State v. Nichols, No. 99-352.

• Docket Nº: No. 99-352.
• Citation: 986 P.2d 1093, 1999 MT 212
• Case Date: September 14, 1999
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

986 P.2d 1093
1999 MT 212

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
William F. NICHOLS, Defendant and Appellant

No. 99-352.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs August 26, 1999.

Decided September 14, 1999.

Rehearing Denied September 30, 1999.

986 P.2d 1095

William F. Nichols, Deer Lodge, Montana, pro se, for Appellant

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Jennifer Anders, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana, for Respondent.

Justice JAMES C. NELSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 William F. Nichols (Nichols), pro se, appeals from the District Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

Background

¶ 2 In January 1989, Nichols pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault and to one count of felony assault. He was sentenced to 20 years for the aggravated assault and to 10 years for the felony assault. The trial court imposed an additional 10-year sentence on the aggravated assault and an additional five-year sentence on the felony assault pursuant to § 46-18-221, MCA. This statute provides for an enhanced penalty for offenses committed with a dangerous weapon. Written judgment was entered on March 1, 1989. Nichols applied for sentence review but did not appeal his conviction.

¶ 3 Thereafter, in October 1990, Nichols moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court deemed his motion to be a petition for post-conviction relief, ordered a response from the State, and, following a hearing, amended Nichols' sentence by vacating the sex offender treatment and restitution requirements imposed in the original sentence. The court did not amend the term of years to which Nichols was sentenced. This amended judgment was filed November 9, 1993. Nichols did not appeal.

¶ 4 Nichols' instant petition was filed March 4, 1999, more than 10 years following his original conviction and more than five years following entry of the amended judgment. Nichols' application, styled as a "Motion for Amended Sentence and Judgment," requested that the court strike the weapons enhancement sentences from each felony sentence. Nichols premised his claim for this relief on our decision in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29, ___ Mont. ___, 975 P.2d 312, 56 St.Rep. 117, wherein we held that application of § 46-18-221, MCA, to felony convictions (there, felony assault) where the underlying offense requires proof of the use of a weapon, violates the double jeopardy provision of Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution. Guillaume, ¶ 16. The State objected to Nichols' petition. The District Court denied Nichols relief on the basis of the State's statute of limitations and retroactivity arguments. This appeal followed.

Issues

¶ 5 We address two issues:

¶ 6 1. Is Nichols entitled to retroactive application of this Court's decision in Guillaume?

¶ 7 2. Is Nichols' post-conviction claim statutorily barred?

Discussion

¶ 8 Both issues involve the District Court's conclusions on and application of the law. Our standard of review of a district court's conclusions of law is whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. See State v. Baker (1995), 272 Mont. 273, 280, 901 P.2d 54, 58 cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1125, 116 S.Ct. 940, 133 L.Ed.2d 865 (1996) (citations omitted).

1.

¶ 9 Is Nichols entitled to retroactive application of this Court's decision in Guillaume?

986 P.2d 1096

¶ 10 Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question which requires that application of a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions be evenhandedly applied to all who are similarly situated in cases pending on direct review or not yet final. See State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114, 125-26, 900 P.2d 260, 266-67, rev'd on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649; Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 300-01, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d 334)

¶ 11 A "new rule" is one which "breaks new ground" or "imposes a new obligation" on the government. Put another way, if the result of the case was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final, then the rule is a "new rule." Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 126, 900 P.2d at 267 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070).

¶ 12 Our decision in Guillaume announced a new rule of...