State v. Osborne

• Decision Date: 03 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 24942.,24942.
• Citation: 516 S.E.2d 201,335 S.C. 172
• Parties: The STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. Elmer OSBORNE, Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

335 S.C. 172

516 S.E.2d 201

The STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. Elmer OSBORNE, Respondent.

No. 24942.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard November 6, 1997.

Decided May 3, 1999.

Patrick M. Teague, Associate General Counsel, and Frank L. Valenta, Jr., General Counsel, both of the South Carolina Department of Public Safety, of Columbia, for petitioner.

Dallas D. Ball, of Pickens, for respondent.

Charles M. Condon, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Deputy Attorney General, Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Harold M. Coombs, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, of Columbia, for petitioner amicus curiae.

WALLER, Justice:

Respondent Elmer Osborne was convicted in magistrate's court of driving under the influence ("DUI") in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2930 (1976). The circuit court reversed, finding the State ¹ failed to prove the corpus delicti. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling. State v. Osborne, 321 S.C. 196, 467 S.E.2d 454 (Ct.App.1996). We granted the State's petition for certiorari, and now reverse.

FACTS

At 11:17 p.m. on November 24, 1991, Trooper J.M. Bagwell arrived at the scene of a one-car accident. The car had gone off the road and hit a speed limit sign. It was abandoned. The car hood was warm to the touch. Bagwell went back to patrolling the area.

At 1:50 a.m., November 25, 1991, Deputy J.S. Duncan met Respondent at a Hot Spot convenience store. Duncan testified Respondent told him he called the police to report his car stolen. In Duncan's opinion, Respondent was very intoxicated. He told Respondent the penalty for filing a false report and advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.² Respondent then told Duncan he wrecked his car. The two then returned to the accident scene, where they met Trooper Bagwell (who was called back to the scene). At first, Respondent told Bagwell the car was stolen; he then admitted he wrecked the car after Deputy Duncan reminded him of what he had said at the Hot Spot. Duncan asked Respondent where the car keys were because the vehicle was locked. Respondent said they were in his pocket and gave them to Duncan. Bagwell asked Respondent whether he drank anything after the wreck; Respondent stated he had not. He then gave Respondent a field sobriety test which in his opinion Respondent failed. He arrested Respondent at 2:28 a.m. on November 25, 1991. Following his arrest, Respondent was given a breathalyzer test which registered .14%.

ISSUES

I. Did Respondent's statements to police constitute a confession?

II. Did the State's evidence establish the corpus delicti?

DISCUSSION

It is well-settled law that a conviction cannot be had on the extra-judicial confessions of a defendant unless they are corroborated by proof aliunde³ of the corpus delicti.⁴ State v. Williams, 321 S.C. 381, 468 S.E.2d 656 (1996).⁵ See also State v. Brown, 103 S.C. 437, 442, 88 S.E. 21, 22 (1916) ("Before a defendant can be required to go into his defense, it is necessary that there shall be some proof of the corpus delicti"). Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued Respondent's statements did not amount to a confession and thus this rule was inapplicable. The State further argued that even if the corroboration rule applied, there was sufficient evidence aliunde Respondent's statements to establish the corpus delicti. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments.

I. Respondent's Statements

The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding Respondent's statements to police amounted to a confession. We agree. The legal definition of "confession" is "restricted to acknowledgment of guilt and does not apply to mere statement[s] of fact from which guilt may be inferred." State v. Cunningham, 275 S.C. 189, 192, 268 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1980)(quoting State v. Miller, 211 S.C. 306, 45 S.E.2d 23 (1947)). See also 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 709 (1994) (although every confession is an admission, not every admission is a confession). Respondent told police (1) his car was stolen, (2) he wrecked his car (retracting the stolen car claim), and (3) he did not have anything to drink after the wreck.⁶ Section 56-5-2930 defines the crime of DUI: "It is unlawful for ... any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquors ... or any other substance of like character ... to drive any vehicle within this State." See also State v. Sheppard, 248 S.C. 464, 465, 150 S.E.2d 916, 917 (1966) ("The act of operating a motor vehicle with impaired faculties is the gravamen of the offense [of DUI]").

We find Respondent's statements do not constitute an acknowledgment of guilt of DUI. They do not even acknowledge Respondent ever drank at all, much less that he was under the influence of alcohol. Rather, these statements are more in the nature of admissions. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 282 S.C. 409, 410-11, 319 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1984) (in reviewing DUI conviction, statements to police that defendant had been using alcohol and drugs, and was driver of car before it wrecked, did not amount to a confession of guilt; court specifically noted that defendant "did not say that he was under the influence") ⁷; Cunningham, 275 S.C. at 189,268 S.E.2d at 289 (defendant's statement she was the driver of car at time of wreck did not constitute a confession to reckless homicide because the defendant never stated she was driving recklessly). Therefore, the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled Respondent's statements constituted a confession.

The State argued to the Court of Appeals, and now argues here, that if Respondent's statements are not viewed as a confession, the corroboration rule does not apply.⁸ We disagree, finding the corroboration rule should apply whether a statement amounts to a confession or merely constitutes an admission.

We think that an accused's admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions and that corroboration should be required.

The need for corroboration extends beyond complete and conscious admission of guilt—a strict confession. Facts admitted that are immaterial as to guilt or innocence need no discussion. But statements of the accused out of court that show essential elements of the crime ... stand differently. Such admissions have the same possibilities for error as confessions. They, too, must be corroborated.

Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90, 75 S.Ct. 158, 163, 99 L.Ed. 101, 107 (1954) (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1986) ("[R]egardless of whether defendant's statements constitute an actual confession or only amount to an admission, our long established rule of corpus delicti requires that there be corroborative evidence, independent of the statements, before defendant may be found guilty of the crime"); 29A Am.Jur.2d at § 753; E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Corroboration of Extrajudicial Confession or Admission, 45 A.L.R.2d 1316, 1323 (1956).

II. Proof Aliunde of Corpus Delicti

The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding it failed to provide sufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti to support Respondent's conviction. We agree.

In Opper v. United States, the Supreme Court considered "the extent of the corroboration of admissions necessary as a matter of law for a judgment of conviction", concluding:

[T]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. It is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, the independent evidence serves a dual function. It tends to make the admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also establishing independently the other necessary elements of the offense. It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth. Those facts plus the other evidence besides the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

348 U.S. at 93, 75 S.Ct. at 164, 99 L.Ed. at 108-09.

This standard enunciated in Opper has been adopted in other jurisdictions, including our sister state of North Carolina. See Trexler, 342 S.E.2d at 880 ("The corpus delicti rule only requires evidence aliunde the confession which, when considered with the confession, supports the confession and permits a reasonable inference that the crime occurred. The independent evidence must touch or be concerned with the corpus delicti." However, "[t]he rule does not require that the evidence aliunde the confession prove any element of the crime.").⁹ We clarify the law in this State that, consistently with Opper and its progeny, the corroboration rule is satisfied if the State provides sufficient independent evidence which serves to corroborate the defendant's extra-judicial statements and, together with such statements, permits a reasonable belief that the crime occurred. Cf. Williams, 321 S.C. at 385 n. 2,468 S.E.2d at 658 n. 2 (emphasizing that "[p]roof of corpus delicti is not a prerequisite to the admission of an extra-judicial confession of a defendant.").

Applying this rule to the facts at hand, we find the State provided sufficient independent evidence to support the trustworthiness of Respondent's statements to police. We further find this independent evidence, taken together with the statements, allowed a reasonable inference that the crime of driving under the influence was committed. "The corpus delicti of DUI is: (1) driving a vehicle; (2) within this State; (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, drugs, or any other substance of like character." Townsend, 321 S.C. at 58, 467 S.E.2d at 140. See also Sheppard, 248 S.C. at 466,150 S.E.2d at 917 (act of operating motor vehicle while impaired gravamen of offense). Proof of the corpus delicti does...