State v. Owens

• Decision Date: 27 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 88905–8.
• Citation: State v. Owens, 323 P.3d 1030, 180 Wash.2d 90 (Wash. 2014)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Jeramie David OWENS, Respondent.

180 Wash.2d 90

323 P.3d 1030

STATE of Washington, Petitioner,

v.Jeramie David OWENS, Respondent.

No. 88905–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

March 27, 2014.

Prosecuting Attorney Snohomish County, Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney, Seth Aaron Fine, Attorney at Law, Snohomish Co Pros Ofc, Everett, WA, for Petitioner.

Washington Appellate Project, Oliver Ross Davis, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

C. JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1This case involves whether RCW 9A.82.050(1) describes alternative means of committing first degree trafficking in stolen property, and if so, whether substantial evidence supports each of the alternative means in this case.The Court of Appeals, Division One, held that RCW 9A.82.050 describes eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed the defendant's conviction.We reverse the Court of Appeals, reinstate the conviction, and hold that RCW 9A.82.050 describes only two alternative means, and in this case, each is supported by sufficient evidence.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 On July 2, 2010, Jeramie Owens and a friend went to the Motor City car dealership in Mount Vernon, Washington, and inspected a 1967 Volkswagen (VW) Beetle with a high-performance engine and a roof rack with a surfboard on top.They took it out for a test drive, and Owens told the salesman he restored and worked on VWs and had a VW tattoo on his back.They left without purchasing the car or leaving their names.The next day, Saturday, July 3, 2010, the salesman opened the dealership and discovered that the back gate to the car lot was open and the padlock securing it had been cut off.The same 1967 VW Beetle that Owens test drove the day before had been stolen off the lot, and one of the dealer's keys was missing.

¶ 3 The next business day, Tuesday, July 6, 2010, Owens registered a 1971 VW Beetle, the registration for which had expired in 1993.On July 28, 2010, in response to a Craigslist advertisement posted by Owens, Craig Sauvageau purchased the 1971 VW Beetle from Owens.Claiming he had lost the title, Owens provided Sauvageau with an affidavit in lieu of title.Sauvageau took the car to an auto shop to have it inspected and worked on.The mechanic discovered that parts for a 1971 VW Beetle did not fit in the car and that a vehicle identification number (VIN) plate on the car (matching the VIN for the 1971 Beetle registered by Owens on July 6) appeared to be brand new and recently reinstalled with rivets.The mechanic informed Sauvageau of these discrepancies, and Sauvageau called the police to report the car as potentially stolen.

¶ 4 When the officers arrived, they identified the confidential VIN on the car.Confidential VINs are usually engraved on a car's frame in an area known only to police.This confidential VIN did not match the newly installed VIN plate, but did match the VIN for the 1967 VW Beetle reported stolen from Motor City on July 3, 2010.The vehicle was returned to Motor City, and Motor City employees noted that it was missing the roof rack and surfboard, was painted a different color, and had a different, more inferior engine than the original high-performance engine.Sauvageau was able to identify Owens from a picture lineup, and the police confirmed that Owens had a VW tattoo on his back.An officer drove by Owens's residence and observed a yellow VW Beetle with a roof rack.Another officer located another Craigslist post by Owens advertising a yellow “Baja” style VW Beetle with a high-performance engine of the same model as the high-performance engine in the stolen 1967 VW Beetle.This officer contacted Owens, posing as a potential buyer for the yellow Beetle, and set up a meeting to see the car at Owens's residence.At the meeting, Owens was arrested, and a search warrant was executed on his residence.

¶ 5 During the search, the police recovered the stolen surfboard and a rivet gun.The police also impounded the yellow Beetle, which contained an engine of the same make and model and with the same aftermarket addition as the engine from the original 1967 Beetle stolen from Motor City.¹Owens was advised of his rights and he told the police that he had test driven the 1967 Beetle at Motor City on July 2, 2010, and ultimately purchased it from someone off of Craigslist, but could provide no details regarding the purchase.

¶ 6 Owens was charged with first degree taking a motor vehicle without permission, first degree trafficking in stolen property, possession of a stolen vehicle, and bail jumping (for missing a court date).The jury was instructed that it must be unanimous as to Owens's guilt and to fill out the general verdict form.The jury convicted Owens of trafficking in stolen property, possession of a stolen vehicle, and bail jumping but acquitted him of taking a motor vehicle without permission.On appeal, Division One affirmed the possession and bail jumping convictions but held that there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of the means by which Owens could have committed trafficking in stolen property.As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed his trafficking conviction.State v. Owens, noted at 174 Wash.App. 1052, 2013 WL 4018534(2013).The State petitioned for review, which this court granted.State v. Owens,178 Wash.2d 1010, 311 P.3d 27(2013).

Analysis

a. Jury Unanimity and Alternative Means Crimes

¶ 7 Under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution, criminal defendants have a right to a unanimous jury verdict.This right may also include the right to a unanimous jury determination as to the means by which the defendant committed the crime when the defendant is charged with (and the jury is instructed on) an alternative means crime.In reviewing this type of challenge, courts apply the rule that when there is sufficient evidence to support each of the alternative means of committing the crime, express jury unanimity as to which means is not required.If, however, there is insufficient evidence to support any means, a particularized expression of jury unanimity is required.State v. Ortega–Martinez,124 Wash.2d 702, 707–08, 881 P.2d 231(1994).²Owens argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that his conviction is invalid because there was no particularized expression of jury unanimity as to the means by which he trafficked in stolen property and there was insufficient evidence supporting at least one of the alternative means.³

b. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 8 The first issue is whether RCW 9A.82.050 is an alternative means crime and, if so, what those alternative means are.This presents an issue of statutory interpretation.Generally, an alternative means crime is one by which the criminal conduct may be proved in a variety of ways.The legislature has not defined what constitutes an alternative means crime or designated which crimes are alternative means crimes.We have determined that each case must be determined on its own merits, but our few cases on the subject have established some guiding principles.

¶ 9 One guiding principle is that the use of a disjunctive “or” in a list of methods of committing the crime does not necessarily create alternative means of committing the crime.State v. Peterson,168 Wash.2d 763, 769, 770, 230 P.3d 588(2010).Another principle provides that the alternative means doctrine does not apply to mere definitional instructions; a statutory definition does not create a “means within a means.”State v. Smith,159 Wash.2d 778, 787, 154 P.3d 873(2007).

¶ 10 Both sides agree that RCW 9A.82.050 is an alternative means crime.At issue is what those alternative means are.The statute provides that

[a] person who knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of property for sale to others, or who knowingly traffics in stolen property, is guilty of trafficking in stolen property in the first degree.

RCW 9A.82.050(1).The analysis our cases have applied focuses on the different underlying acts that could constitute the same crime.In Peterson, for example, the defendant was convicted for failing to register as a sex offender.On appeal, he argued that the failure to register statute created an alternative means crime because the crime can be committed by failing to register after (1) becoming homeless, (2) moving between residences in one county, or (3) moving between counties.This court held, however, that the statute did not create alternative means because an individual's conduct in each of the three scenarios did not vary significantly; the statute prohibited the single act of moving without providing the proper notice.Peterson,168 Wash.2d at 770, 230 P.3d 588.Thus, alternative means should be distinguished based on how varied the actions are that could constitute the crime.

¶ 11The Court of Appeals here held that RCW 9A.82.050(1) describes eight alternative means: “knowingly (1) initiating, (2) organizing, (3) planning, (4) financing, (5) directing, (6) managing, or (7) supervising the theft of property for sale to others, or (8) knowingly trafficking in stolen property.”Owens, noted at 174 Wash.App. 1052, 2013 WL 4018534, at *2.

¶ 12 In contrast, Division Two of the Court of Appeals recently decided State v. Lindsey,177 Wash.App. 233, 311 P.3d 61(2013).In Lindsey,the defendant challenged his conviction for trafficking in stolen property, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support all eight alternative means of committing the crime.Analyzing the statuteas a whole, the court held that RCW 9A.82.050(1) describes only two alternative means of trafficking in stolen property.Lindsey,177 Wash.App. at 241, 311 P.3d 61.

[T]he placement and repetition of the word “knowingly” suggests that the legislature intended two means.The first “knowingly” clearly relates to all seven terms in the first part of the statute...