State v. Norris

CourtTexas Civil Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtBISSETT
CitationState v. Norris, 550 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
Decision Date14 April 1977
Docket NumberNo. 1166,1166
Petition Historywrit ref'd n.r.e.
PartiesSTATE of Texas et al., Appellants, v. Lila Faye NORRIS, Appellee.
OPINION

BISSETT, Justice.

This is a suit brought under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 (Supp.1976), commonly called the Texas Tort Claims Act. Lila Faye Norris filed suit against the State of Texas, the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, and the State Commission for Highways and Public Transportation to recover damages for personal injuries which she sustained in an automobile accident on January 23, 1974, which allegedly occurred because a traffic signal light at an intersection in Bay City, Texas, was malfunctioning. Trial was to a jury. All issues were answered favorably to plaintiff. Judgment was rendered that plaintiff recover from defendants the sum of $82,597.43. Defendants have perfected an appeal from that judgment.

Defendants contend in point of error 6 that the trial court erred in submitting Special Issue 1 inquiring of a "malfunctioning condition", because the same constitutes a global submission which is not limited to a controlling issue. The issue, as submitted, reads:

"Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the traffic signal at Avenue C and 7th Street in Bay City, Texas, was in a malfunctioning condition on the occasion in question?"

The jury answered: "we do,"

Rule 277, T.R.C.P. (Supp.1976), as amended in 1973, permits the trial court, at its discretion, to submit broad issues to the jury. An issue is not now objectionable because it is general. The rule, as now amended, should be given a liberal construction. Security Federal Savings & Loan Association v. DeWitt, 536 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Members Mutual Insurance Company v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 517 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Point 6 is overruled.

The jury further found: the traffic signal light system at the intersection of Avenue C and 7th Street in Bay City, Texas, was in a malfunctioning condition on the occasion in question; and that the malfunctioning condition constituted a dangerous condition (12). Those findings (Nos. 1 and 12) are attacked by points 1 and 4, "no evidence" points, and by points 8 and 15, "factually insufficient evidence" points.

The collision made the basis of this suit occurred shortly before noon on January 23, 1974, in Bay City, Texas in the intersection of Avenue C and 7th Street. State Highway 35 traverses that portion of 7th Street in the area of the intersection. Plaintiff, immediately preceding the accident, was driving her automobile north along Avenue C. She entered the intersection of Avenue C and 7th Street, hereinafter referred to as "the intersection," and while she was in the intersection her automobile was struck by a truck which was then being driven by Mr. Jessie Figueroa, who was proceeding east on 7th Street.

In Bay City, 6th and 7th Streets run east and west; 7th Street is north of 6th Street. Avenue C runs north and south and crosses both 6th and 7th Streets.

It is undisputed that the State Highway Department, in the year 1970, assumed the maintenance of the traffic signal light system hereinafter referred to as "the light," at the intersection in question. At all times pertinent to this appeal, it was the duty and responsibility of the Highway Department to maintain the light at the intersection where the collision occurred in proper working order.

The color of the lights which are shown for traffic on the intersecting streets, as well as the time each color is exhibited and the cycle of change, is regulated by a "controller," an electronic device. The controller actuates the relay system for the traffic signal light.

Plaintiff testified that immediately before the collision, she was proceeding west on 6th Street. At the intersection of 6th Street and Avenue C, she observed that the traffic signal light facing south on Avenue C at the intersection of 7th Street and Avenue C was red. She turned right (north) onto Avenue C and proceeded toward 7th Street. She stated that the traffic signal for traffic moving north on Avenue C turned green before she reached 7th Street, and further stated that it was green when she entered such intersection to turn left (west) on 7th Street. Her automobile was struck by the truck before she cleared the intersection. Mr. Figueroa, the driver of the truck, testified that the signal facing him (for traffic proceeding east on 7th Street) was green when he entered the intersection.

The evidence with respect to whether both plaintiff and Figueroa had a green light when each entered the intersection is conflicting. But it was within the province of the jury to resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of any witness as well as in the testimony of different witnesses. Ford v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 151 Tex. 538, 252 S.W.2d 561 (1952). "The credibility of witnesses is a matter which is evaluated by a court or a jury sitting as a fact and truth finder." Great American Insurance Company v. Murray, 437 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex.Sup.1969).

The State Highway Department correctly observes that the only witnesses who testified directly that the light was green for both drivers of the vehicles when each entered the intersection were the drivers themselves. It contends that such testimony "constitutes no evidence of a malfunction of the traffic signal, or at most, no more than a mere scintilla." We do not agree. Figueroa was a disinterested witness in this case. Plaintiff's testimony was positive, unequivocal, and is as competent to raise an issue of fact as the same evidence coming from a disinterested witness. Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Sup.1962). There was ample evidence, both direct and circumstantial, all of which had probative value to support the jury's findings that the light showed "green" simultaneously for both plaintiff and Figueroa, that it was in a malfunctioning condition on the occasion in question, and that the malfunctioning condition constituted a dangerous condition. Points 1, 4, 8, and 15 are overruled.

The jury also found: the State Highway Department had notice of the malfunctioning condition prior to the accident (Special Issue No. 2); the State Highway Department failed to correct the malfunctioning condition within a reasonable time after notice of the malfunctioning condition (Special Issue No. 3); such failure was negligence, which was a proximate cause of the accident (Special Issues Nos. 4 and 5); the failure by the State Highway Department to warn motorists of the malfunctioning condition was negligence, which was a proximate cause of the accident (Special Issues Nos. 10 and 11); the State Highway Department had knowledge of the dangerous condition prior to the accident (Special Issue No. 13).

Defendants attack the answers to Special Issues Nos. 2, 3, and 13 by "no evidence" points (2, 3, and 5), and the answers to Special Issues Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 13, by "factually insufficient evidence" points (9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16). They further contend in point 7 that Special Issue No. 2, which inquired into whether the State Highway Department had "notice" of the malfunctioning condition of the traffic signal system should not have been submitted over defendants' objection because "actual notice" is required.

The pertinent provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, hereinafter called "the Act," read, in part, as follows:

"Sec. 3. Each unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages . . . proximately caused by the . . . death or personal injuries so caused (proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment or office) from some condition or some use of tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances where such unit of government, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state . . ."

"Sec. 14. The provisions of this Act shall not apply to:

(12) Any claim arising from the absence, condition, or malfunction of any traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device unless such absence, condition, or malfunction shall not be corrected by the governmental unit responsible within a reasonable time after notice, or any claim arising from the removal or destruction of such signs, signals or devices by third parties except on failure of the unit of government to correct the same within such reasonable time, after actual notice . . ."

"Sec. 18(b). As to premise defects, the unit of government shall owe to any claimant only the duty owed by private persons to a licensee on private property, unless payment has been made by the claimant for the use of the premises. Provided, however, that the limitation of duty contained in this subsection shall not apply to the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads or streets, nor shall it apply to any such duty to warn of the absence, condition or malfunction of traffic signs, signals or warning devices as is required in Section 14 (12) hereof."

The parties in the trial court disagreed as to the issues that were to be submitted to the jury. The trial judge submitted the case both ways in accordance with the parties' own interpretation of the Act. Special Issues 2 through 5 submitted the case on plaintiff's theory that only "notice" of the malfunctioning traffic signal system was required to support her recovery in the action brought by her under the Act. Special Issues 6 through 9 submitted the case on the State Highway...

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