State v. Outlaw

• Docket Number: SC 20729
• Decision Date: 07 August 2024
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TREVOR MONROE OUTLAW
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

1

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TREVOR MONROE OUTLAW

No. SC 20729

Supreme Court of Connecticut

August 7, 2024^[*]

Argued February 14, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of murder conspiracy to commit murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the court, Vitale, J., denied the defendant's motion in limine to preclude evidence of a witness' plea agreement; thereafter, the charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder and carrying a pistol without a permit were tried to the jury before Vitale, J.; subsequently, the court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the charge of conspiracy to commit murder; thereafter verdict of guilty of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit; subsequently, the charge of criminal possession of a firearm was tried to the court, Vitale, J finding of guilty; judgment of guilty in accordance with the jury's verdict and the court's finding, from which the defendant appealed to this court.Affirmed.

Pamela S. Nagy, supervisory assistant public defender, for the appellant(defendant).

Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state's attorney, and Seth R. Garbarsky and Jason Germain, supervisory assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee(state).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

OPINION

DANNEHY, J.

In this appeal, the defendant, Trevor Monroe Outlaw, challenges his convictions of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes(Rev. to 2019)§ 53a-217 (a)(1), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes(Rev. to 2019)§ 29-35 (a).The defendant claims that (1)the trial court abused its discretion by failing to question or dismiss a juror who appeared to be sleeping during a portion of the first day of evidence, (2)the trial court improperly admitted evidence related to witness protection, (3)the trial court improperly allowed a witness to testify that she had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, and (4)the prosecutor improperly commented in closing argument on the defendant's right to a jury trial.We disagree with these claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts.On the night that the victim, Giovanni Rodriguez, was killed, the defendant and his girlfriend, Cheenisa Rivera, asked Loretta Martin to reserve two rooms at the Comfort Inn and Suites in Meriden, one for Rivera and the defendant, and one for Rivera's daughter, Man-asia Bennett, and her boyfriend, Freddy Hidalgo.Rivera and the defendant drove to Martin's house, where Martin booked the rooms electronically and Rivera paid her in crack cocaine, and then picked up Bennett and Hidalgo.Upon arriving at the hotel, Rivera checked in, gave Bennett and Hidalgo their room keys, and went with the defendant to park the car that she had rented.

Unbeknownst to the defendant, the victim and his girlfriend, Derrika James, planned to spend the night at the same hotel.While James was in the lobby check- ing in, she encountered Bennett and Hidalgo.James heard Bennett state that the victim was in a car outside.Although there was no evidence that the defendant and the victim had a personally hostile relationship, they were members of rival gangs.Hidalgo instructed Bennett to call Rivera and warn her and the defendant.James returned to her car, and the victim drove them to the same side of the building where Rivera and the defendant had parked.

While she was standing in the parking lot, Rivera received the call from Bennett and activated her phone's speaker.Rivera and the defendant reentered her rental car, and Rivera drove toward James and the victim, who were near James' car, retrieving their belongings.As James and the victim got closer, the defendant fired a semiautomatic pistol out of the passenger window, striking the victim, who was later pronounced dead at the scene.

The defendant was subsequently charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm.^[1]Rivera was later arrested on unrelated charges and, in connection with the present case, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and to hindering prosecution in the first degree.She and Martin testified against the defendant pursuant to cooperation agreements, both of which were admitted into evidence.After the prosecutor rested the state's case-in-chief, the court granted defense counsel's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy charge.The jury found the defendant guilty of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit, and the trial court found the defendant guilty of criminal possession of a firearm.The trial court ren- dered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and the court's finding.The trial court thereafter sentenced the defendant to sixty-five years of imprisonment, and the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction directly to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b)(3).Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court should have questioned or dismissed a juror who appeared to be sleeping, and that its failure to do so requires reversal.During a recess on the first day of evidence, the court met with counsel in chambers and informed them that one of the jurors seemed to be having trouble staying awake.During this meeting, defense counsel''emphatically conveyed his desire that [the juror]not be removed from the jury at such time,'' because neither he nor his client had noticed the juror sleeping and because they were apprehensive about removing an African American juror.^[2](Emphasis in original.)Following the recess, the court stated on the record that one of the jurors had appeared to be asleep from approximately 2:30 to 3:30 p.m., and that it had discussed these observations with counsel in cham-bers.^[3] Both prosecutors also claimed to have seen the juror sleeping and noted that this behavior also appeared to have occurred in the morning session and during the court's introductory remarks.Defense counsel stated that, although he could not say that the juror had not been sleeping, neither he nor the defendant had seen him doing so.The court urged defense counsel to observe the juror for the rest of the day and stated that it would not act at that point but would consider excusing the juror if the behavior continued.

After the jury was excused for the day, the prosecutor noted that he had seen the same juror sleeping when testimony resumed following the in-chambers meeting and subsequent discussion on the record.Defense counsel acknowledged that the juror might have been ''nodding off,'' although he added that he was looking at the juror ''through three sheets of plastic'' and ''could barely see the guy ....''^[4]The court stated that it realized the juror was ''African American . . . [and was] sensitive to . . . the defense, with respect to that,'' expressed that it would continue to watch him, and encouraged counsel to do the same.^[5] Defense counsel responded that he understood and did not ask the court to take any further action.At the end of the second day of evidence, the court indicated that it had not seen a recurrence of the juror's behavior, and the issue was not raised again.

Before this court, the defendant argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the trial court failed to act after the juror in question ''looked to be asleep'' during the presentation of evidence.The state contends that this claim has been waived because the defense induced the court not to question or remove the juror and that, even if this court does review the claim, the trial court reasonably determined, after conferring with counsel, that no further action was warranted.We conclude that the defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that his right to a fair trial was infringed.

Although the parties agree that this issue is unpreserved, the defendant claims that it is nonetheless reviewable pursuant to Statev.Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823(1989), as modified byIn re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188(2015).Alternatively, the defendant seeks review under the plain error doctrine.SeeStatev.Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 306, 221 A.3d 798(2019).

''Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate [the] harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.''(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)Statev.Johnson345 Conn. 174, 189, 283 A.3d 477(2022).''[A]party satisfies the third prong of Golding if he or she makes a showing sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.''In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 780-81.Even if these conditions are met, however, this court has declined to review claims of induced error, which occurs when the complaining party, ''through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to make the erroneous...