State v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 13 June 1884
• Citation: State v. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205, 4 P. 159 (Kan. 1884)
• Parties: THE STATE OF KANSAS v. DANIEL M. NIXON
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

4 P. 159

32 Kan. 205

THE STATE OF KANSAS v. DANIEL M. NIXON

Supreme Court of Kansas

June 13, 1884

Appeal from Russell District Court.

AT the March Term, 1882, Daniel M. Nixon was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He appeals. The opinion contains a sufficient statement of the facts.

Judgment affirmed.

J. G Mohler, for appellant.

W. A Johnston, attorney general, and Edwin A. Austin, for The State.

VALENTINE J. All the Justices concurring.

OPINION

VALENTINE, J.:

This was was a criminal prosecution for murder in the first degree. The defendant, Daniel M. Nixon, was charged with killing William Crawford, in Trego county, on the 9th day of September, 1880, by shooting him with a gun loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls. For reasons not necessary to be stated, the case was tried in Russell county, where the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. On the trial it was admitted by the defendant that he killed Crawford, as charged in the information; but he interposed two defenses: first, self-defense; second, insanity--the latter of which was the real and the important defense. No claim is made in this court that the court below erred with reference to the first-named defense; hence it is not necessary for us to again mention it.

With reference to the defense of insanity, the defendant claims that the court below erred in its instructions given to the jury, and also erred in refusing to give certain other instructions asked for by him, and consequently erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial; and these are the only rulings of the court below alleged for error in this court, or relied upon by the defendant for a reversal of the judgment of the court below. The instructions given by the court below with reference to insanity read as follows:

"The counsel for the defendant claim also here that the defendant should not be held responsible for these acts alleged or proved against him, no matter what they are, because of the fact of the defendant's insanity. Upon this question I say in the outset, that the cardinal rule of responsibility in the criminal law when judging of the acts of men is, was the accused, at the time of doing the act complained of, conscious of the nature of his act, or did he know that it was wrong to do it?

"Now there are many sorts of diseases of the mind that are dwelt upon and discussed by physicians and psychologists in these days, and that are presented in court for the consideration of a jury, and upon which the jury is asked to find that the mind of the accused was, at the time in question, so overthrown as to make him wholly irresponsible, and therefore that he should be acquitted for his otherwise unlawful acts.

"Now, however varied these diseases may be, for they may be as varied as the diseases of the body, I say to you they all come under the great or generic head of insanity, and the main test is the rule that I have just given; all else is argument or minor rule under this head, and which must resolve itself back to it. I will not discuss the evidence in the case upon this question--counsel will do so at length, I apprehend --and after applying it to the rules I herein lay down, I trust you may be fully able to discern that which is right. One or two things more, however, I should say.

"The testimony here, by deposition and otherwise, covers several years in the defendant's life. This is all proper testimony, and you should consider it for what you may think it is worth as bearing upon the question as I have stated it, remembering that it is the condition of the defendant's mind at the time when he fired the fatal shot or shots, upon which you are to judge him, and that all or any of this testimony is only competent as it may throw light upon his probable and actual condition at that point of time. Some of the witnesses have testified that the defendant had the reputation at his old home in Illinois of being insane. Some witnesses have given it as their opinion, from acquaintance with and knowledge of him and his acts, that he was insane; some that he was sane on some subjects, and insane on others; some that he was insane at times, and sane at others; some that he was melancholy at times; one at least that his reputation was of laboring under delusions; others that he was eccentric, and so forth. You should consider this testimony as it is. I do not pretend to quote it, but only to partially classify it. Many of these witnesses have testified as to circumstances in his life, and that the reasons of the conditions of mind, or some of them, that they have given, were from special causes named by them. These causes are at least three or four. You should also consider the testimony of those witnesses who testify of him since his residence in Kansas. The defendant himself has also appeared before you. If you should believe from all this testimony and circumstances, that the mind of the defendant was diseased, you would then further inquire: Was he at the time of the killing laboring under such a defect of reason and intellect as not to know the nature and quality of that particular act he was doing, or if he did know this, that he did not know that he was doing wrong? If he had sufficient intelligence and reasoning powers to know what he was doing, that it was wrong, and the will and mental powers to do or not to do it, then in contemplation of law he is responsible for the act he has done. The law recognizes what seems to be an incontrovertible fact, that a person may be sane upon some questions and insane upon others, and that he will be responsible morally and legally for acts done on those subjects on which he is sane, and irresponsible for action upon those subjects wherein he is insane. Hence the rule that I have laid down; and the question always is as to sanity and responsibility upon the particular act in question. This is called partial insanity, and it is not necessary that it should be total. In this as in all cases of prosecution for alleged crime, the defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge made against him, and innocent of any other degree of crime included in such charge, innocent of the act alleged to have been done, and innocent of any guilty intent. This presumption stands at law and continues until and unless the contrary is proven by the evidence, and until each and every ingredient and element of the crime is proved by such evidence.

"When there is a reasonable doubt, therefore, whether the guilt of the defendant is satisfactorily proven by the evidence, you must acquit; and when such guilt is satisfactorily proven, but there is a reasonable doubt in which of two or more degrees of an offense the defendant is guilty, there can be only a conviction for the lower degree. . . .

"Upon the question of insanity, I say that every person is supposed (presumed) in the law to be sane until the contrary appears. It devolves upon the defendant, therefore, in the first instance to raise the question. When he does so, and introduces testimony fairly tending to prove the same, our supreme court has laid down the following rule: 'In a criminal action where the defense of insanity is set up, it does not devolve upon the defendant to prove that he is insane by a preponderance of the evidence; but if upon the whole of the evidence introduced on the trial, together with all the legal presumptions applicable to the case under the evidence, there should be a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is sane or insane, he must be acquitted.'

"And where habitual unsoundness of mind is once shown to exist, either wholly or partially, it is presumed to continue until the presumption is rebutted by competent proof. The jury can, in determining this case or any question involved, take into consideration, or rather call to their aid, all such general knowledge as is common to mankind.

"If you should not be satisfied that the defense of insanity should prevail, you should consider any testimony introduced upon that question for whatever you might think it worth, as bearing upon the question of the beliefs of the defendant of the imminence of his danger when assailed by the deceased, if you should believe he was assailed. In fact, you should decide no question until considering all the evidence that may bear upon it. . . .

"If you should believe that the allegations of the information would be made out by the state were there no defense here, it would be well then for you to consider, first, this defense of insanity. If you should say that it should prevail under the rules I have given you on that subject, you would then acquit; for if a man is not found responsible for his acts, in law he is innocent of it, no matter how monstrous, physically, it may appear; but if you should here say he should be held responsible for it, you would then turn and determine more exactly the nature of the act itself, and here would arise the question of self-defense."

The defendant asked the court below to give certain instructions to the jury, which the court refused, and the defendant duly excepted; among which are the following, which the defendant still claims the court below erred in refusing to give, to wit:

"2. In criminal trials the burden of proof is always on the state, and it never shifts to the defendant. The state is therefore required to make out every portion of its case by competent testimony, or the defendant must be acquitted."

"5. In a criminal action, when the defense of insanity is set up it does not devolve upon the defendant to prove that he is insane by a preponderance of the evidence; but if upon the whole of the evidence...