State v. Overbay

Decision Date17 February 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–1955.,10–1955.
Citation810 N.W.2d 871
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Rachael OVERBAY, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Brendan E. Greiner, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellee.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case presents the question whether a motorist is entitled to suppression of her blood alcohol test results because she was informed, incorrectly, that her refusal of the requested chemical test would have automatically led to revocation of her driving privileges, when in fact her refusal of the blood test would not have been deemed final but would have led to her being offered a different chemical test. Consistent with our precedents, we conclude that inaccurate information does not render a driver's consent involuntary when the record indicates that the inaccuracy did not affect the driver's decision. For this reason, we reverse the district court's decision to grant the driver's motion to suppress, vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History.

On June 25, 2010, at approximately 12:43 in the morning, Trooper Tyson Underwood of the Iowa State Patrol was dispatched to the scene of a single-vehicle accident on Interstate 80. Emergency medical personnel from Altoona Fire and Rescue were already attending to the injured party, Rachael Overbay, as she lay in a grassy area of the median. According to Underwood, Overbay “was very loud, crying [and] screaming.” She did admit to being the driver of the vehicle.

Trooper Underwood noticed that Overbay emitted a “strong alcoholic beverage odor” and her speech was “very slurred and mumbled.” Overbay admitted she had been drinking at the Yankee Clipper in Ankeny. The trooper did not request field sobriety tests at the scene of the accident because he was uncertain as to the extent of Overbay's injuries and whether she would be able to perform the tests in her condition. Overbay was transported by ambulance to Mercy Hospital.

Trooper Underwood met Overbay in the emergency room of the hospital about fifteen minutes later and continued his investigation. When he arrived, Overbay was being treated by medical personnel. At that time, she was strapped to a backboard on a hospital bed, with a brace on her neck and tubing in her nose. Overbay also had a urinary catheter inserted, although Underwood was not aware of this. According to Underwood, Overbay was “still very loud” and “out of sorts,” and the nurses were trying to calm her down.

Trooper Underwood asked Overbay to submit to a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. She declined. Underwood did not ask Overbay to perform the other field sobriety tests (the walk and turn test or the one-leg stand test) because of her medical condition. Underwood also asked Overbay for permission to conduct a preliminary breath test (PBT) under Iowa Code section 321J.5 (2009), but she apparently refused this test.

Trooper Underwood invoked implied consent under Iowa Code section 321J.6. He requested a blood sample from Overbay and read the implied consent advisory required by section 321J.8 out loud to her, handing her a copy. Although the form itself is not in the record, it is not disputed that Overbay received the standard advisory based on the statutory language of section 321J.8. This advisory told Overbay that if she refused to submit to the chemical test, her license would be revoked for one year if she had no prior revocations within the previous twelve years, or two years if she had. The advisory also told Overbay that if she submitted to the test and an alcohol concentration of eight hundredths or more was found, her license would be revoked for 180 days if she had no previous revocations within the previous twelve years, or one year if she had.

State law provides that “refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood is not deemed a refusal to submit, but in that case, the peace officer shall then determine which one of the other two substances [urine or breath] shall be tested and shall offer the test.” Iowa Code § 321J.6(2). However, Underwood did not specifically tell Overbay that if she refused the blood test, he would then have requested a urine test before deeming her refusal to be final. Instead, as noted, Underwood provided an advisory which tracks the language of section 321J.8 and simply refers to “chemical” testing without distinguishing the types of chemical tests.

Overbay verbally agreed to provide the blood sample. The sample was tested by the DCI Criminalistics Laboratory. The results showed a blood alcohol content of .178, more than twice the legal limit.

On September 1, 2010, the State filed a trial information charging Overbay with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OWI)—second offense, an aggravated misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)( b). On October 15, 2010, Overbay filed a timely motion to suppress the result of her blood test. An evidentiary hearing was held on October 29, 2010. Overbay did not testify at the suppression hearing. Trooper Underwood testified, as did a friend of Overbay's who had visited Overbay that night at the hospital. Underwood confirmed that the official consent notice he read did not state that if the defendant refused to provide a blood sample, this alone would not lead to revocation.

However, Trooper Underwood testified that if the defendant had refused a blood test, he would then have requested a urine test. (A breath test would not have been feasible because there was no DataMaster at the hospital.) Underwood stated that it is the policy of the Iowa State Patrol to request a blood sample first in this instance:

Q. Did you request a urine sample? A. No, in this instance we request blood first and then if they refuse the blood, then I would have requested urine.

....

Q. Did it seem to you it would have been-she was in a condition where a urine sample would be easily obtained? A. I'm not quite sure. I didn't pay attention to that because she consented to the blood sample, so I proceeded with a blood sample, therefore, I didn't pay any attention to the possibility of a urine specimen.

Q. Prior to requesting the blood sample, did you even consider requesting a urine sample? A. I would have considered it if she would have refused the blood because that's our procedure, but up to that point, no, I didn't think of anything about a urine specimen.

Q. You didn't even consider it prior to asking for blood? A. No, because our procedure, like I said, is blood first. If they refuse that, then I would go to urine.

Q. Is that written procedure? A. That's what the DCI lab requests, that's the way I've been trained.

On November 9, 2010, the district court granted Overbay's motion to suppress, finding that although the trooper had reasonable grounds for invoking implied consent, Overbay's consent to the blood test was not voluntary because it was based on “misleading information.” On December 3, 2010, the State filed an application for discretionary review. On December 16, 2010, we granted the application and ordered a stay of the district court proceedings. We subsequently transferred the case to the court of appeals.

On August 24, 2011, the court of appeals issued a decision, with one judge dissenting, that affirmed the district court's suppression order. The court of appeals majority first noted Overbay had been given a “misleading” implied consent advisory because the advisory failed to inform her a refusal to provide the blood sample would not have been a basis by itself for license revocation. The court then turned to the State's argument that the misleading advisory was of no consequence. According to the State, if Overbay had refused the blood test she would have been asked to provide a urine sample. Her refusal or consent to that test would have been dispositive, and if she had consented, the test results would have been the same as for blood. Thus, in the State's view, failing to tell Overbay that her refusal to consent to blood testing would not have been deemed a refusal of consent to all testing did not matter.

The court of appeals, however, rejected this argument. It noted that the State failed to present evidence that it could have obtained urine” from Overbay under the circumstances. Accordingly, based on the misleading advisory, that court found that Overbay's consent to the blood test was involuntary.

We granted the State's application for further review.

II. Standard of Review.

“When a defendant who has submitted to chemical testing asserts that the submission was involuntary, we evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not the decision was made voluntarily.” State v. Garcia, 756 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 2008). Our review is de novo, State v. Hutton, 796 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Iowa 2011); therefore, we make an independent evaluation based on the entire record, State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010). We give considerable weight to the district court's assessment of voluntariness but are not bound by its factual findings. State v. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1994). Where questions of statutory interpretation arise, we review for correction of errors at law. Garcia, 756 N.W.2d at 220.

III. Analysis.

A. Iowa's Implied Consent Law. The operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or while having an alcohol concentration of .08 or more is an offense under Iowa law. Iowa Code § 321J.2. Iowa Code section 321J.6, titled “Implied consent to test,” establishes the authority of a peace officer to test the breath, blood or urine of any person suspected of driving while intoxicated. It provides that when there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the...

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