State v. Le

• Decision Date: 25 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 74708,74708
• Citation: 260 Kan. 845,926 P.2d 638
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Tung Thanh LE, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 638

926 P.2d 638

260 Kan. 845

STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v.Tung Thanh LE, Appellee.

No. 74708.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 25, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1.The several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bring them into workable harmony and giving effect to the entire act if it is reasonably possible to do so.

2.General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling.

3.In determining legislative intent, courts are not limited to a mere consideration of the language used, but look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested.

4.The legislature is presumed to intend that a statute be given a reasonable construction, so as to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.

Timothy J. Chambers, County Attorney, argued the cause, Alan Hughes, Assistant County Attorney, Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, on the brief, for appellant.

Janine Cox, Assistant Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, on the brief, for appellee.

LOCKETT, Justice:

The State appeals the denial of its motion to amend a complaint charging defendantTung Thanh Le with felony reckless aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3414 and the subsequent dismissal of the complaint.The district judge determined that a law enforcement officer was not a member of the class the legislature intended to protect when it enacted the general aggravated battery statute, K.S.A. 21-3414.

On May 2, 1995, the defendant was shot by a Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper who was being dragged by the defendant's vehicle as the defendant attempted to flee from a traffic stop.The State charged the driver with intentional aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, K.S.A. 21-3415, and possession of marijuana.

K.S.A. 21-3415 provides:

"(a) Aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer is: (1) an aggravated battery [intentionally causing great bodily harm to another person or disfigurement of another person] committed against a uniformed or properly identified state, county, or city law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of the officer's duty; or

(2) an aggravated battery [intentionally causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner hereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, or death can be inflicted] or [intentionally causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude, insulting, or angry manner with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, or death can be inflicted] committed against a uniformed or properly identified state, county or city law enforcement officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of the officer's duty."

After evidence was presented at the preliminary examination, the judge dismissed the charge of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, finding that there was no probable cause that the defendant's actions were intentional, a statutory element of K.S.A. 21-3415.

The State refiled the complaint.Count I of the second complaint charged that the defendant"recklessly cause[d] bodily harm to another person, to-wit: Daniel Dick, a uniformed State Law Enforcement Officer, with a deadly weapon, to-wit: Ford Bronco"(emphasis added) and cited K.S.A. 21-3415 as authority for the charge.Count II remained the same.Le was bound over for arraignment on both counts.An information was filed.

After the arraignment, Le filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer charge, pointing out that K.S.A. 21-3415 required that he be charged for an intentional act of battery and not a reckless act.Le pointed out that the legislature had not enacted a statutory crime of reckless aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer.The State moved to amend the information to charge Le with recklessly causing bodily harm to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, or death can be inflicted pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(B), the general aggravated battery statute.

At the hearing on the motion, the judge determined that the State's proposed amendment violated the rule of statutory construction requiring a specific statute to be charged over a general statute.The district judge observed that the legislature intended intentional aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer to be a distinct act from aggravated battery set out in K.S.A. 21-3414.The district judge denied the State's motion to amend the information, holding that the State could not proceed with the general aggravated battery statute because the victim was a law enforcement officer, a distinct class protected under specific statutes.In reaching this conclusion, the judge stated:

"The State should not be allowed to circumvent the legislative intent with the pretext that Trooper Dick is merely a member of the general public.Trooper Dick is a member of a particular specific class that has been identified by the legislature.An amendment to the information would not prejudice the defendant.However, the particular proposed amendment I believe violates the rule of statutory construction which requires a specific statute to be charged over a general statute."

The judge then opined that K.S.A. 21-3413, the simple battery against a law enforcement officer statute, provided the authority for charging the defendant with reckless aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, a misdemeanor.The judge observed that the State could proceed with the prosecution of a misdemeanor battery against a law enforcement officer or dismiss the case.The State declined to prosecute the defendant for misdemeanor battery, and the judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.The State timely appealed pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1), claiming that the district court erroneously applied the law of statutory construction in concluding that the legislature did not intend law enforcement officers to be members of the class protected by the general aggravated battery statute, K.S.A. 21-3414.

In construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony and giving effect to the entire act if it is reasonably possible to do so.State v. Gonzales, 255 Kan. 243, 248, 874 P.2d 612(1994)." 'General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling.' "State v. Sodders, 255 Kan. 79, 81-82, 872 P.2d 736(1994)(quotingKansas Racing...