State v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 29 March 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 34093.,34093. |
| Parties | STATE et al. v. NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Albin S. Pearson, Judge.
Proceedings by the State and Port Authority of St. Paul against the Northern Pacific Railway Company and others charging that switching charges for carload traffic switched from property of the Port Authority to industries in St. Paul Switching District were unduly preferential, unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful. From an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission fixing the maximum charges defendants might thereafter lawfully collect for switching services in the district, the defendants appealed to the district court and from an order of that court staying enforcement of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission's order pending the appeal, the State and Port Authority of St. Paul appeal.
Order affirmed.
J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., and George T. Simpson, Special Counsel, Bruce J. Broady, Corporation Counsel, and Ira Karon, Asst. Corp. Cnsl., all of St. Paul, for appellants.
Conrad Olson, of St. Paul, P. F. Gault and Guy A. Gladson, both of Chicago, Ill., L. E. Torinus, Jr., of Stillwater, A. H. Lossow and A. O. Bjorklund, both of Minneapolis, Eldon M. Martin, of Chicago, Ill., Richard Musenbrock, of Minneapolis, Philip Stringer, of St. Paul, and C. O. Newcomb and A. C. Erdall, both of Minneapolis, for respondents.
These proceedings were instituted by the filing of two separate verified complaints with the railroad and warehouse commission, one by the Port Authority of Saint Paul (a municipal commission created under the harbor act, L.1929, c. 61, L.1931, c. 132, Minn.St.1941, § 458.09, Mason St.1940 Supp. § 1372-7½), and one by the state through the attorney general. The complaints both alleged in substance that certain switching charges for carload traffic switched from the property of said Port Authority to industries in the St. Paul Switching District were unduly preferential, unreasonable, discriminatory, and unlawful.
The two proceedings were joined and tried before the commission as one action. After the hearing, on May 1, 1945, the commission made its order determining that certain of the switching rates complained of were excessive, unequal, and unreasonable, and unduly preferred certain shippers; all in violation of public convenience and necessity. Said order did not make "a tariff of rates, fares, charges, and classifications," as provided by Minn. St.1941, § 216.19, Mason St.1927, § 4644, to be substituted for the tariff complained of, but fixed the maximum charges defendants might thereafter lawfully collect for switching services in said district. The order provided: "That all carriers serving the St. Paul Switching District, as herein defined, shall by appropriate and lawful tariff publication, establish on not less than five days' notice, to become effective on or before June 1, 1945, the charges for the switching of carload traffic from points and places on the tracks of the Port Authority of the City of St. Paul to connections with connecting lines and industries on their respective lines, the charges herein found reasonable;"
Service of the order upon defendants was made on May 2, 1945. On May 17, 1945, they appealed therefrom to the district court of Ramsey county, as provided by §§ 216.24 and 216.25 (§§ 4650, 4651). On May 18, 1945, they moved said court for an order staying the effect of the commission's order pending the appeal. On May 23, 1945, the court stayed the commission's order until final determination of the appeal, and further ordered that, commencing June 1, 1945, defendants keep a detailed account of all switching charges in the district, showing the date of each switching movement, the names and addresses of each consignee of freight handled therein, and the amounts collected from such consignees in excess of the maximum charges fixed by the commission's order. The court's order further provided that each defendant file with the clerk of said court an undertaking with sureties in the sum of $1,000, conditioned that each of them would refund to any persons entitled thereto all sums collected in excess of the amounts finally authorized in these proceedings.
On May 28, 1945, this appeal was taken from the court's order staying enforcement of the original order of the commission.
On appeal, complainants contend (1) that the district court, by virtue of § 216.19 (§ 4644), was without power, either in its discretion or otherwise, to stay the enforcement of the commission's order pending the appeal; and (2) that, if the district court had discretionary power to stay enforcement of said order, its action in doing so was arbitrary and in effect an abuse of discretion.
1. We are of the opinion that the district court, by virtue of the applicable statutes, had discretionary power to stay enforcement of the order of the railroad and warehouse commission pending appeal. Section 216.19 (§ 4644) provides:
It is complainants' contention that the commission's order in effect constituted a tariff of rates, fares, charges, and classifications, and, hence, under § 216.19 (§ 4644), that the district court was not authorized to stay enforcement thereof during the pendency of the appeal. Examination of § 216.19 (§ 4644) indicates that the restrictive provisions thereof relate to tariffs of rates, fares, charges, and classifications made or established by the commission. In the instant case, we do not find that a tariff of rates, fares, charges, or classification was made by the commission. Its order was limited to a statement of the maximum charges over which defendants might not go in establishing their tariffs in the district involved. Defendants, and not the commission, by the terms of the order were to make and establish the tariffs required, presumably in compliance with § 218.35 (§ 4832), which provides:
In the commission's order there was no reference to classification of freight, tables of distances, schedules of rates, terminal charges, or to the rules and regulations contemplated by § 218.35 (§ 4832), nor could its order in the form issued "be substituted for the tariff so complained of" as specified in § 216.19 (§ 4644). It must follow, therefore, that the court order here under attack did not, in violation of § 216.19 (§ 4644), stay enforcement of a tariff of rates, fares, charges, and classification made by the commission and "substituted for the tariff so complained of."
(It may be of interest to note here that the United States Supreme Court, in Pacific T. & T. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553, 68 L.Ed. 975; Porter v. Investors' Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 52 S.Ct. 617, 76 L.Ed. 1226; and Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 299 U.S. 167, 57 S.Ct. 168, 81 L.Ed. 99, directly or by implication casts doubt upon the constitutionality of restrictive provisions such as are contained in § 216.19 (§ 4644) suggesting that in effect such provisions deny due process to litigants.)
2. In addition, subsequent sections of our statutes provide ample authority to support the court's action in suspending enforcement of the commission's order. Thus, § 216.25 (§ 4651) provides: (Italics supplied.)
It is clear therefrom that the legislature intended to extend to the courts power to stay enforcement of the commission's orders, including orders relating to rates, under the procedure outlined therein. Complainants' contention that § 216.25 (§ 4651) has no application to rate orders is not sustained by the language of said statute. That the section is applicable to orders relating to rates is apparent from the words "If such appeal is not taken * * * it shall thereupon be the duty of the carriers...
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