State v. Overby

• Decision Date: 29 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 38330,38330
• Citation: State v. Overby, 290 S.E.2d 464, 249 Ga. 341 (Ga. 1982)
• Parties: STATE v. OVERBY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 464

290 S.E.2d 464

249 Ga. 341

STATE v. OVERBY.

No. 38330.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 29, 1982.

Stephen A. Williams, Dist. Atty., Dalton, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., George M. Weaver, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Millard G. Gouge, Robert A. Whitlow, Dalton, for George D. Overby, III.

JORDAN, Chief Justice.

We held in Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 818(1), 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975), and again in Aldridge v. State, 247 Ga. 142, 144(2), 274 S.E.2d 525 (1981), that upon their arrival at the scene of a suspected crime, and without first administering Miranda warnings, police officers may make an initial inquiry solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there currently is any danger to them or to other persons who are present at the scene. The questioning must not be "aimed at obtaining information to establish a suspect's guilt." 247 Ga. at 144, 274 S.E.2d 525. In both Shy and Aldridge, we held that the principles of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), are not violated by an initial, on-the-scene, police inquiry aimed at determining the nature of the situation the officers are confronting. 234 Ga. at 823, 218 S.E.2d 599; 247 Ga. at 145, 274 S.E.2d 525.

The crime scenes in Shy and Aldridge were located at places which conveniently may be referred to as "on the streets", whereas the scene of the homicide in the present case was "behind bars" in the detoxification cell or drunk tank of the Whitfield County Jail. These facts pose the question of whether or not Miranda precludes the same sort of limited threshold inquiry "behind bars" which Shy and Aldridge permit "on the streets."

The Court of Appeals analyzed the case in light of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), in which the Supreme Court of the United States amplified the term "interrogation" as used in the Miranda context. The Court of Appeals failed, however, to consider either Shy or Aldridge. For this reason, we granted certiorari. Overby v. State, 160 Ga.App. 537, 287 S.E.2d 568 (1981).

1. We agree with the Attorney General insofar as he contends that the same principles governing initial on-the-scene inquiries which we have applied in Shy and Aldridge when the crime scene is "on the streets" should apply also when the scene of the crime is "behind bars" in a penal institution, jail or other custodial institution. We hold that the mere fact that the accused already is in institutional custody pending disposition of his case or serving his sentence at the time of the initial, on-the-scene questioning does not of itself require the officers to refrain from all inquiry until those persons present at the scene have received proper Miranda warnings. Solely for the purpose of determining whether a criminal incident has occurred, or whether the crime has been completed or still is underway, or for the purpose of determining whether the supposed perpetrator still is present and should be placed under police scrutiny or custody, the officers may ask all or some of the assembled citizenry "on the streets", or the accused or convicted inmates "behind bars", such questions as, "What happened?", or, "What is going on?", without adversely implicating the Miranda principles recently reaffirmed in Rhode Island v. Innis, supra. See, Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1979).

2. Although we agree with the Attorney General's contention that Shy and Aldridge should apply "behind bars" as well as "on the streets," we disagree with the position that Shy and Aldridge should excuse the police conduct in the present case. The facts are these: The deceased, Reeves, the defendant, Overby, and the witness to the...