State v. Osborne

• Decision Date: 10 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 22726,22726
• Citation: 941 P.2d 337,130 Idaho 365
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kameryn D. OSBORNE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 337

941 P.2d 337

130 Idaho 365

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kameryn D. OSBORNE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22726.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 10, 1997.

Petition for Review Denied

Aug. 15, 1997.

Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant. Mitchell W. Brown argued.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

PERRY, Judge.

Kameryn D. Osborne appeals from his judgment of conviction for rape. I.C. § 18-6101(5). Osborne claims that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial, that the district court failed to suppress an illegally obtained statement, that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Osborne and Emily Carmona were introduced on March 12, 1995. Osborne, Carmona and a group of friends drank throughout the evening of the twelfth and the morning of the thirteenth. Osborne and Carmona also danced together at least once during the evening. Carmona obtained a ride to her apartment from a third party and arrived home at approximately 7:00 a.m. She removed her clothes, other than her underwear, and fell asleep or passed out on the couch under a blanket. Osborne arrived at Carmona's home approximately one hour later with Carmona's roommate and his girlfriend. Osborne lifted the blanket and saw that Carmona was nearly nude. After Carmona's roommate and his girlfriend retired to a bedroom, Osborne disrobed and climbed Osborne testified at trial that, after disrobing and joining Carmona on the couch, he had consensual sex with her until he got tired and stopped. Osborne claimed that Carmona was a willing participant because she opened her eyes at some point, she touched him, pulled him onto her and lifted her hips to allow him to remove her underwear. After the encounter, Carmona got up and went to her bedroom. Osborne stated that he got dressed and made a phone call to arrange a ride home. He went into Carmona's bedroom to speak to her, but she was angry and told him to get out and leave her alone. Osborne claimed that he then ate a sandwich he had purchased earlier and walked to a local high school to meet his ride.

on the couch, under the blanket, with Carmona.

Carmona testified at trial that she woke up on the couch and Osborne was on top of her. She pushed him off, went to her bedroom and got into bed. Osborne, nude, followed her and pulled at the blankets. Carmona stated that she told him to leave her alone and to leave the apartment. Carmona then went back to sleep. When the phone awakened her later, she got up and went to the bathroom. She then realized that she was no longer wearing her underwear. She also noticed that the tampon she had been wearing when she went to sleep was no longer in place. Carmona called a friend, stated that she thought she had been raped and asked for a ride to the hospital. At the hospital, the attending doctor indicated that Carmona's tampon had been pushed into the end of her vagina. The police were notified, and the tests in a rape evidence kit were performed.

Officer Maimer, of the Fort Hall Police Department, contacted Osborne that afternoon. Officer Maimer drove Osborne to the Blackfoot Police Department, where he and Osborne were let into the locked building by detective Hunsaker. The three men then went to a conference room near the sheriff's office. Detective Hunsaker questioned Osborne about the reported incident. Osborne gave a written statement wherein he admitted that he and Carmona had engaged in consensual sex. At the close of the interview, Osborne was returned home by officer Maimer.

Osborne was charged with rape pursuant to I.C. § 18-6101(5). ¹ The case went to trial, with the district court sitting as the finder of fact. Osborne made an untimely motion to suppress his statement to the police. Osborne's trial counsel submitted an affidavit which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as good cause for the delay. The district court heard testimony and argument and denied the motion. The district court found Osborne guilty and sentenced him to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year. The district court retained jurisdiction, awaiting an evaluation by the Department of Corrections. The execution of the sentence was stayed pending Osborne's appeal.

On appeal, Osborne asserts that his statement taken at the police station was illegally obtained because he was in police custody at the time and was never given the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Osborne also claims that his conviction should be overturned and a new trial granted because the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, namely the results of the rape kit tests taken the day of the incident which failed to detect the presence of semen. Osborne additionally claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

We first address whether the statement made by Osborne at the Blackfoot police station was obtained in violation of Miranda.

                Osborne claims he was in custody and not given any of the warnings required by Miranda.   Osborne sought, by motion, to have the statement suppressed.  The district court denied the motion based on its finding that Osborne was not in custody
                

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact where supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 122, 795 P.2d 15, 16 (Ct.App.1990).

Unwarned inculpatory statements obtained while in police custody are to be excluded from evidence at trial in the state's case in chief. State v. Nobles, 122 Idaho 509, 511, 835 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Ct.App.1991). This Court set forth the analysis to be used when determining whether a given defendant is "in custody":

Miranda warnings are triggered by custodial interrogation. See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576, 634 P.2d 435, 438 (1981). The United States Supreme Court equated custody with a person being "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. This test has been refined to mean when a person's freedom of action is "curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.' " State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610, 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct.App.1990) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). The Court, in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) ... instructed that the "test is an objective one based on the surrounding circumstances." To determine if a suspect is in custody, this Court, subsequent to Mathiason, adopted the Supreme Court's test that "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Myers, 118 Idaho at 611, 798 P.2d at 456 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151).

... We must review the "totality of all the circumstances" that are presented in the record. See Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 578, 634 P.2d at 440 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)); see also WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §§ 27.3(a)-(c) (circumstances to be considered when determining whether a defendant is in custody are: location of interrogation, conduct of the officers, nature and manner of the questioning, time of interrogation, and other persons present).

State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117-18, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367-68 (Ct.App.1992).

The question before this Court is whether Osborne was in custody at the time that he was questioned by detective Hunsaker and officer Maimer. Osborne claims that the following facts indicate that he was in police custody: (1) he was picked up at his residence by a man he knew was a police officer; (2) he was taken from Fort Hall to the Blackfoot police station and entered through a locked door; (3) the questioning lasted for up to two hours and forty minutes; (4) he was interviewed by two officers; and (5) he was unaware of why he was there.

Officer Maimer testified that Osborne went to Blackfoot voluntarily and that officer Maimer had not intimidated Osborne or told him that he had to go. Detective Hunsaker testified that the questioning lasted only about an hour. Detective Hunsaker also testified that he did not tell Osborne that he was under arrest and never stated that Osborne could not leave. Neither officer was in uniform, but it was apparent that they were police officers. Officer Maimer stated that Osborne never asked to be taken home. At the conclusion of the interrogation, officer Maimer returned Osborne to his home.

Officer Maimer testified that, to the best of his knowledge, Osborne was free to leave if he had so wished. There was additional testimony concerning exits from the police station available to Osborne other than through the locked door he entered. Detective Hunsaker testified that he did not read The facts of this case are similar to those in the previous decision of this Court in State v. Birkla, 126 Idaho 498, 887 P.2d 43 (Ct.App.1994). In Birkla, an officer asked the suspect to accompany him to the police station to answer questions and then placed the suspect in a room which the suspect thought was locked. As we stated there, the fact that questioning takes place in a police station does not necessarily mean that a party is in custody. Birkla, 126 Idaho at 502, 887 P.2d at 47.

Osborne the Miranda warning because, "Mr. Osborne...