State v. Obrero

• Decision Date: 08 September 2022
• Docket Number: SCAP-21-0000576
• Citation: 151 Hawai‘i 472,517 P.3d 755
• Parties: STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard OBRERO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

151 Hawai‘i 472
517 P.3d 755

STATE of Hawai‘i, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Richard OBRERO, Defendant-Appellant.

SCAP-21-0000576

Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

September 8, 2022

Thomas M. Otake, Honolulu, for appellant

Donn Fudo, Honolulu, for appellee

McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.; WITH NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY AND DISSENTING, WITH WHOM McKENNA, J., JOINS AS TO SECTIONS II AND III; AND RECKTENWALD, C.J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is about what limits, if any, Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 801-1 (2014) imposes on the State's ability to prosecute felonies. The law says:

No person shall be subject to be tried and sentenced to be punished in any court, for an alleged offense, unless upon indictment or information, except for offenses within the jurisdiction of a district court or in summary proceedings for contempt.

HRS § 801-1.

Defendant-Appellant Richard Obrero argues the State violated HRS § 801-1 by using the complaint and preliminary hearing process to prosecute him for second-degree murder, attempted murder in the first and second degree, and use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony.

We agree. Obrero isn't charged with contempt. And the felonies he's charged with are neither within the jurisdiction of the district court nor chargeable by information, see HRS §§ 806-82 (2014), 806-83 (Supp. 2021). So Obrero is a person who shall not "be subject to be tried and sentenced ... in any court, for an alleged offense, unless upon indictment." HRS § 801-1.

We hold that HRS § 801-1 means what it plainly says: criminal defendants cannot be "subject to be tried and sentenced to be punished in any court, for an alleged offense" without an indictment or information unless the charged offense is either contempt or within the jurisdiction of the district court.

We also hold that defendants are "subject to be tried and sentenced to be punished" at arraignment, when they must either plead guilty, and be subject to sentencing, or plead not guilty, and be subject to trial and possibly also sentencing.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Circuit Court Proceedings

On November 12, 2019, the State filed six separate complaints against Obrero, alleging, among other things,¹ that he had committed second-degree murder in violation of HRS §§ 707-701.5 (Supp. 2021) and 706-656.

Two days later, on the morning of November 14, 2019, the State presented its case against Obrero to an O‘ahu Grand Jury.² The grand jury returned a no bill. It did not think there was probable cause to believe Obrero committed any of the charged crimes. And it voted against allowing the State to subject Obrero to the indignity, expense, and stigma of a criminal prosecution.

The State was undeterred. On the afternoon of November 14, 2019 – just a few hours after the grand jury returned a no

517 P.3d 759

bill – the State made its case again,³ this time at a preliminary hearing before the district court. The hearing was continued to the next day; when it concluded, the district court — unlike the grand jury — found there was probable cause to charge Obrero. It committed Obrero's case to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit.⁴

Obrero pled not guilty at his November 2019 arraignment.

Later, in July 2021, Obrero moved for dismissal of the charges. He argued the State's prosecution of him was unlawful because there was no indictment. He pointed to the plain language of HRS § 801-1 :

No person shall be subject to be tried and sentenced to be punished in any court, for an alleged offense, unless upon indictment or information, except for offenses within the jurisdiction of a district court or in summary proceedings for contempt.

HRS § 801-1.

Obrero argued that his charges weren't for contempt and didn't fall "within the jurisdiction of a district court." He reasoned that since the charges against him can't be charged by information (which is only available for certain Class B and C felonies, see HRS §§ 806-82, 806-83 ), he is a person who shall not "be subject to be tried and sentenced to be punished in any court, for an alleged offense, unless upon indictment." See HRS § 801-1.

The State opposed Obrero's motion. It urged the court to look beyond the plain text of HRS § 801-1 and interpret the statute through reference to article I, section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution.

Before 1982, the Hawai‘i Constitution mirrored the federal constitution in requiring grand jury presentments or indictments for felony prosecutions. In 1982, a constitutional amendment rolled back the constitutional grand jury indictment requirement for felony prosecutions. Now, article I, section 10 begins: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime,⁵ unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury or upon a finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing held as provided by law or upon information⁶ in writing signed by a legal prosecuting officer ...." (emphasis added).

The State argued that the 1982 amendment didn't just make it constitutional for it to initiate felony prosecutions through the complaint and preliminary hearing process, it also effectively nullified HRS § 801-1 ’s grand jury protections by authorizing the State to use complaints and preliminary hearings to initiate felony prosecutions.

The State supported this position with a discussion of Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure Rules (HRPP) 5(c) and 7(b). The former explicitly contemplates preliminary hearings as proceedings that may follow the arrest of defendants charged with felonies. The latter — in direct conflict with HRS § 801-1 — states that a felony may be prosecuted by complaint "if with respect to that felony the district judge has found probable cause at a preliminary hearing and has committed the defendant to answer in the circuit court ..." (or if the defendant has properly waived the right to an indictment or preliminary hearing). See HRPP Rule 7(b). The State notes that under HRS § 602-11 the HRPP have the force and effect of law.

517 P.3d 760

The trial court denied Obrero's motion to dismiss. It relied on the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, which provides that laws on the same subject matter should be "construed with reference to each other" so that "[w]hat is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Omiya, 142 Hawai‘i 439, 450, 420 P.3d 370, 381 (2018). The court recognized that HRS § 801-1 "standing alone ... could lend itself to the interpretation that Mr. Obrero in this case should have been indicted by a grand jury in order for the State to proceed." But, it said, HRS § 801-1 does not stand alone; the statute must be read "in pari materia to other statutes, which the State has pointed out, and other constitutional provisions and other rules that are promulgated by our Supreme Court, which, pursuant to HRS [§] 602-11, do have the force and effect of law." The court concluded that when HRS § 801-1 was read in pari materia with the authorities identified by the State, it did not preclude the State from using the complaint and preliminary hearing process to prosecute Obrero.

B. Proceedings on Appeal

Obrero took an interlocutory appeal to the ICA. He then applied for, and received, transfer to this court.

On appeal, Obrero contends that the circuit court erred by applying the in pari materia canon of statutory interpretation.⁷ That canon, he contends, applies only where there is something doubtful or ambiguous about a statute. Since HRS § 801-1 is clear on its face, the application of the in pari materia canon in this case doesn't resolve ambiguity, it creates it.

The State counters that it is a "fundamental tenet" of statutory interpretation that "laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." The State observes that article I, section 10, HRS §§ 805-7 and 806-8, as well as HRPP Rules 5 and 7, all relate to the same topic as HRS § 801-1 : the methods by which a criminal prosecution may be initiated. So, it reasons, HRS § 801-1 ’s meaning should be triangulated through reference to those other authorities.

The State points out that in 1991 the legislature amended HRS §§ 806-6, - 7, and - 8 to add "complaint" to the disjunctive series "information, complaint, or an indictment" and said the amendment's purpose was "to include complaints as a means of commencing a criminal prosecution." See HRS §§ 806-6 (2014), -7 (2014), and -8 (2014). The legislature described the amendment as a " ‘housekeeping measure’ to conform certain provisions of the [HRS] to what is currently practiced under the [HRPP]." House Standing Committee Report Number 1652, in 1991 House Journal, at 1437. The State says we should interpret HRS § 801-1 in light of this legislative history.

On appeal, the State also argues that HRS § 801-1 was repealed by implication. It points to HRS §§ 602-11,⁸ 805-7,⁹ and 806-8,¹⁰ and HRPP Rules 5 and 7 and argues they "cover

517 P.3d 761

the field regulating the process, practices, and procedure that authorize a person to be held to answer for felony offenses upon a finding of probable cause after a preliminary hearing" and that HRS § 801-1, therefore, "seems to have been, in part, impliedly repealed or amended" such that it cannot be interpreted as Obrero contends.

Obrero rejects the State's repeal-by-implication argument. Citing State v. Casugay-Badiang, 130 Hawai‘i 21, 305 P.3d 437 (2013), he argues that for a statute to be repealed by implication it must be " ‘plainly irreconcilable’ with some other statute or constitutional provision." Id. at 29, 305 P.3d at 445. Obrero says the State has not shown that "effect can[not] reasonably be given" to both HRS § 801-1 and the constitutional and statutory provisions the State contends implicitly repeal HRS § 801-1.

III. DISCUSSION

HRS § 801-1...