State v. Nguyen

Decision Date29 August 2001
Citation31 P.3d 489,176 Or. App. 258
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Jimmy Joseph NGUYEN, Respondent.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

Daniel M. Carroll, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was David E. Groom, Public Defender.

Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and DEITS, Chief Judge, and ARMSTRONG, Judge.

DEITS, C.J.

The state appeals from a trial court order suppressing evidence acquired as the result of a motor vehicle stop. The state contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the deputy who performed the stop did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had committed a crime. ORS 131.615(1). We review for errors of law, ORS 138.220, and reverse.

At 2:51 a.m. on April 24, 1998, a named citizen informant telephoned the Washington County Sheriff's Office and reported a "car prowl" in progress at the parking lot of the Tapiola Manor Apartments on 180th Avenue in Aloha. She reported that she was observing two people breaking into a car and described the suspects as two 20-to 25-year-old males with dark hair, and wearing dark clothing. Deputy Branch was nearby and responded to the call. As Branch was headed toward the location of the reported crime, he was advised by the dispatcher that the persons involved in the car prowl were walking from the location of the crime toward 180th Avenue. Branch arrived at the scene about two minutes later, at around 2:53 a.m., and immediately saw a car pull away from the shoulder of the road on 180th Avenue, across from the apartments, and head in his direction. The car then made a U-turn in front of Branch and began heading south on 180th Avenue. Branch, who had been driving without his headlights on, turned his headlights on and began following the car. This apparently startled defendant and his companion. Branch testified that they immediately "stiffened up." Defendant, who was driving, then made an exceptionally slow turn onto another road. Branch described the turn as not "anything remotely close to being normal." Branch testified that the two occupants matched the description of two 20-to 25-year-old dark-haired individuals wearing dark clothing1 and that there were no other pedestrians or vehicles on the road at that time.

Branch turned on his overhead lights, and defendant pulled his vehicle to the side of the road. Branch approached the driver's side of the vehicle and told the suspects to keep their hands in sight. Branch testified that he recognized the two men in the vehicle based on his prior experience as a gang enforcement officer. He recognized defendant, in particular, because he had once arrested him. Within a short time of the stop, Deputy Obenauf arrived at the scene and walked to the passenger side of the car. The deputies, who could see into the vehicle, observed surgical gloves and various tools on the floor of both the passenger and the driver's sides of the car. Branch asked defendant to step out of the car and patted him down while Obenauf spoke with the passenger.2 In Branch's pat-down of defendant, he discovered another pair of surgical gloves, a screwdriver and a pair of surgical scissors. The deputies then searched the car, its glove box and trunk, and discovered an amplifier, a CD changer with no serial numbers, a glasscutter, a flashlight, a "Leatherman" multi-purpose tool, and another screwdriver. At some point, a third deputy, Kisor, arrived at the scene, accompanied by the citizen informant who had reported the alleged crime. The informant identified the suspects as the men she had observed breaking into the car in the Tapiola Manor parking lot.

At trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained as a result of the stop, including the identification by the citizen informant, arguing that Branch did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop. The trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that Branch had a subjective belief that defendant had committed the reported crime, but that his belief was not objectively reasonable. Specifically, the court found:

"[T]here were numerous apartments and homes in the neighborhood. The court finds it was dark on the evening in question. The Court finds Dep. Branch did not get a good look at the vehicle's occupants. The Court finds Dep. Branch based his stop on the description of two young males, 20-25, with dark hair and dark clothes. However, the Court finds Dep. Branch could not have been able to tell whether the occupants were wearing dark clothing or whether they were male or female. The Court finds that the startled appearance of the suspects was not unusual under the circumstances. The court finds the suspects were the only individuals on the road at that time."

The state assigns error to the trial court's granting of defendant's motion to suppress. The state contends that, under the totality of the circumstances, Branch had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. Because there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings of historical facts on this issue, we are bound by the trial court's findings. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). Consequently, our review is limited to whether the trial court was correct in its legal conclusion that the officer's suspicion was not objectively reasonable. State v. Belt, 325 Or. 6, 11, 932 P.2d 1177 (1997).

A peace officer may stop a person temporarily in order to make a reasonable inquiry of that person if the officer "reasonably suspects" that the person has committed a crime. ORS 131.615(1). " 'Reasonably suspects' means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 to 131.625." ORS 131.605(5). A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion and, thus, is permitted to stop an individual for investigation, if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that gave rise to the officer's suspicion that the individual committed a crime. State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66, 80, 854 P.2d 421 (1993). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Hammonds/Deshler, 155 Or.App. 622, 627, 964 P.2d 1094 (1998), and it is dependent on "the inferences drawn from the particular circumstances confronting the officers, viewed in the light of the officer's experience." Ehly, 317 Or. at 80, 854 P.2d 421 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 27-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). An officer need only form a belief that is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances that an individual has committed a crime and may draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances based on the officer's experience. State v. Loud, 149 Or.App. 250, 255, 942 P.2d 814, rev. den. 326 Or. 58, 944 P.2d 948 (1997); see also State v. Crites, 151 Or.App. 313, 316, 948 P.2d 757 (1997), rev. den. 327 Or. 82, 961 P.2d 216 (1998) (because "there are possible lawful explanations for behavior does not mean that it does not also give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminality").

The trial court concluded that Branch was not reasonable in relying on the above facts to infer that the suspects were the same individuals that the citizen informant had observed prowling, because Branch "could not have been able to tell whether the occupants were wearing dark clothing" or "whether they were male or female," and "the startled appearance of the suspects was not unusual under the circumstances."

In reviewing the record in this case, accepting only those facts that the trial court found, we are satisfied that Branch identified specific and articulable facts that were "sufficient as a matter of law to give rise to an inference that a reasonable officer would hold the required subjective belief." State v. Belt, 325 Or. 6, 12, 932 P.2d 1177 (1997). Branch knew that criminal activity was occurring when he was notified that a named citizen informant had reported a car prowl. He knew that the witness had given a description of the suspects and indicated that they were heading across the apartment parking lot toward SW 180th Avenue. Branch arrived two minutes later at the location of the reported car break-in and saw two persons in a car on 180th Avenue across from the parking lot. This was a residential neighborhood, and it was around 3:00 a.m. Branch stated that there were no other persons or vehicles on the road. As he arrived at the location, the headlights of a car had just been turned on, and the car was leaving the scene. When Branch began following defendant's vehicle and illuminated his patrol car's headlights, the occupants of the suspect vehicle appeared startled, and the driver of the vehicle, defendant, made an unusually slow turn.

It is true that there are possible lawful explanations for defendant's behavior that Branch observed. Again, however, the fact that there are possible lawful explanations for behavior does not mean that it may not also give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Crites, 151 Or.App. at 316,948 P.2d 757. As noted above, the standard for establishing reasonable suspicion to justify stopping and questioning a person about possible criminal activity is less restrictive than the standard for probable cause to arrest. Hammonds/Deshler, 155 Or.App. at 627, 964 P.2d 1094. We conclude that the standard for reasonable suspicion was satisfied. The police officer pointed to specific and articulable facts that supported a reasonable suspicion that defendant may have committed a crime.

Defendant argues, alternatively, that the trial court was correct in granting his ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • State v. Luers
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 14 Febrero 2007
    ...regarding the lawfulness of the seizure and search. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487-88, 443 P.2d 621 (1968); State v. Nguyen, 176 Or.App. 258, 262, 31 P.3d 489 (2001). We begin with the stop itself, both as made initially and as extended. As defendant concedes, the initial stop was lawful......
  • State v. Hudson
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 7 Noviembre 2012
    ...to specific and articulable facts that gave rise to the officer's suspicion that the individual committed a crime.” State v. Nguyen, 176 Or.App. 258, 262, 31 P.3d 489 (2001). To have reasonable suspicion, an officer “need only form a belief that is objectively reasonable under the totality ......
  • State v. Alvarado
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 24 Julio 2013
    ...to specific and articulable facts that gave rise to the officer's suspicion that the individual committed a crime.” State v. Nguyen, 176 Or.App. 258, 262, 31 P.3d 489 (2001). In contrast, the test for probable cause is whether the officer (1) “subjectively believe[d] that a crime has been c......
  • State v. Vinh Ba Nguyen
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • 22 Julio 2009
    ...be suspected and stopped, even though each is only one of many individuals who fit that description. See, e.g., State v. Nguyen, 176 Or.App. 258, 263-64, 31 P.3d 489 (2001) (stop of individual who may or may not have fit description of suspect, but who was driving suspiciously late at night......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT