State v. Newsome
| Decision Date | 06 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 14947,14947 |
| Citation | 682 A.2d 972,238 Conn. 588 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Shawn NEWSOME. |
Timothy H. Everett, with whom were Patrick Bristol and Sandra Crowell, Legal Interns, and, on the brief, David Schneider, Legal Intern, for appellant (defendant).
Frederick W. Fawcett, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Attorney, and John Blawie, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).
Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.
The defendant, Shawn Newsome, was convicted after a jury trial of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. 1 He was sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment. He appeals from the trial court's judgment of conviction directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3). 2 We affirm the trial court's judgment.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on March 4, 1992, Bridgeport police officer David Daniels heard two gunshots fired in the area of 455 Trumbull Avenue in Bridgeport. When Daniels responded to the location where he believed the shots had been fired, he saw a car leave the area and discovered the victim, Lance Surrency, lying in the grass in front of 385 Trumbull Avenue. The victim had been shot in the face and was unresponsive. He died shortly thereafter.
The following day, the police questioned Rodney Womble about the shooting. In a signed, sworn statement, Womble identified the defendant as the person who had shot the victim. Womble told the police that on the previous evening he had observed a fight between the victim and several other men, including the defendant, while they were standing near a "food bus" in a parking lot of the Trumbull Gardens Housing Complex. Womble stated that the defendant had poured beer on the victim to provoke him to fight and had then taken out a gun and shot the victim. He further stated that immediately after the shooting, the defendant had entered a car parked nearby and had driven away.
The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with the victim's murder. At both the probable cause hearing and at trial, Womble testified that although he had witnessed the shooting, he had not been able to identify the person who had shot the victim. Womble admitted that he had told the police that the defendant was the shooter, but claimed that he had only heard rumors that the defendant had shot the victim and had given the defendant's name to the police in order to leave the police station as quickly as possible. At the probable cause hearing, the state introduced the portion of Womble's prior statement to the police in which he described the shooting. The segment of the statement was offered for substantive purposes pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S.Ct. 597, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). The trial court found probable cause to believe that the defendant had murdered the victim. At trial, the state introduced Womble's entire statement, with some redactions, for substantive purposes pursuant to Whelan. Womble's statement provided the only identification evidence against the defendant. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder.
Subsequently, the defendant moved for a new trial, claiming that he had been deprived of a fair trial by certain juror misconduct, namely: one juror's alleged visit to the scene of the crime; certain comments alleged to have been made by jurors regarding the dress and demeanor of certain witnesses and the credibility of Womble; and contact between one juror and a member of the defendant's family. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that the challenged conduct had not affected the jury deliberations or prejudiced the defendant so as to require a new trial. Other facts will be discussed as they become relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case because the finding of probable cause was invalid; (2) the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court improperly admitted Womble's extrajudicial statement into evidence at trial; and (4) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
The defendant's first three claims relate to the Whelan rule, which permits "the substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination." State v. Whelan, supra, 200 Conn. at 753, 513 A.2d 86. Specifically, the defendant first claims that the trial court's finding of probable cause was invalid because it improperly admitted, for substantive purposes, the portion of Womble's extrajudicial statement at the probable cause hearing. He argues that the statement failed to evince a basis of personal knowledge on the part of the declarant and that it was inherently unreliable and hence inadmissible under Whelan. Alternatively, he claims that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
The defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction at trial. In this regard, he urges us to hold that a witness' prior statement identifying the accused, which is not confirmed at trial, is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support a criminal conviction in the absence of additional corroborative evidence of identification. The defendant also appears to claim that, even in the absence of such a rule, the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Alternatively, the defendant claims that Womble's statement was improperly admitted at trial under Whelan for the same reasons he claims that it was improperly admitted at the probable cause hearing.
Finally, the defendant also urges us to adopt additional criteria, including a requirement of corroboration, for the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of identification and to require and institute special jury instructions to be given when a witness' prior inconsistent statement provides the only evidence of identification at trial. We address and reject each of these claims seriatim.
We turn first to the defendant's claim that the trial court's finding of probable cause "was not warranted by law" because the trial court improperly admitted a portion of Womble's prior inconsistent statement to the police for substantive purposes and because, even if the statement had been properly admitted, there was not sufficient evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding of probable cause. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to the resolution of these claims. Womble testified at the hear ing ing on probable cause that on the evening of March 4, 1992, he was standing in a parking lot on Trumbull Avenue at the Trumbull Gardens Housing Complex in Bridgeport when he saw several young men attack the victim, who was standing about one bus length away. At that time, Womble had known the victim for a few years. He also had known the defendant for a few years and had no difficulty recognizing him. Womble testified that he had seen the young men hit the victim, who had fought back but also had tried to get away. He then saw one of the men take a gun from his hooded sweatshirt and shoot the victim, who fell to the ground. Womble testified that he was unable to identify the person who had shot the victim because the shooter's face was obscured by the hood.
On cross-examination, Womble indicated that it had been dark when the shooting occurred, that it had been difficult to see who was fighting with the victim and that, although he knew who had been there, he had not "specifically" seen the defendant. When asked whether he had seen the defendant pour beer on the victim, Womble stated that he was "not quite sure" and that he "just [did not] remember." He stated that he had not been able to identify the person who had shot the victim, but that he had told the police that it was the defendant because that is what he had heard. Womble conceded that some of the information he had given in his statement to the police was not true, and that he had not at any point while giving the statement told the police that he had not actually seen the defendant shoot the victim, but that he had only heard that on the street. Further, he stated that he had not told the police that he had only heard that the defendant had shot the victim because he had wanted to leave the police station as quickly as possible.
Detective Lynn DeSarli, who had investigated the victim's death and who had interviewed Womble and had taken his statement on March 5, 1992, also testified at the hearing in probable cause. She stated that Womble had told her that he had seen the defendant shoot the victim. The court found probable cause to believe that the defendant had murdered the victim.
"Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, provides in part that [n]o person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marra, 222 Conn. 506, 513, 610 A.2d 1113 (1992). "[A]n invalid finding of probable cause at such a hearing undermines the court's power to hear the case at trial." State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 332, 512 A.2d 140 (1986).
We turn first to the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly admitted a portion of Womble's statement to DeSarli at the probable cause hearing for substantive purposes pursuant to ...
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