State v. Ouellette
| Decision Date | 16 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 16694.,16694. |
| Citation | 859 A.2d 907,271 Conn. 740 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Michael OUELLETTE. |
Adele V. Patterson, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Denise B. Smoker, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Scott J. Murphy, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
The defendant, Michael Ouellette, was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a1 and elected to be tried by a three judge court in accordance with General Statutes § 54-82(b).2 Following a trial, the trial court, Leuba, Wollenberg and Wiese, Js., rejected the defendant's affirmative defense of mental disease or defect; see General Statutes § 53a-13;3 and his alternative affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance; see General Statutes § 53a-54a (a);4 and found him guilty of murder.5 On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court failed to ensure that his waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing, voluntary and intelligent as required by the federal and state constitutions; (2) his waiver of a probable cause hearing was constitutionally infirm because the trial court had failed to canvass him adequately with respect to that waiver; (3) his constitutional right to due process was violated by virtue of the trial court's failure to canvass him in connection with his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect to ensure that his plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent; and (4) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a presentence psychiatric examination under General Statutes § 17a-566.6 We reject these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claims. On the evening of June 24, 1999, the defendant, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, brutally bludgeoned to death Robert Lysz, a Roman Catholic priest, inside St. Matthew's Church in Bristol. The defendant was discovered the next morning hiding in the church rectory, wearing the victim's pants and in possession of the victim's wallet, credit card, and driver's license. Initially, the defendant told the police that he had killed the victim in self-defense, but subsequently raised the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect and the alternative affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
After the defendant's arrest, defense counsel moved, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d,7 for an evaluation of the defendant to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The trial court granted the motion and, on July 15, 1999, the defendant was examined by a team of mental health professionals from the department of mental health and addiction services (department). Following their examination of the defendant, the members of the evaluation team unanimously concluded that, due to psychiatric impairment, the defendant did not have the capacity either to understand the charges against him or to assist in his own defense but that, with appropriate treatment, there was a substantial probability that the defendant could be restored to competency. The trial court thereafter found that the defendant was not competent to stand trial and remanded him to the custody of the department for treatment designed to restore him to competency.
Over the next nine months, the defendant was evaluated for competency on three separate occasions. On the first two occasions, the members of the evaluation team concluded that, although the defendant was making progress toward competency, he had not yet been restored to competency. On April 20, 2000, however, after a third examination of the defendant, the evaluation team unanimously concluded that he was competent to stand trial. Thereafter, on the basis of the evaluation team's report and without objection from either party, the trial court found the defendant competent to stand trial.8 At trial, the defendant did not dispute that he had killed the victim but asserted that, due to his mental illness, he had been incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. Alternatively, the defendant claimed that he had killed the victim while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court found that the state had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had killed the victim with the intent to do so by repeatedly striking the victim on the head with a heavy, four foot long, brass candlestick holder. The trial court also found that, although "at various times over the years the defendant has displayed ... the symptoms of mental illness," the defendant nevertheless had failed to establish either of his affirmative defenses,9 which, the court further concluded, had been contrived by the defendant, after the murder, in an attempt to shirk responsibility for the crime.10 Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the trial court failed to ensure that the defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing, voluntary and intelligent as required by the federal and state constitutions. The defendant's claim is twofold. First, he contends that his right to a jury trial guaranteed under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution11 was violated by virtue of the trial court's failure to canvass him adequately, in light of his history of mental illness, regarding his waiver of a trial by jury. Second, the defendant contends that his rights under article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by article four of the amendments,12 were violated because the court did not inform him of certain rights to which he was entitled under the state constitution.13 We reject both of these contentions.14
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claims. On August 1, 2001, the defendant, through counsel, informed the court that he wished to forgo his right to a jury trial and be tried by a three judge court. At that time, the following colloquy ensued:
The six day trial commenced on October 23, 2001. Before the presentation of evidence, the state renewed its motion to consolidate certain other charges with the murder charge.15 Defense counsel objected, claiming that, according to his recollection of the hearing on August 1, 2001, the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial only as to the murder charge. The parties agreed to proceed with the trial and to have the court defer a ruling on the motion to consolidate until the transcript of the August 1, 2001 hearing could be obtained for review by the trial court. The state then proceeded with its first witness.
Immediately after the lunch recess, the trial court denied the state's motion to consolidate the charges, stating that it had reviewed the transcript of the hearing at which the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial and that the transcript indicated that the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial only as to the murder charge. Immediately thereafter, the trial court made the following inquiry of the defendant regarding his decision to forgo his right to a jury trial on the murder charge:
"[The Defendant]: Yes, sir."16 Before addressing the merits of the defendant's claims, we set forth the applicable standard of review. ...
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State v. Connor, No. 18099.
... ... This court repeatedly has followed the interpretation of Godinez that we adopted in Day. 19 See, ... 973 A.2d 648 ... e.g., State v. Ouellette, ... 292 Conn. 514 ... 271 Conn. 740, 752-53, 859 A.2d 907 (2004) (waiver of right to jury trial); State v. Johnson, supra, 253 Conn. at 26, 751 A.2d 298 (right to plead guilty); State v. Wolff, 237 Conn. 633, 662-63, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996) (waiver of right to counsel) ... ...
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