No.')

'THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed now or do you want time to think this over? (Each defendant states he is ready to proceed now.)

'THE COURT: All right, you may arraign the defendants then, Mr. State's Attorney.'

The court then asked the defendants their ages, which they stated. Their ages ranged from 19 to 23 years. O'Neill gave his age as 21. Copies of the information were furnished the respective defendants and the information was read in open court. After the reading of the information, each defendant was asked in turn whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty, and each responded, 'Guilty, your honor.' The clerk was then directed to enter the pleas and the State moved separately for sentence on the information. The defendants were asked,

'Have either one of you any legal cause or grounds to show why sentence and punishment should not be imposed at this time?'

Then the transcript shows:

'(Each one of the defendants states he has no legal cause or grounds to show why sentence should not be imposed.)'

On the second arraignment, which was for grand larceny, the court said:

'You and each of you are entitled to a lawyer in this case just as I advised you you were entitled to a lawyer in the other case. We have to advise that in each case, but this time I guess you know you are charged with a serious offense. If you want a lawyer you are privileged to have one. Do you, any of you, want a lawyer?'

Each defendant then individually answered that he did not want a lawyer.

The record also contains a written confession, signed by each of the defendants, setting forth in some detail how the two crimes were committed. At the conclusion of the second arraignment, the court questioned the defendants extensively regarding their backgrounds and activities, including family and church relationships. He sentenced each of the defendants in each case for an indeterminate sentence of not less than one nor more than five years, to begin at noon on September 25, 1944. Thus the sentences ran concurrently.

According to petitioner's brief, which he prepared and signed, he served some eleven months in prison and the balance of his sentence on parole from which he was subsequently discharged. He explains why he is attacking the validity of the sentences after they have been served. It appears that in the state of Minnesota he pleaded guilty to a charge of larceny and admitted his prior convictions in North Dakota. Under the Minnesota law, M.S.A. Sec. 610.28 provides longer sentences for second offenses than for first offenses. He was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 0 to 20 years instead of 0 to 10 years which could have been the maximum for a first offense. He was placed on probation. The probation was revoked and he is now in prison at Stillwater, Minnesota.

This proceeding was instituted by a motion noticing a hearing on his petition for a writ to be heard on January 29, 1962.

No question is raised as to procedure. This court has considered challenges to judgments of conviction on jurisdictional grounds after the time for appeal had expired in the following case: State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358; State v. Malnourie, N.D., 67 N.W.2d 330; State v. Whiteman, N.D., 67 N.W.2d 599. The defendant relies heavily upon the Magrum and Whiteman cases. In both of these cases the defendant pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree without benefit of counsel. In each case we held that the plea of guilty and waiver of counsel was not freely and understandingly made and that the judgments of conviction were therefore void. The records in those cases disclose circumstances materially different from those now before us.

When Magrum was sentenced, he was a minor 19 years of age. One Carl Wilson died late on November 24, 1935, from a gunshot wound previously inflicted. Magrum was taken into custody on November 26, but held incommunicado by the sheriff as a material witness. On several occasions during the afternoon and early evening the accused's brother was denied permission to see him. At eight o'clock that evening he was brought before the magistrate upon a complaint charging him with murder in the first degree and bound over to the district court. An information was immediately filed and he was arraigned at nine o'clock the same evening in the district court. The court asked Magrum, after informing him that he was charged with murder in the first degree,

'Do you also understand that you have a legal...

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4 cases
  • State v. Orr
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 1 Octubre 1985
    ...not only by the courts of this State, see, e.g., State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242 (N.D.1970); State v. Whiteman, supra; State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857 (N.D.1962), cert. den., 373 U.S. 939, 83 S.Ct. 1544, 10 L.Ed.2d 694 (1963), but also by the Legislature as far back as 1895. See, e.g., No......
  • State v. Hendrick
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 30 Enero 1996
    ...Application of Stone, 171 N.W.2d 119, 124 (N.D.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 912, 25 L.Ed.2d 93 (1970); State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857, 862 (N.D.1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 939, 83 S.Ct. 1544, 10 L.Ed.2d 694 (1963). But here, Hendrick had prior criminal courtroom experienc......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 1 Junio 2006
    ...credibility of the petitioner's assertions, and the inferences that he seeks to draw from the showing that he has made. State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857, 863 (N.D. 1962). As Justice Sand noted, however, in State v. Lueder, the statute "seems to allow the filing of an application without reg......
  • Application of Stone
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 25 Septiembre 1969
    ...him to enter pleas of guilty. A defendant can plead guilty voluntarily to an information and the court may accept it. State v. O'Neill, 117 N.W.2d 857 (N.D.1962); State v. Throndson, 49 N.D. 348, 191 N.W. 628 (1923). The petitioner has done so in this case and, after a full examination of t......

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