State v. Ojeda
| Decision Date | 01 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Lower Tribunal No. 05-37152,No. 3D08-1079,Consolidated: 3D08-1077,Lower Tribunal No. 07-10526A,3D08-1079 |
| Parties | The State of Florida, Appellant, v. Manuel Ojeda, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
This opinion is not final until disposition of any further motion for rehearing
and/or rehearing en banc. Any previously filed motion for rehearing en banc is
deemed moot.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Rosa I. Rodriguez, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Lane Hodes and Nikole Hiciano, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Jay Levine, for appellee.
Before SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.*
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Upon consideration of the State of Florida's motion for rehearing in these consolidated cases, we grant the State's motion for rehearing in Case No. 3D08-1077 (lower tribunal number 05-37152) and deny the State's motion for rehearing in Case No. 3D08-1079 (lower tribunal number 07-10526A). We reverse the order granting the motion to suppress in lower tribunal number 05-37152 and affirm the order granting the motion to suppress in lower tribunal number 07-10526A. We substitute the following opinion for that issued on October 27, 2010.
This is the State's consolidated appeal of adverse rulings in two suppression hearings involving the same defendant, Manuel Ojeda. Ojeda's business is hydroponic marijuana farming. He had an extensive criminal history, including at least six felony and misdemeanor convictions, before his arrest in Case No. 05-37152. He is well known to the local authorities, down to the type of vehicle he drives. Miami-Dade County Police Department Detective Edward Orenstein was the sole State witness at each suppression hearing. We treat the State's appeal from each order in turn.
On November 30, 2005, Detective Orenstein received an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown at a private residence located at 7621 S.W. 136th Avenue, Miami-Dade County, Florida. A background check on Ojeda—who Orenstein had been investigating as a suspect in the grow house business and who Orenstein apparently knew or learned either owned, resided at, or otherwise was associated with the residence—revealed Ojeda's prior felony and misdemeanor offenses. Armed with this information, Orenstein, along with three other detectives, one sergeant, and two uniformed officers, went to Ojeda's residence at 7:45 a.m. that morning.
Orenstein and one other detective went to the front door. Two uniformed officers were standing on the sidewalk at the front of the residence, about twenty to thirty feet from the front door, their marked police cars parked behind them at the side of the road. The officers and their vehicles were visible to anyone who chose to look out of the residence. The other three detectives were deployed around the sides of the house, prepared to stop any fleeing suspects.
Ojeda, who had just gotten out of bed, responded to Detective Orenstein's knock on the front door. According to Orenstein, when Ojeda opened the door, Orenstein explained the purpose of his visit, in response to which Ojeda replied, "Come on inside." As Detective Orenstein and his colleague at the door entered the house, the three detectives emerged from the sides of the house and alsoentered. All five detectives were dressed in plain clothes, covered by a vest with the word "Police" across the front, and a badge and identification hanging around their necks. No guns were drawn, and no insistent statements or threats were uttered by any detective.
Once inside the house, Orenstein read Ojeda the warnings required by Miranda1 to be given to a person in custody and asked Ojeda whether he understood them. Ojeda responded in the affirmative and, according to Orenstein, was "willing to cooperate with me with whatever I asked." Thereupon, Orenstein asked whether Ojeda would consent to a search. Ojeda agreed and signed a consent form to search the house, adding, "Come, I'm going to show you around the house." As the detectives were going through the house, Orenstein additionally asked for consent to search the vehicles in the driveway. According to Orenstein, Ojeda responded, "Yes, sure," which response was confirmed by the execution of yet another consent form.2 Ojeda ultimately led the detectives into the garage, where they encountered a marijuana hydroponics grow operation. Ojeda claimed he recently had moved back into the house, after having leased it to someone, and found the garage in this condition. He could neither produce the name of the lessee or a lease, nor had he called the police regarding his find. Ojeda did not appear scared, under the influence of any narcotics, to have any mental issues, or tohave issues of understanding during the encounter. Orenstein described Ojeda's demeanor as "confident that whatever he was going to tell me about a tenant being in the house," would be credible. There was no evidence of odor detection before the door to the garage was opened.
The trial court granted the motion to suppress on the ground consent to search the premises was unlawfully procured through an overwhelming show of police authority, exacerbated by an unnecessary administration of Miranda on the defendant. The trial court also held Orenstein's testimony was not credible. On de novo review, according a presumption of correctness to the trial court's finding of historical facts, as we are required to do, we conclude the defendant's consents to search were objectively voluntary. We also conclude the trial court erred in finding Detective Orenstein's testimony was not credible in this case.
Whether consent is freely and voluntarily given is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-29 (1973)); see also State v. Othen, 300 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). The factors to be considered include the age and maturity of the accused; whether he had a prior criminal history; the time and place of the encounter; the number of officers; whether the defendant executed a written consent form; the length of time police interrogated him before he consented; whether he was in custody; and the words and actions ofthe officers. Miller v. State, 865 So. 2d 584, 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997)). In conducting our review, we accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's findings of historical facts where there is substantial competent evidence to support them. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla. 2001). However, our application of the law to the facts, including our determination of whether the defendant's consent was objectively voluntary, is de novo. Id. Finally, because a home is an area in which a person enjoys the highest reasonable expectation of privacy, we scrutinize the factors with special care. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980); Gonzalez v. State, 578 So. 2d 729, 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
In this case, the trial court relied on only three factors to conclude the consent to search was involuntary: (1) the time and place of the encounter; (2) the number of officers; and (3) the words and actions of those officers. A full analysis of all the factors, as required by law, mandates a reversal of the order entered by the trial court in this case.
First, Ojeda's age, thirty-four at the time of the search, suggests he was of sufficient maturity and experience to make an intelligent decision. Second, there is no evidence he was intoxicated or otherwise impaired. Third, Ojeda executed a written consent form that was in English, after being asked whether he wanted it inEnglish or Spanish. See Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So. 2d 592, 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (). Fourth, Ojeda had a prior criminal history, creating a presumption he knew his rights. See Wilson v. State, 952 So. 2d 564, 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (). Fifth, Ojeda was read the warnings required by Miranda prior to executing the written consent. Although the warnings were unnecessary, see Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1189 (Fla. 1997) ( ), recent authority from our supreme court has recognized that, depending on the circumstance, an unneeded administration of Miranda warnings can be more protective of an individual's rights than intimidating in nature. See Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 201 (Fla. 2010); see also Ladson v. State, 63 So. 3d 807, 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (); accord Ruiz v. State, 50 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances of this case, we conclude the administration of Miranda warnings to Ojeda did notcompromise his decision-making faculties. Although the warnings given him were not tailored to a consent to search, he was advised he had the right to counsel and the right to terminate the encounter at any time. He never elected to terminate the encounter. Rather, he communicated with the authorities in a cooperative spirit from the moment he opened the front door.
Sixth, Ojeda was not deprived of any convenience or sequestered for an undue length of time prior to signing the consent. The Miranda administration took just a few minutes. Ojeda then...
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