State v. Nelson
| Decision Date | 13 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010-KO-1726,No. 2010-KO-1724,2010-KO-1724,2010-KO-1726 |
| Parties | STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GLEN DALE NELSON STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MELVIN M. GOLDMAN |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
The Opinions handed down on the 13th day of March, 2012, are as follows:
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. GLEN DALE NELSON c/w STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MELVIN M. GOLDMAN (Parish of Ouachita)
(Illegal use of weapons; armed robbery; conspiracy to commit armed robbery; habitual offender)
For the reasons assigned herein, we find the trial court erred both in its application of Batson, and in formulating a remedy for the alleged Batson violation. Therefore, we are compelled to reverse the decision of the court of appeal, vacate the convictions and sentences, and remand the matters to the trial court for a new trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL REVERSED; DEFENDANTS' CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES ARE VACATED. THESE MATTERS ARE HEREBY REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Defendants, Glen Dale Nelson and Melvin Goldman, were convicted by jury of one count of illegal use of weapons in violation of La. R.S. 14:94, four counts of armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64, and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:26. Both defendants received substantial sentences as habitual offenders. Defendants appealed their convictions, asserting as error the trial court's handling of jury selection, specifically its handling of a "reverse-Batson"1 challenge by the State. Finding no error by the trial court, the court of appeal affirmed.2 We granted defendants' writ applications to review thecorrectness of the court of appeal's decision.3 Although the defendants asserted additional assignments of error in the court of appeal, none are at issue in this Court. The sole issue addressed by this Court is the reverse-Batson issue. We decline to address the additional assignments of error raised by defendant Goldman.
For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal, vacate the defendants' convictions and sentences, and remand these matters to the trial court for a new trial.
On December 2, 2007, three armed men entered a mobile home to rob the occupants who were in the midst of a high-stakes poker game. The robbers had been called to the game by James McGraw, whose task it was to summon them at an appropriate time and then to feign being a victim. One of the victims identified McGraw's half-brother, Glen Dale Nelson, as one of the masked armed robbers. McGraw ultimately pled guilty and identified the remaining two robbers as Melvin Goldman and Keith Blakes, who also pled guilty and implicated defendants, Nelson and Goldman. Nelson and Goldman were represented by separate counsel, but tried together after the trial court denied Goldman's motion to sever.
Trial began on May 18, 2009, and voir dire was conducted with three panels of sixteen prospective jurors. The first panel included five black prospective jurors; the second panel included six black prospective jurors; and the third panel included four black prospective jurors. After the first panel was examined, the trial court stated that peremptory challenges, twelve for each co-defendant and twenty-four for the State, would be exercised simultaneously in writing with duplicate challenges assessed against all parties who exercised them. The court also offered that defensecounsel for each co-defendant could confer if they chose, so as not to duplicate their peremptory challenges. Goldman, represented by Mr. Walker, exercised eight peremptory challenges to excuse white jurors and one to excuse a black juror. Nelson, represented by Mr. Racer, used nine peremptory challenges, all against white jurors. In total, seventeen of the eighteen peremptory challenges exercised by the defendants were used to excuse white prospective jurors. The State used seven out of ten peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors. With a venire that was approximately thirty-three percent black, the eight jurors provisionally selected at that time were evenly divided along racial lines.4
When voir dire resumed, the State urged a reverse-Batson objection, arguing that defense counsel had used their peremptory challenges to exclude white prospective jurors. The State further argued that because defense counsel conferred before striking prospective jurors, the court should consider their peremptory usage together for purposes of Batson. According to the State, the cooperative use of seventeen out of eighteen peremptory challenges to strike white prospective jurors constituted prima facie evidence of discriminatory intent. The trial court initially agreed with the State, stating:
Okay, look, gentlemen, it looks like the State has made - matter of fact, I'm about to rule that the State has made a prima facie case. Now, this Batson objection is made against - I'm to deal with the two defendants as an entity. Correct?
Defendants objected, but the trial court ultimately decided to treat Goldman and Nelson as a single entity for purposes of evaluating the Batson challenge.
Counsel for Nelson volunteered his race neutral reasons for exercising each peremptory challenge. After hearing his reasons, the court was inclined to acceptthem, but proceeded to direct counsel for Goldman to offer his reasons as well.5 After Goldman offered his race neutral reasons, the trial court considered the racial makeup of the panels and the number of peremptory challenges exercised by the defendants together. The court confirmed its decision that the State had made a prima facie case of a Batson violation. The court went on to discuss defendants' collaboration on peremptory challenges. Defense counsel explained they collaborated only to the extent they did not duplicate peremptory challenges. The trial court agreed there was no inherent problem with the collaboration, but found the collaboration relevant in terms of the Batson analysis. Specifically, the court stated:
There is nothing I regard - I don't regard that there is any illegitimacy at all in the defenses [sic] attorneys' - the defense parties collaborating, conspiring, if you want to use the word, to maximize their use of exercise of peremptory challenges to maximize its use. In other words, particularly since the state has twenty-four challenges. There's nothing wrong with that at all. What the state is indicating - what the state is suggesting is that you - that your collaboration has the effect intended or otherwise of complicating any Batson analysis if you're regarding - if they're regarded as a separate exercise. In other words, if you collaborate and they say, Judge, you should take that collaboration into account to determine whether or not these defendants have violated Batson. Now, even if I do decide that collectively you violated Batson, then my question is, how do I deal with the remedy.
The court subsequently clarified that it found defense counsel exercised their peremptory challenges with discriminatory effect but without any apparent intent to discriminate.
The court eventually ruled:
Okay. I'm ruling. The state has made out its prima facie case. I find the race neutral explanations offered by both defendants convincing as to one or more of the individual jurors, but the overall pattern and the vagueness of some of the reasons convinces me that a Batson violation has occurred. The sheer numerical analysis not only makes out a prima facie case, but a compelling case. And the race neutral explanationsoffered do nothing to—do very little to push back on the compelling case. Now, let's get the remedy. Does the state have a suggestion?
After much discussion and disagreement with defense counsel over the proper application of Batson, and in an attempt to clarify the record, the court eventually stated for the record its determination of whether the defendants' race-neutral reasons were adequate as to each stricken juror. The court accepted certain reasons offered by the defendants, but ultimately rejected the race-neutral reasons as to nine prospective jurors after finding that defendants had failed to rebut the prima facie case as to those jurors.6
The court adopted a three-part remedy for the Batson violation. First, the court re-seated those prospective jurors for whom the court rejected the proffered race-neutral reasons. Second, the court ruled that the peremptory challenges that had been used impermissibly and whose effects were negated by the reseating would nonetheless not be restored to the defendants. Third, the court further declared that no party would be permitted to strike any of the re-seated jurors. Of the nine prospective jurors ordered re-seated, two could not be located after they were initially dismissed and one was ultimately removed for cause.7 Ultimately, a twelve-person jury was seated and three alternates were chosen. The final twelve-person jury was comprised of nine white females, two black males, and one white male. Of these, five jurors were re-seated, two originally struck by Nelson and three struck by Goldman.8
Following their convictions, both defendants appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The court of appeal found no error in the trial court's finding that the State had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, noting the trial court's "consideration and analysis of Defendants' use of peremptory challenges was exhaustively conscientious and thorough." Goldman, 41 So. 3d at 653. The court pointed out defendants collectively used seventeen out of eighteen challenges against Caucasian...
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