State v. Nokes

Decision Date02 July 1996
Docket NumberNo. 14355,14355
Citation678 A.2d 510,42 Conn.App. 10
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Alan M. NOKES.

Stephen F. Cashman, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Christopher T. Godialis, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, State's Attorney, and Mary Rose Flaherty, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (state).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and SPEAR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The principal issue of this appeal is whether the trial court's instruction on the rebuttable presumption in General Statutes § 14-227a(c) 1 impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on an essential element of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a). 2

The defendant was arrested without a warrant after a Berlin police officer witnessed the defendant driving erratically. The defendant failed field sobriety tests, was read his Miranda rights and was taken to the police station where he submitted to two breath tests. The first test was administered about twenty-eight minutes after the defendant's arrest and measured his blood alcohol content (BAC) at 0.219 percent; the second test was administered about one hour after his arrest and measured his BAC at 0.210 percent. The defendant was found guilty by a jury of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

The pertinent part of the charge that must be analyzed in order to resolve the defendant's claim is as follows: "In any criminal prosecution for driving a vehicle while under the influence of, or affected by the use of, intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood at the time alleged is shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance, shall give rise to the following presumptions: If there was at that time ten hundredths of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. If you find that the results of the chemical analysis test are above twelve hundredths of one percent, and that the test was commenced within two hours of the time of operation, then you can find that the ratio of alcohol in the defendant's blood was in excess of the legal limit of ten hundredths of one percent at the time of operation. These presumptions are rebuttable presumptions. These presumptions can be overcome by the defendant through the introduction of other evidence. You will recall that the defense introduced the testimony of [Brian] Pape, an expert in the field of toxicology. It is for you to decide whether or not to believe all or any part of his testimony, and whether or not his testimony successfully rebutted the presumptions." (Emphasis added.)

The defendant excepted to the instruction, claiming that it unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the state to the defendant and that, because he had presented evidence to rebut the presumption, the jury should not have been instructed on the presumption at all.

A challenge to a jury instruction requires a review to determine whether it is reasonably possible that a jury was misled; State v. Ortiz, 217 Conn. 648, 667, 588 A.2d 127 (1991); and the instruction is to be read as a whole to judge its total effect rather than its individual parts. State v. Leroy, 232 Conn. 1, 8, 653 A.2d 161 (1995).

The jury charge here allowed the jury to make a permissive inference in that it could consider the test results and attach whatever weight it chose to them. The charge did not impermissibly allow the state to use an evidentiary presumption to relieve itself of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1970-71, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). The court told the jury that if the defendant's ...

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3 cases
  • Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • April 14, 1998
    ...plaintiff's claim, the trial court referred to two recent cases of this court to support its position. Those cases were State v. Nokes, 42 Conn.App. 10, 678 A.2d 510, remanded for reconsideration, 239 Conn. 926, 683 A.2d 22, on remand, 44 Conn.App. 40, 686 A.2d 999 (1996), and State v. Korh......
  • State v. Nokes
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • December 31, 1996
    ...decision in State v. Gerardi, 237 Conn. 348, 677 A.2d 937 (1996). The facts of the present case are set forth in State v. Nokes, 42 Conn.App. 10, 11-13, 678 A.2d 510 (1996), and do not warrant repetition here. The dispositive question was "whether the trial court's instruction on the rebutt......
  • State v. Nokes
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 1, 1996
    ...Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, in opposition. The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 42 Conn.App. 10, 678 A.2d 510 (AC 14355), is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for reconsideration in light of th......

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