State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto. VIN 252376X159267, No. 12393
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 270 N.W.2d 362 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ONE 1966 PONTIAC AUTOMOBILE VIN 252376X159267, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Docket Number | No. 12393 |
| Decision Date | 28 September 1978 |
Page 362
v.
ONE 1966 PONTIAC AUTOMOBILE VIN 252376X159267, Defendant and
Appellant.
Decided Sept. 28, 1978.
Page 363
Steven L. Zinter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and respondent; William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on brief.
Robert J. Burns of Burns & Hagen, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant; Thomas J. Johnson, Sioux Falls, on brief.
PER CURIAM.
This action arose as the result of the forfeiture of an automobile which purportedly contained a controlled substance. A default judgment was rendered against the automobile by the trial court and the trial court denied appellant's motion made some thirteen months later to set aside the default judgment. We affirm.
On October 23, 1975, the state of South Dakota commenced a forfeiture proceeding pursuant to SDCL 39-17-129(4) 1 against appellant Jack O'Connor's automobile by personal service upon appellant of a summons and complaint. The complaint stated the statutory authority for forfeitures, the automobile involved, the registration of the
Page 364
automobile, the date and county in which the proscribed activity took place, the statutory authority for seizure of the automobile, and the location of the seized automobile. The complaint further described the proscribed activity in which "said automobile was used to transport, possess or conceal certain controlled drugs and substances in violation of SDCL 39-17; namely bi-phetamines. . . ." Appellant was put on notice in the prayer in the complaint that the state sought to have the automobile condemned, forfeited and disposed of as provided by law.Appellant thereafter failed to file an answer or otherwise appear in any manner. On December 12, 1975, the trial court granted the state's motion for default judgment and ordered that the automobile be condemned and forfeited to the state and that all property rights in the automobile be extinguished in favor of the state. On January 6, 1976, appellant was served with notice of entry of judgment. Appellant failed to appeal from the default judgment.
Approximately one year after the trial court entered its default judgment, on December 22, 1976, this court declared SDCL 39-17-129(4) 2 unconstitutional in that there were no provisions for notice and hearing after seizure and prior to forfeiture which deprived the defendants of their property without due process of law. State v. Miller, 1976, S.D., 248 N.W.2d 377. On February 4, 1977, approximately thirteen months after the default judgment was entered, appellant moved to set aside the judgment on the ground that the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional.
In denying appellant's motion to set aside the judgment, the trial court concluded that the validity of an automobile forfeiture is not dependent upon the conviction of the registered owner of the automobile. The trial court further concluded that the ruling in State v. Miller, supra, should not be applied retroactively. We agree.
Appellant contends that the trial court "erred in finding that a forfeiture pursuant to SDCL 39-17-129(4) can be pursued where the Defendant (Appellant) has never been convicted of nor has pleaded to the underlying criminal charges." 3 It is clear that the statute merely provides for a proceeding in rem for the forfeiture of controlled substances and conveyances connected therewith. The conveyance used in connection with the controlled substance is considered to be the offender under the statute and there is no expressed or implied provision for a prior conviction of the registered owner as a condition precedent to forfeiture. We therefore agree with the trial court's conclusion that the validity of the forfeiture does not depend upon the prior conviction...
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McCafferty v. Solem, Nos. 16121
...State v. Thwing, 84 S.D. 391, 172 N.W.2d 277 (1969) (Miranda rights not applied retrospectively). In State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto, 270 N.W.2d 362 (S.D.1978), we established the following criteria to determine whether a particular decision should be given retrospective effect: "(1) The pur......
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Baatz v. Arrow Bar, No. 15875
...retroactivity of new rules which are substantially the same as those enunciated by this court in State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., 270 N.W.2d 362, 365 (S.D.1978). These criteria are: "(1) the purpose to be served by the particular new rule; (2) the extent of reliance which had been placed up......
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Siers v. Weber, No. 26823.
...v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), were first employed by this court in State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., 270 N.W.2d 362 (S.D.1978). [¶ 20.] The State argues that, applying the Linkletter factors in this case, McNeely should not be given retroactive effect. Under ......
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Burgard v. Benedictine Living Communities, No. 22994.
...omitted). However, the Court "has inherent power to apply its decisions prospectively or retrospectively." State v. One 1966 Pontiac, 270 N.W.2d 362, 365 (S.D. 1978) (additional citations omitted). We have consistently affirmed the principle that "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requ......
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McCafferty v. Solem, Nos. 16121
...State v. Thwing, 84 S.D. 391, 172 N.W.2d 277 (1969) (Miranda rights not applied retrospectively). In State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto, 270 N.W.2d 362 (S.D.1978), we established the following criteria to determine whether a particular decision should be given retrospective effect: "(1) The pur......
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Baatz v. Arrow Bar, No. 15875
...retroactivity of new rules which are substantially the same as those enunciated by this court in State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., 270 N.W.2d 362, 365 (S.D.1978). These criteria are: "(1) the purpose to be served by the particular new rule; (2) the extent of reliance which had been placed up......
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Siers v. Weber, No. 26823.
...v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), were first employed by this court in State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., 270 N.W.2d 362 (S.D.1978). [¶ 20.] The State argues that, applying the Linkletter factors in this case, McNeely should not be given retroactive effect. Under ......
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Burgard v. Benedictine Living Communities, No. 22994.
...omitted). However, the Court "has inherent power to apply its decisions prospectively or retrospectively." State v. One 1966 Pontiac, 270 N.W.2d 362, 365 (S.D. 1978) (additional citations omitted). We have consistently affirmed the principle that "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requ......