State v. Ness
Decision Date | 09 February 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17-0476,17-0476 |
Citation | 907 N.W.2d 484 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. John William NESS, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Zachary S. Hindman of Mayne, Arneson, Hindman, Hisey, & Daane, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Jacklyn Fox and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
This appeal requires us to decide whether a conceded error in the admission of evidence was harmless.
An individual on probation drove himself to the probation office. When he arrived, his probation officer detected the strong smell of an alcoholic beverage. This would have been a violation of the terms of his probation, so the officer gave him a breath test with a device that law enforcement use to perform preliminary breath tests (PBT). The test showed a blood alcohol level of .130. The individual was arrested, booked into jail, and charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI) third offense.
In the subsequent trial, the district court admitted this test result over the defendant’s objection. The jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant now appeals, arguing that admission of the test result was an error in light of language from Iowa Code section 321J.5(2) which reads, "The results of this preliminary screening test ... shall not be used in any court action except to prove that a chemical test was properly requested of a person pursuant to this chapter." Iowa Code § 321J.5(2) (2016).
For purposes of this appeal, the State does not dispute that the test results should not have been admitted. However, it argues the defendant failed to preserve error below or, alternatively, any error was harmless.
We conclude the defendant did preserve error, and the error was not harmless. This is not one of the relatively rare OWI cases where admission of a test showing a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit could be considered harmless. We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
On July 11, 2016, at about 1:15 p.m., John Ness drove to a meeting with his probation officer, Nick O’Brien. O’Brien noticed that Ness had to back out and straighten his car before reparking it. Ness kept his footing as he walked toward the building to meet O’Brien, although he did gesticulate quite a bit upon meeting O’Brien in the parking lot.
During their encounter, which continued inside the building, O’Brien detected the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. The terms of Ness’s probation forbid his consumption of alcohol. When questioned, Ness initially denied consuming alcohol. O’Brien obtained an Alco-Sensor III device, which is often used as a preliminary breath screening device by law enforcement. He asked Ness to breathe into the device. It returned a reading of .130, well above the legal limit of .08.
At this point, Ness admitted he had been drinking the night before but said he thought he had "sobered up enough to drive to the appointment." Ness’s eyes appeared bloodshot and watery. O’Brien’s supervisor Karen Borg entered the meeting, and she too noticed a strong smell of alcoholic beverage, bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech. The Sioux City police were contacted.
Upon his arrival, Sioux City Police Officer Ryan Denney placed Ness under arrest and transported him to the jail. He likewise noticed the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, bloodshot and watery eyes, and slurred speech. In addition, Ness appeared to Denney unsteady as he walked. Like O’Brien and Borg, Denney felt that Ness was under the influence of alcohol.
At the jail, Ness was asked a series of standard booking questions. Among other things, Ness was asked whether he was intoxicated. He answered "yep." The affirmative answer was recorded on the booking video and also memorialized in the questionnaire answers that Ness later signed, representing that he had "read the above CAREFULLY and ha[d] answered ALL questions correctly to the best of [his] knowledge."
Ness did not file a written response before the pretrial hearing, which took place the next day. At the hearing, Ness’s attorney argued the test results should not come into evidence "as ... a reason for the OWI." He insisted that the case did involve implied consent because a screening test was "the basis for this charge."
The case went to a jury trial on February 28. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed that a guilty verdict required a finding that Ness was operating his vehicle "[w]hile under the influence of an alcoholic beverage"; the jury was not instructed on the "[w]hile having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more" alternative. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a ), (b ). The jury returned a guilty verdict. Ness was committed to the custody of the director of the department of corrections for a term not to exceed five years for assignment into the OWI continuum. See id. § 321J.2(5)(a )(1). Ness was also fined, and his driver’s license was ordered revoked for six years.
Ness timely appealed, and we retained his appeal.
Our analysis of the district court’s decision to admit the result of the Alco-Sensor breath test depends on statutory interpretation. "Our review is therefore for correction of errors at law." State v. Albrecht , 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003). However, we will not overturn a conviction for an error in the receipt of evidence if the error was harmless. See State v. Moorehead , 699 N.W.2d 667, 672–73 (Iowa 2005).
Iowa Code § 321J.5 (emphasis added). In Ness’s view, the phrase "any court action" encompasses the trial we are reviewing, and thus his .130 test result should not have been admitted.
In the proceedings below, the State argued—and the district court found—that the evidentiary prohibition in Iowa Code section 321J.5(2) did not apply to the Alco-Sensor device per se but only to the device when it is being used to perform a preliminary breath test within the meaning of the implied-consent law. See id. § 321J.6. In other words, any evidentiary bar was test-based rather than device-based.
Ness counters that such a distinction is not contemplated by the statute and would not be workable because it would require examination of the subjective intent of the person utilizing the device and would open up a large loophole in the implied-consent law. Ness also cites us to Harmon v. State , where the Maryland Court of Special Appeals relied on similar language in Maryland’s implied-consent law (i.e., "may not be used as evidence by the State in any court action") to reject a similar prosecution argument. 147 Md.App. 452, 809 A.2d 696, 705 (2002) (quoting Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 16–205.2 ).
We need not resolve this dispute over the meaning of Iowa Code section 321J.5(2) today because the State concedes for appeal purposes that the .130 test result should not have been admitted. Instead, the State insists Ness failed to preserve error because he did not argue below that the statute precluded admission of the test. Alternatively, the State contends that admission of the test result was harmless error.
We can dispense with the State’s first argument quickly. The State filed a motion in limine below seeking a pretrial ruling that the implied-consent law did not bar admission of the test results....
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Hummel v. Smith
...Standard of Review. The issue is one of statutory interpretation. "Our review is . . . for correction of errors at law." State v. Ness, 907 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Iowa 2018) (quoting State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)). IV. Analysis. In 2017, the Iowa legislature amended Iowa Code......