State v. Norwood

• Decision Date: 11 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 318A94,318A94
• Citation: State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 476 S.E.2d 349 (N.C. 1996)
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Lorenza Donnell NORWOOD.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 349

476 S.E.2d 349

344 N.C. 511

STATE of North Carolina v. Lorenza Donnell NORWOOD.

No. 318A94.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 11, 1996.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, for the State.

William F.W. Massengale and Marilyn G. Ozer, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

WEBB, Justice.

The defendant brings forth numerous assignments of error relating to each facet of the trial and capital sentencing proceeding. For the reasons set forth herein, we find the defendant's trial and sentencing proceeding to have been free from prejudicial error.

JURY SELECTION ISSUES

The defendant first assigns error to the excusal for cause of twelve prospective jurors based on their answers to the trial court's death qualification questions. First, the defendant says that the trial court's questions were confusing and that they failed to establish either an understanding on the part of the jurors of what they were being asked or an actual bias justifying their removal from the venire. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The defendant also says the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow him the opportunity to rehabilitate these jurors. Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court's "formula" for excusing jurors for cause had a devastating impact on the racial composition of the jury, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and infringed on the rights of the excluded jurors under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). These contentions are without merit.

The trial court explained to each prospective juror the procedure followed in a capital sentencing hearing in pertinent part as follows:

The law ... provides ... that it is the duty of the jury to recommend that the defendant be sentenced to death if the State satisfies the twelve jurors beyond a reasonable doubt of three things: Number one, that one or more of the aggravating circumstances prescribed by statute exists; number two, that the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty; and number three, that any mitigating circumstances found to exist are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances found. Do you understand that ... ?

....

If the State fails to satisfy the jury of all these three things ... it is the duty of the jury to recommend life imprisonment. Do you understand that ... ?

The court then asked each juror the following questions:

If you are selected to serve as a juror in this case, can and will you follow the law as it will be explained to you by the Court in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of first degree murder or of any other lesser offense?

....

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of those things necessary to constitute first degree murder, can and will you vote to return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, even though you know that death is one of the possible penalties?

....

Considering your personal beliefs about the death penalty ... please state for me ... whether you would be able or unable to vote for a recommendation of the death penalty, even though you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the three things required by law concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances previously mentioned[.]

The trial court excused for cause those jurors who answered that they would be "unable" to vote for a recommendation of death, even if they answered that they could follow the law as to the sentencing requirements.

We upheld the same process and reason for excusing jurors for cause in State v. Ward, 338 N.C. 64, 449 S.E.2d 709 (1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2014, 131 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1995). In that case we held that the trial court did not improperly excuse for cause those jurors who stated that they would be unable to impose the death penalty. Id. at 87-88, 449 S.E.2d at 721-22. We further held that the trial court's use of standardized questions and answers and its failure to allow rehabilitation by the defendant was not an abuse of discretion. Id.

We have held that a venireman may be excused for cause if he is irrevocably committed before the trial begins to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 41, 430 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1993). A juror cannot properly be excused for cause for his views on capital punishment unless those views "would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980)). It is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow the rehabilitation of a juror who has expressed unequivocal opposition to the death penalty. State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 307, 389 S.E.2d 66, 71 (1990).

The defendant concedes that there is no evidence on the record that any of the prospective jurors were confused or misunderstood the questions. He contends, however, that their confusion was likely since other prospective jurors expressed confusion when questioned about their responses. As in Ward, the record discloses that twelve prospective jurors in this case unequivocally stated that they would be unable to vote for the death penalty even though they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the requirements for its imposition were present. Additional questions by the defendant would not likely have produced different answers from those given to the court. Id. It was not error for the court to deny the defendant the right to question these prospective jurors further.

Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court's allowance of these challenges for cause deprived him of his constitutional rights to a trial by a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He says this is so because seven of the nine African-American women and two of the four African-American men were excluded after they said they would be "unable" to vote for the death penalty. The defendant also says, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, that the challenges infringed on the rights of these excluded jurors. There is no merit to either argument.

These prospective jurors were properly excused for cause because of their opposition to the death penalty. Neither the Sixth Amendment nor Batson guarantees the defendant the right to a jury composed of members of a certain race or gender. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). Furthermore, Batson applies only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause. The excusal of these jurors for cause did not deprive the defendant or the jurors of their constitutional rights. State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 19, 337 S.E.2d 786, 796 (1985).

This assignment of error is overruled.

In his next assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to find that the defendant had established prima facie grounds to challenge the prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge and by improperly excusing a juror for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.

After the trial court had excused several of the minority jurors, the State used a peremptory challenge to excuse prospective juror Towanda Cooper. The defendant contends that nothing in the voir dire suggests a nondiscriminatory reason for excusing Ms. Cooper. He says he made a credible prima facie showing of discrimination because of the races of the defendant and victim, the racial overtones of the case, and the ultimate racial make-up of the jury. See State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 400 S.E.2d 712 (1991). The trial judge found that the State had not previously used a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American juror, that an African-American man was seated on the panel, and that there was no discernible pattern of removing African-American jurors. He concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. We accord great deference to the findings of the trial court. State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 134, 456 S.E.2d 789, 796 (1995). We cannot say the trial court erred in finding that the defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination.

The defendant also argues that the court improperly excused Doris Williams, the only remaining black female, because of personal commitments. The juror was a single woman with five children and had just enrolled in community college. The defendant concedes that the trial court validly exercised discretion and that this was a valid hardship excusal. The defendant argues, however, that the juror should not have been considered in isolation, as she was the defendant's last hope of having a black female serve on the jury. He contends that he was denied a jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community. As we discussed above, the defendant is not entitled to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of a certain race. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137. The court properly exercised its discretion in this instance and did not err in excusing Ms. Williams ex mero motu.

This assignment of error is overruled.

In his next assignment of error, the defendant again contests the excusal for cause of two prospective jurors. Both prospective jurors stated that they were unable to impose the death penalty. For the reasons...