State v. Norrell

Decision Date24 February 1993
Docket NumberNo. 24659-KA,24659-KA
Citation614 So.2d 755
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. James NORRELL, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Steven A. Hansen, Monroe, for appellant.

Richard Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, Jerry L. Jones, Dist. Atty., Douglas R. Haynes, II, Asst. Dist. Atty., Monroe, for appellee.

Before MARVIN, VICTORY and BROWN, JJ.

MARVIN, Chief Judge.

James Norrell appeals consecutive 15-year sentences for two counts of oral sexual battery and a concurrent 10-year sentence for molestation of a juvenile, an upward departure from the sentencing-grid guidelines. LRS 14:43.3; LRS 14:81.2. Norrell pled guilty to these charges pursuant to a plea agreement.

We affirm.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

LSA-Const. Art. 1, Sec. 20 prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. CCrP Art. 894.1 mandates that the trial court consider the recommendations of the Felony Sentencing Guidelines (FSG), and state for the record the considerations it has taken into account, including any aggravating and mitigating circumstances which may be present, and the factual basis for imposing sentence.

We have noted that the guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. A sentence shall not be declared unlawful or excessive solely because the sentencing court imposes a sentence that does not conform with the designated sentence range in the guidelines grid. LRS 15:326; LRS 15:328; CCrP Art. 894.1; FSG Sec. 103J; State v. Strother, 606 So.2d 891 (La.App.2d Cir.1992), writ denied.

Upward departures from the designated sentence range of the guideline grid should be made when one or more aggravating circumstances significantly differentiates the particular case from the "typical." Sec. 209A3. The guidelines set forth 19 aggravating circumstances which, when present to a significant degree, differentiate the case under consideration as more serious than the typical case arising under a particular offense. Sec. 209B. If the trial court finds one or more aggravating circumstances, then the grid range for the "typical case" is inapplicable and the trial court must exercise its reasoned discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. State v. Strother, supra.

The guidelines continue the statutory suggestion that concurrent sentences "should" be imposed if two or more criminal acts constitute parts of a common scheme. Compare Sec. 215A2 and CCrP Art. 883. While the word "should" is not mandatory, the guidelines clearly suggest that a trial court specifically consider the several aggravating factors which may warrant imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Strother, supra.

The seriousness ranking for type II oral sexual battery (where the victim is under 15 years) is four. Applying this ranking and Norrell's criminal history index, as calculated by the probation officer, the recommended sentence for each count of oral sexual battery is 42-30 months. The seriousness ranking for molestation of a juvenile is three. The recommended sentence for this conviction is 66-54 months.

In considering the recommendation of the guidelines, the trial court found several aggravating circumstances which warranted an upward departure of the sentencing guidelines and imposition of the maximum sentences allowed. The trial court stated these reasons for the departure:

After reviewing the sentence guidelines report and the presentence investigation report, I find that your case is definitely not a typical case and, for that reason, I am departing from the recommendation of the sentence guidelines report. I do find that there are a number of aggravating circumstances present in your case that would merit such departure. Number one, your conduct in buying favors [gifts, trips, etc.] for the young boy involved and in providing sexual material for him, such as movies and things of that sort, amounted to your arousal of his sexual desires and was done for the sole purpose of satisfying your own sexual needs without any consideration at all of the lasting effect that your acts may have on this young boy for the rest of his life. And this was especially true, as I pointed out to you earlier because of your own history that you related [sexual abuse] and your attributing your problems to that history in your young life. The second aggravating factor is that you knew, or you certainly should have known, that this young boy was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to his extreme youth and lack of experience in life. Third, you used your status as an adult to...

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  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • 22 August 2001
    ...factor, but was an impermissible factor when the age of the victim is already an element of the offense, citing State v. Norrell, 614 So.2d 755 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). The state contends that the defendant faced a 50-year exposure on his charges, and his sentence exposure was significantly r......
  • 30,877 La.App. 2 Cir. 8/19/98, State v. Maxie
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • 19 August 1998
    ...trial court specifically consider several aggravating factors which may warrant imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Norrell, 614 So.2d 755 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). Concurrent sentences arising out of a single cause of conduct are not mandatory and consecutive sentences under those c......
  • State v. Camese
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • 11 July 2001
    ...trial court specifically consider several aggravating factors which may warrant imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. Norrell, 614 So.2d 755 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). Concurrent sentences arising out of a single cause of conduct are not mandatory and consecutive sentences under those c......
  • 31,737 La.App. 2 Cir. 3/31/99, State v. Mickens
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • 31 March 1999
    ...prohibited consideration of essential elements of the offense of conviction as aggravating factors. See, i.e., State v. Norrell, 614 So.2d 755 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). Nonetheless, we can find no case not controlled by the guidelines prohibiting such consideration. Indeed, the third circuit h......
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