State v. Noor

• Decision Date: 15 September 2021
• Docket Number: A19-1089
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Mohamed Mohamed Noor, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

State of Minnesota, Respondent,
v.
Mohamed Mohamed Noor, Appellant.

No. A19-1089

Supreme Court of Minnesota

September 15, 2021

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Thomas C. Plunkett, Saint Paul, Minnesota; Matthew D. Forsgren, Caitlinrose H. Fisher, Forsgren Fisher McCalmont DeMarea Tysver LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Peter B. Wold, Aaron Morrison, Wold & Morrison, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Roseville, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

William Ward, Minnesota State Public Defender, Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Board of Public Defense.

Robert Small, Minnesota County Attorneys Association Executive Director, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Travis J. Smith, Murray County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.

SYLLABUS

1. The mental state necessary for depraved-mind murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (2020), is a generalized indifference to human life, which cannot exist when the defendant's conduct is directed with particularity at the person who is killed.

2. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the circumstances proved is that appellant's conduct was directed with particularity at the person who was killed, and the evidence is therefore insufficient to sustain his conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a), for depraved-mind murder.

Reversed and remanded.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case comes to us following the tragic death of Justine Ruszczyk on July 15, 2017. Ruszczyk had called police that night out of concern for a woman she heard screaming behind her home. When Ruszczyk approached the police vehicle that came in response to her call, appellant Mohamed Mohamed Noor fired his service weapon at her from the passenger seat. Noor's bullet struck Ruszczyk in the abdomen and sadly, she died at the scene.

A jury acquitted Noor of second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2020) but found him guilty of third-degree depraved-mind murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (2020), and second-degree manslaughter, Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) (2020). He appealed, arguing that his conviction of depraved-mind murder could not stand because his actions were directed at Ruszczyk. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. State v. Noor, 955 N.W.2d 644, 664 (Minn.App. 2021).

The issue before us on appeal is not whether Noor is criminally responsible for Ruszczyk's death; he is, and his conviction of second-degree manslaughter stands. The issue before us is whether in addition to second-degree manslaughter, Noor can also be convicted of depraved-mind murder. Because conduct that is directed with particularity at the person who is killed cannot evince "a depraved mind, without regard for human life," Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a), and because the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the circumstances proved is that Noor directed his single shot with particularity at Ruszczyk, we conclude that he cannot. Accordingly, we reverse Noor's conviction of depraved-mind murder and remand the case to the district court for Noor to be sentenced on the second-degree manslaughter conviction.

FACTS

After the fatal shooting of Ruszczyk, the State charged Noor with depraved-mind murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a), and second-degree manslaughter, Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1). Later, the State amended the complaint to include second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1). At trial, the jury heard testimony from dozens of witnesses, including Noor and his partner Matthew Harrity.

From this testimony, the jury learned that Harrity and Noor responded to Ruszczyk's 911 call about a woman screaming in the alley behind Ruszczyk's home. Harrity drove, and Noor was in the passenger seat. They drove slowly down the alley with their windows down, listening for the person in distress. When they reached the end of the alley, Harrity told Noor to enter a "Code 4," meaning that the scene was clear and that no help was needed. Harrity stopped the car at this point because he saw a bicyclist traveling nearby.

The bicyclist had not yet passed the car when Harrity had "some weird feeling to [his] left side." As Harrity began turning left, he heard something hit the car and "some sort of a murmur." He exclaimed, "[O]h, shit or oh, Jesus," and he immediately pulled his gun out of its holster. At this point, he could see that there was a "figure" outside his window, but he could not distinguish any details. Based on the unknown identity of the figure and the noise, Harrity thought "this could be a possible ambush or something."

Harrity was still turning to his left when he heard a "pop" and "saw a flash." His first instinct was to see if he had been shot because he did not know from where the shot came. Harrity did a "quick side eye" to his right and saw Noor with his gun drawn.

Noor testified that as soon as he entered the Code 4, he heard a "loud bang" on the driver's side. At the same time, someone appeared outside the driver's-side window. Harrity looked at the figure and screamed, "Oh, Jesus," and immediately reached for his gun. Noor claimed that Harrity looked at him "with fear in his eyes" and that his gun appeared caught in its holster. Noor observed a blonde woman wearing a pink shirt. Noor testified that she began raising her right arm toward Harrity, so Noor rose from his seat, put his left arm across Harrity's chest, fired one shot at the woman, and "[t]he threat was gone." When they got out of the car, Noor realized that he shot an innocent person. Still, he testified that-in the moment-he shot out of concern for Harrity's life.^[1]

In its closing argument, the State repeatedly asserted that Noor fired specifically at Ruszczyk and maintained this position when arguing about depraved-mind murder, explaining that Noor was "trying to fire at Ms. Ruszczyk" and that "[w]e know from the evidence, in fact, that the defendant's act was specifically directed at Ms. Ruszczyk. The person shot was the person that he meant to kill." But the State also contended that Noor satisfied the elements of depraved-mind murder because firing the single shot also endangered Harrity and the bicyclist. In response, defense counsel argued that depraved-mind murder does not occur when one is "focusing on a known individual." According to the defense, depraved-mind murder "is like shooting into a crowd" or "like driving a car, speeding down the road with a blindfold on."

The jury acquitted Noor of second-degree intentional murder but found him guilty of depraved-mind murder and second-degree manslaughter. The court convicted Noor of depraved-mind murder and second-degree manslaughter but sentenced Noor only on the depraved-mind murder conviction.

Noor appealed, arguing in relevant part that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of depraved-mind murder.^[2] Noor essentially asserted that our case law creates a "particular-person exclusion," which prohibits a conviction of depraved-mind murder when the defendant's conduct is directed at the person who is killed. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 664. The majority contended that three cases were apposite. Id. at 652-53. It cited State v. Lowe, 68 N.W. 1094, 1095 (Minn. 1896), for the proposition that "third-degree [depraved-mind] murder may occur even if the death-causing act endangered only one person." 955 N.W.2d at 653. Quoting State v. Mytych, 194 N.W.2d 276, 277 (Minn. 1972), it explained that "[e]ach [depraved-mind murder] case must be determined on its own facts and issues." 955 N.W.2d at 653 (emphasis omitted). In particular, the court of appeals noted that "Mytych upheld a conviction of third-degree murder even though the victims were known to and targeted by the defendant." Id. at 655. Finally, the court reasoned that the particular-person exclusion was analogous to the "without intent to effect the death of any person" language discussed in State v. Hall, 931 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Minn. 2019) (holding that the "without intent to effect the death of any person" language in the depraved-mind murder statute did not create an element that must be affirmatively proven). Noor, 955 N.W.2d at 655-56.

Having concluded that depraved-mind murder includes death-causing actions directed with particularity at the victim, the majority considered the sufficiency of the evidence used to establish Noor's mental state. Id. at 657-59. Citing its decision in State v Coleman, 944 N.W.2d 469, 479 (Minn App 2020), aff'd on other grounds, 957 N.W.2d 72 (Minn 2021), the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Noor "was aware that his conduct created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death to another person and consciously disregarded that risk" 955 N.W.2d at 658^[3] The majority therefore affirmed Noor's depraved-mind murder conviction Id. at 664 The dissent, however, agreed with Noor that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for depraved-mind murder Id. at 664-70 (Johnson, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

We granted Noor's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

Noor challenges his conviction for depraved-mind murder under section 609.195(a). Under that statute, third-degree murder occurs when a person, without the intent to kill, "causes the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others" that "evinc[es] a depraved mind, without regard for human life." Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (emphasis added). This case involves the statutory phrase requiring the State to prove that the...