State v. Olson

• Decision Date: 27 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-268.,02-268.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sharon Marie OLSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

66 P.3d 297
2003 MT 61
314 Mont. 402

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Sharon Marie OLSON, Defendant and Appellant

No. 02-268.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 3, 2002.

Decided March 27, 2003.

66 P.3d 299

Eric Olson, Chief Public Defender, Great Falls, Montana, Kelli Sather, Deputy Public Defender, Missoula, Montana, for Appellant

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Ilka Becker, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana, for Respondent.

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Appellant, Sharon Marie Olson, was charged by information filed in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County, with criminal endangerment, in violation of § 45-5-207, MCA (1999), and accountability for criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs, in violation of § 45-2-302(3), MCA (1999) and § 45-9-110, MCA (1999). She moved to suppress evidence gathered by the State. When the District Court denied Olson's motion, she pled guilty to an amended charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. However, she appeals from the District Court's denial of her motion to suppress. We reverse in part and affirm in part the District Court's order. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

¶ 2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

¶ 3 1. Did the District Court err when it denied Olson's motion to suppress the statements she made to Detective Wells?

¶ 4 2. Was the search warrant application supported by probable cause?

¶ 5 3. Did a particularized suspicion exist to justify an investigative traffic stop of Olson's vehicle?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 6 On March 16, 2001, Detective Jeff Beecroft received a report from informant Mike Smith regarding a possible methamphetamine laboratory on his wife's property in Great Falls, Montana. Mike stated that he and his wife, Nora Smith, were separated, and then provided Beecroft with Nora's address. Mike advised Beecroft that he had entered Nora's garage to retrieve two camper

66 P.3d 300

jacks. Mike further advised Beecroft that while in the garage, he had observed what he believed to be a meth lab. Mike indicated that he had observed tubing, mason jars, and coffee filters connected together, and had smelled the odor of anhydrous ammonia. He informed Beecroft that he had worked in a fertilizer plant for several years and was familiar with the smell of anhydrous ammonia. Mike also told Beecroft that he had observed a man "cooking" methamphetamine in the garage and identified the man as Huston Curran. Finally, he informed Beecroft that he had spoken briefly with Curran, who had stated, "you're going to keep this cool, now, right?"

¶ 7 Detective Beecroft dispatched Detectives Jim Wells and Michael Grubb to conduct surveillance of Nora's property. Within an hour after Wells and Grubb began surveillance, individuals on Nora's property began to remove items from the garage and place them into a vehicle. The vehicle then left Nora's property. At the request of Wells and Grubb, Sergeant Tito Rodriguez initiated an investigative traffic stop of the vehicle. At the time of the stop, Olson was driving the vehicle and her young son was in the passenger seat. Curran and a man identified as Justin Becker were in the rear seat.

¶ 8 The vehicle stopped by Sergeant Rodriguez was registered to Olson. After Olson was removed from the vehicle, Detective Wells approached her and advised her of his investigation. Wells informed Olson that he knew a meth lab had been placed in the trunk of her vehicle. Olson initially denied Wells' allegations. However, after Wells spoke to her about the health risks of a meth lab, Olson admitted that the equipment was located in her vehicle. A warrant was subsequently issued, and the search of Olson's trunk revealed chemicals, glassware, funnels, tubing, methamphetamine, and other "precursors" used to manufacture methamphetamine, including red pills labeled Sudafed.

¶ 9 On March 29, 2001, the Respondent, State of Montana, filed an information, which charged Olson with criminal endangerment, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-207, MCA (1999), and accountability for criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of § 45-2-302(3), MCA (1999) and § 45-9-110, MCA (1999). Olson pled not guilty to both charges on April 12, 2001. On June 22, 2001, Olson filed a motion to suppress evidence, in which she claimed that: (1) the search warrant application did not adequately establish the reliability and credibility of the informant whose statements provided the basis for the warrant request; (2) the search warrant application was legally invalid because it included inaccurate and misleading information; (3) the search warrant application did not establish probable cause; (4) the initial traffic stop was not supported by a particularized suspicion; (5) her statements were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights; and (6) evidence seized as a result of the search of her vehicle must be suppressed.

¶ 10 The District Court conducted hearings on Olson's motion to suppress on October 24, and October 29, 2001. On November 13, 2001, the State filed an amended information, which charged Olson with the additional offense of criminal possession of precursors to dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-107(1)(n), MCA (1999). The District Court denied Olson's motion to suppress that same day. On November 15, 2001, Olson pled guilty to an amended charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA (1999). The terms of Olson's plea agreement preserved her right to appeal from the District Court's denial of her motion to suppress. The remaining charges against Olson were dismissed. Olson was sentenced by the District Court on January 30, 2002.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 The standard of review of a district court's denial of a motion to suppress is whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171, ¶ 13, 295 Mont. 212, ¶ 13, 983 P.2d 916, ¶ 13.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE 1

¶ 12 Did the District Court err when it denied Olson's motion to suppress the statements she made to Detective Wells?

66 P.3d 301

¶ 13 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 25, of the Montana Constitution provide that no person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. The United States Supreme Court addressed this privilege against self-incrimination in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The Miranda Court held that the prosecution may not use statements that stem from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless the defendant is warned, prior to questioning, that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. These "warnings" are often referred to as Miranda warnings

¶ 14 In this case, Olson alleges that the statements she made to Detective Wells were obtained in violation of her Fifth Amendment and state constitutional rights because she did not receive Miranda warnings before she made the statements. A person is entitled to receive Miranda warnings only if he or she is subject to a custodial interrogation. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27, 302 Mont. 228, ¶ 27, 14 P.3d 456, ¶ 27. This Court has previously concluded that a custodial interrogation occurs when "there is a significant restriction of personal liberty similar to an arrest." Dawson, ¶ 35.

¶ 15 Olson was not under arrest at the time she conversed with Detective Wells. We have repeatedly held that law enforcement officers do not need to administer Miranda warnings to suspects during brief investigative encounters, even if such encounters are somewhat coercive. Dawson, ¶ 35. However, we have also concluded that if a person has no free right to leave, then the interrogation is custodial. State v. Staat (1991), 251 Mont. 1, 6, 822 P.2d 643, 646. To determine whether or not a custodial interrogation has occurred, this Court examines the following six factors: (1) place of the interrogation; (2) time of the interrogation; (3) persons present during the interrogation; (4) whether Miranda...