State v. Owens

Decision Date03 June 2016
Docket Number112,472
CourtKansas Court of Appeals
PartiesState of Kansas, Appellee, v. Derek Deon Owens, Appellant.

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appeal from Johnson District Court; Sara Welch, judge.

Adam D. Stolte, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Shawn E. Minihan, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Malone, C.J., Buser and Bruns, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Derek Deon Owens appeals his convictions for unintentional second-degree murder, rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and four counts of violating a protective order. Owens was originally charged in February 2011 and convicted by a jury in February 2014. Over the course of the 3 years in which the case was pending, the district court continued the trial date several times at the request of Owens. Moreover, Owens was represented by several attorneys throughout this time period.

For about 5 months while the case was pending, Owens represented himself, and the district court appointed standby counsel on his behalf. During this time, the district court required the State to produce numerous documents to Owens, and the district court allowed him to use a witness room at the courthouse to review digital documents on a court computer. The district court also appointed a new investigator at Owens' request and allowed the two to use a courtroom to review evidence. Although Owens had initially agreed that the case should proceed to trial on January 7, 2013, he later asked the district court to appoint an attorney to represent him and requested a continuance 4 days before the trial date. The district court granted both requests. For the remainder of his case, counsel represented Owens, and a jury eventually convicted Owens on February 21, 2014.

On appeal, Owens does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, nor does he claim any trial errors. Instead, for the first time on appeal, he contends that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by not continuing the trial date during the brief period of time he represented himself 13 months prior to trial. Owens argues that the district court should have granted him additional continuances so that he could have more adequately represented himself and, that by not doing so, he was deprived of his constitutional right to represent himself.

We find that the district court went to great lengths to ensure that Owens and his investigator were able to review all the documents provided by the State and that Owens did not take full advantage of some of the opportunities provided to him to review discovery. In addition, we find that Owens does not show how he was prejudiced or injured as a result of the district court's actions and that Owens' ultimate decision to request the reappointment of counsel was voluntary and stemmed from a realization that it was not in his best interests to represent himself. Thus, we affirm.

Facts

On February 20, 2011, the State charged Owens with first-degree premeditated murder of a female friend. Eventually, the State amended the charges to one count each of first-degree premeditated murder, rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and four counts of violating a protective order. Owens claimed that the victim was intoxicated and fell on several pieces of furniture while trying to walk around his apartment, causing her death. He further claimed that he and the victim had sexual intercourse during the course of the evening and he discovered her dead the next morning lying in the bed. An autopsy, however, determined that the cause of death was blunt force injuries to the victim's head and chest as well as strangulation as a contributing factor.

Two days after the State had charged Owens, the district court appointed a public defender to represent Owens. However, the public defender withdrew about a month later due to an alleged conflict, and the district court appointed another attorney to represent Owens. A few months later, the district court permitted Owens' second attorney to withdraw after it discovered that Owens had filed a disciplinary complaint against the attorney. The third appointed attorney also withdrew because of an alleged conflict. The district court appointed a fourth lawyer to represent Owens, but Owens also filed a disciplinary complaint against this attorney, so the district court permitted him to withdraw. The district court also entered an order authorizing retention of Dr. Thomas Young to serve as an expert witness on Owens' behalf. Specifically, Dr. Young rendered opinions regarding the victim's cause of death and mechanism of injury.

On May 31, 2012, the district court appointed Scott Toth-an experienced criminal defense attorney-as the fifth attorney to represent Owens. However, Owens became dissatisfied with Toth's representation as well, and Toth filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. During a hearing on the motion held on August 8, 2012, Owens told the district court that he wanted to represent himself. After the district court explained to Owens the risks of doing so, Owens reaffirmed that he wanted to represent himself. Accordingly, the district court granted Owens' request and appointed Toth to serve as standby counsel to assist Owens if needed. The parties then agreed that the trial should commence on January 7, 2013. We note that the trial had originally been set to begin on March 26 2012, but the district court had continued the date at Owens' request while he was represented by his fourth attorney.

On August 23, 2012, the district court entered an order authorizing Owens to retain Shay Legal Investigations to assist him in preparing for trial. A few weeks later, the State provided Owens with several disks containing witness interview videos, photographs, and other discovery. The State indicated that Owens might have technical difficulties viewing information on computers provided at the jail. Moreover, Toth indicated that he had provided Owens' investigator with all the discovery provided by the State.

On October 11, 2012, Owens filed a motion for additional discovery. During the hearing on the motion, the district court determined that the State did not have much of the additional material Owens was requesting and, as such, it explained to Owens that he would have to subpoena third parties to obtain some of the requested records. The district court also explained to Owens that the amended complaint and the subsequently filed motions to endorse witnesses listed all the State's witnesses. Finally, after addressing each of Owens' requests, the district court explained to Owens that if he wanted to continue the agreed-upon trial date that he would have to file a motion for a continuance explaining his reasons.

On October 31, 2012, Owens filed a motion asking the district court to continue the January trial date because he needed more time to obtain discovery, to review documents, to obtain an expert witness, to send subpoenas, and for his investigator to complete her investigation. On the same day Owens filed another motion for discovery, requesting 24 items. The State opposed the motion to continue, arguing that Owens and his investigator had sufficient time to prepare for trial.

At the hearing on the motions held on November 6, 2012, Owens stated that he needed more time because he could only communicate with others through letters and that his investigator had not responded to his request for help finding an expert witness other than the one he had previously retained. Evidently Owens was concerned about a possible issue with Dr Young's credibility. In response, the State pointed out that the case was nearly 2 years old, that it had gone to great lengths to accommodate Owens and his multiple changes in counsel, and that it had provided approximately 1, 200 pages of discovery. The State also argued that Owens could still use Dr. Young as his expert witness and that Owens would not be able to find an expert witness who would testify that the victim died by falling on furniture.

Owens claimed that he was only allowed to go to the law library at the jail "maybe twice a week for an hour" and that "[h]alf of the disks" the State had produced did not work on the jail computers. The State agreed that the computers in the jail's library might not have had the proper code for decoding the disks. When asked by the district court, Toth stated that Owens had not notified him of any technical issues he was having reviewing the disks. Nevertheless, the district court agreed to try to resolve the problem by contacting the jail to arrange for the necessary computer equipment so that Owens could play all the disks.

After reviewing several of the disks that afternoon with the parties, the district court ultimately proposed to have Owens come to the courthouse to play the disks on a compatible computer in a witness room for an extended period of time. Owens agreed that 1 day might be sufficient for him to review the necessary information. The day after the hearing, Owens reviewed the disks on a computer provided by the district court.

At the hearing, the district court also addressed Owens' motion for additional discovery. Although the State pointed out that it had already provided Owens with most of the items he requested, the parties agreed that Toth would catalog all the disks that the State had given Toth to make sure that Owens had them all. Also during the hearing, Owens stated that his court-appointed investigator was not responding to his letters, and the district court suggested that he try calling her on the phone, to which Owens responded, "I can try, I guess."

The district court held another hearing on ...

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