State v. Ohm
Decision Date | 10 December 2008 |
Docket Number | D052398T.,A130976. |
Citation | 197 P.3d 1136,224 Or. App. 390 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Allison Nicole OHM, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ben Eder argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Rolf C. Moan, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before SCHUMAN, Presiding Judge, and ORTEGA, Judge, and SERCOMBE, Judge.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, assigning error to the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence that she refused to submit to a breath test. She argues that evidence of her refusal was inadmissible for two reasons: first, because the refusal occurred without the advice of counsel and was therefore fatally tainted; and second, because she had a constitutional right to refuse the test and the state cannot use the invocation of a constitutional right as evidence of guilt. We rejected the second argument in State v. Gefre, 137 Or.App. 77, 83-84, 903 P.2d 386 (1995), rev. den., 323 Or. 483, 918 P.2d 848 (1996), and again in State v. Greenough, 216 Or.App. 426, 430-31, 173 P.3d 1227 (2007), rev. den., 344 Or. 280, 180 P.3d 702 (2008), and we here reject it yet again without further discussion. We agree with defendant that the evidence of her refusal resulted from an uncounselled decision, but we conclude that the error was harmless. We therefore affirm.
What happened next is captured in the following colloquy between defense counsel and the officer:
Schneider further testified that, after the 15-minute observation period that is required before conducting a breath test, "I asked her again what she wanted to do, if she wanted to take the breath test, and at that time she told me, and I quote, `I don't want to take the test,'" a statement that Schneider recorded as a refusal. At a pretrial hearing, defendant submitted a motion to suppress evidence of her refusal to submit to a breath test. The court denied that motion, and defendant was subsequently convicted by a jury.
The right delineated by these cases is the right to have an opportunity to consult with counsel. Defendant asserts that a driver arrested for DUII has the right to consult privately not just with counsel, but with anyone. She relies on language from State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981), and Moore v. Motor Vehicles Division, 293 Or. 715, 652 P.2d 794 (1982). In Newton, 291 Or. at 807, 636 P.2d 393, the court referred to "[f]reedom of an arrested person to communicate" and "liberty to communicate as he chose"; in Moore, 293 Or. at 719, 652 P.2d 794, the court described Newton as "holding that an arrested person is entitled to communicate with counsel or others and that the police must reasonably accommodate a request to do so unless it would interfere with their duties." Neither of these cases involves a defendant's right to counsel, under either the federal or Oregon constitution. Only three justices relied on a constitutional source in Newton; one justice concurred on statutory grounds, Newton, 291 Or. at 813, 636 P.2d 393 (Tongue, J., specially concurring), and three dissented, id. at 815, 818, 636 P.2d 393 (Lent, Linde, and Peterson, JJ., dissenting). The plurality relied not on the right to counsel, but on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 806-07, 636 P.2d 393. In Moore, the court reached no constitutional question; it did, however, state hypothetically that an unjustified refusal to allow a person to speak with a lawyer deprives that person of "liberty," which we take as a reference, as in the Newton plurality opinion, to the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, to the extent that Newton and Moore refer to a right to consult with a nonlawyer, that right derives from the Due Process Clause.
Durbin and Matviyenko, on the other hand — the cases holding that the right to consult with counsel implies the right to do so in private — rely on Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the implied privacy right is inextricably linked to the fact that the consultation is with an attorney; a driver arrested for DUII has the right to consult privately with counsel because "confidentiality is `inherent' in the right to counsel." Durbin, 335 Or. at 190, 63 P.3d 576. That is so because "the purpose of the lawyer-client privilege cannot be fulfilled unless the communications between a client and a lawyer are confidential." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, defendant correctly asserts that, under Newton and Moore, a driver arrested for DUII "is entitled to communicate with counsel or others and * * * the police must reasonably accommodate a request to do so unless it would interfere with their duties." Moore, 293 Or. at 719, 652 P.2d 794. Police must reasonably accommodate such a request because "[c]ommunication may be the means to security release, advice, reassurance of one's family or associates, or professional assistance." Newton, 291 Or. at 807, 636 P.2d 393. Insofar as the communication is not with an attorney, it does not necessarily include an inherent right to confidentiality. Thus, a driver arrested for DUII has the right, upon request, to consult with a lawyer or a nonlawyer, but to consult privately only with counsel. Accord State v. Veatch, 223 Or.App. 444, 196 P.3d 45 (2008) ( ).
The question in this case, therefore, is whether defendant invoked her right to counsel when she told the police officer that she "wanted to ask someone" for advice before deciding whether to take the breath test. If a suspect makes an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel under Article I, section 12,3 police are required to ask follow-up questions to determine what the suspect meant before proceeding with interrogation. State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, 54, 913 P.2d 308 (1996). Similarly, we conclude that if a driver arrested for DUII makes an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, police must ask follow-up questions to determine whether they must inform the driver that, once he or she contacts an attorney, privacy will be afforded. In determining whether a defendant's statement is an equivocal invocation, we view the statement in light of the totality of the circumstances at and preceding the time that it was made, "to ascertain whether a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood that defendant was invoking [her] rights." State v. Holcomb, 213 Or.App. 168, 176, 159 P.3d 1271, rev. den., 343 Or. 224, 168 P.3d 1155 (2007).
We conclude that, under the circumstances here, a...
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